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Abstract 
For almost a decade, there was a commodity super-cycle (2002- 2011) that supplied 
many mineral-rich economies with rents for growth and development. However, on 
Africa’s account, the impact of such rents on growth has been mixed, with the market 
economic system taking a fair share of the blame. Due to market inefficiencies and the 
decoupling of growth from the environment, the concept of sustainable development 
(SD) emerged as the cure for the ills of the market system. In this light, the 
fundamental question of enquiry in the thesis was to dissect the linkages between the 
SD concept and mining in Africa, i.e., to what extent is mining and SD linked in 
resource-rich African (RRA) countries, when mineral resources are non-renewable, 
physically unsustainable, and the concept of extraction opposes the idea of 
sustainability? 
In dissecting the concept of SD, its definitions and applications to mining were 
interrogated, firstly teasing from literature the challenges of SD, and using a 
sustainability assessment framework methodology to devise indicators to measure SD 
at the national level, vis-à-vis the current interpretation. Four gold producing countries 
(Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and South Africa) were measured 
against the indicators to determine progress, and whether the ‘Mining, Minerals and 
Sustainable Development’ interpretation of SD for mining remains appropriate. The 
findings in the four countries showed that the balancing component’s definition is 
challenging for true sustainability to be realised. In this bid, the conclusions to the 
national level assessment pointed to situating optimal mining within the broader view 
of SD and its inter-linkages. Thus, here, sustainable economic development (SED) 
was forged as a pivotal goal for optimising SD and mining in RRA economies.  
Further assessment of what SED means resulted in the development of the ‘Investment 
Framework for Resource-rich Africa’s Development’ (IFRAD) Strategy as a pathway 
vi 
 
for Africa’s growth. The IFRAD Strategy consists of a five-step process of: aligning 
development frameworks; understanding the resource potential of a country; types of 
mining investments; building critical mining sector linkages; and managing 
investment options for the future. These are fundamental for net equitable distribution 
of benefits and realising the goal of SED and growth of RRA economies.  
The four countries (Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and South 
Africa) were further evaluated on the IFRAD process with specific lessons and 
recommendations to determine an implementation plan in realising the Strategy in 
each country. For mineral economies, a key lesson was re-calibrating mining policies 
with development and industrial policies, while ensuring that all key sectors are well- 
coordinated within an industrial policy framework. All in all, the contribution to 
knowledge is IFRAD’s holistic approach, which ensures that the enabling 
environment for policy and requirements for mineral development are enhanced for 
sustainable economic development. The IFRAD process further provides a tool for the 
measurement of SED, and pathways for net equitable distribution of benefits from 
mineral wealth. This would be impactful for the management of rents by governments 
taking into consideration especially the compliance of the broader minerals industry 
in mining policy implementation.   
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Chapter 1  
Mining and Sustainable Development in Mineral Economies: The Quest for a 
Growth ‘Strategy’ in Africa 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
There is undeniable proof of mining’s contribution to the economic and social 
development of countries. However, over the decades, it has been observed that 
economies which are abundant in natural resources have realised decreased growth 
and performed marginally on economic development metrics in comparison to 
countries that are resource poor (Auty, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 1995). The reasons 
to account for this low growth are both structural and dependent on the political 
economic dynamics of the resource-rich State in question (Auty, 2001). 
In Africa specifically, the evidence to support the proof of mining’s contribution to 
sustainable development (SD) remains mixed with the impacts of the so-called 
‘Resource Curse’ (RC)0F1 dampening efforts at development. The prospects of mining’s 
contribution seem dim in light of the RC. Thus, the Thesis takes a different view that 
an optimal conceptualisation of SD for Resource-rich African (RRA) countries can 
lead to a transformation of mining’s contributions to economies in Africa and thereby 
gradually reduce the effects of the RC on mineral economies.  
The Thesis comes at a watershed moment for proponents of SD. Its focus on SD arises 
from the fact that, as a discourse, SD has become the yardstick to assess all forms of 
                                                   
1 In terms of the economic reasons for the RC, one of the arguments suggests that the rise in mineral exports 
leads to a real appreciation in the value of a country’s exchange rates, which makes it easier for countries to 
import or spend on foreign commodities. This ‘spending’ effect results in a shift of labour and capital from the 
manufacturing sector to the mining and non-tradable sector; thus, weakening the countries terms of trade in 
manufactured goods and eventually economic growth in periods of downturn (Isham, 2005). 
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development at the project, national, regional and global levels; hence the move to 
define SD goals post-2015 development agenda. Furthermore, if the perceived and 
real impacts from mining have a major influence on SD’s geographical manifestations; 
how should developing mining countries appropriate and implement the concept of 
SD in their jurisdictions?  
In light of the above arguments, the purpose of the Thesis is to revisit the meaning of 
SD in mining; to deconstruct the concept and how best it fits into the framework of 
the market system. The contribution to knowledge and importance of this Thesis is the 
development of a ‘Strategy’ for sustainable economic development of mineral 
economies that is measurable and provides for net equitable distribution of benefits so 
that all can be better off. This would be impactful for the management of rents by 
governments and taking into consideration especially the compliance of the broader 
minerals industry.  
This introductory Chapter focuses on some of the seminal studies that account for 
economic growth and development, narrowly placing emphasis on the historical trends 
of policy application amongst RRA countries. More questions are raised rather than 
answered to guide the formulation of the research objectives and aims in the latter part 
of the Chapter.  
1.2 Shortcomings of Neo-Liberalism, Economic Theories and Why 
Sustainable Development 
The section provides an overview of economic theories and its associated challenges 
to better situate the arguments for SD. It considers the shift to neo-liberalism and why 
growth has not been exceptional under the current market system.  
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1.2.1 Economic Growth Theories and Development Policies in Africa 
The starting point for this assessment is from the classical and neo-classical schools 
of thought. 1F2,2F3 Here, the view of ‘economic growth’ is precedent on the quantity of 
goods and services produced by a nation over time. It suggests that given a certain 
amount of labour, at a certain level of production, wages will be paid and the ‘capital 
surplus’ which remains will then accumulate to the capitalist. This type of capital is 
further re-invested in the production cycle to increase output over time. This, often 
termed ‘capital factor accumulation’ 3F4,  has been argued by some to be a myopic view 
of production due to its non-recognition of technology as a key factor in the production 
function (see Todaro and Smith, 2011, for an account of growth theories). 
Ghatak (1995) criticised the factor accumulation thesis because of its simplistic lens 
in viewing the nature of development in developing countries. His rationale was that 
it did not consider other complex factors such as culture, attitudes and traditions, 
which are the underlying social structures that influence developing economies in the 
short and long run (Ibid: p. 51).  
To refine this view, later growth models drew emphasis on capital formation through 
savings, investment and trade, and labour productivity as pertinent for economic 
                                                   
2The literature survey does not consider the former arguments by the physiocrats and French schools of 
economic thought since largely what has become common place has been an extension and reformation of 
the classical approach as pioneered by Adam Smith (1776), David Ricardo (1817), Rev. Robert Malthus (1820) 
and John Stuart Mill (1849).  
3 In summary, Adam Smith’s Thesis- ‘wealth of nations’ which sets the tone for the other classical economists 
like Ricardo, Mill and Malthus is about how economic growth can happen when nations focus their attention 
on manufacturing with little government intervention, or allowing the interplay of the invisible hand of the 
market to allocate the factors of production- land, labour and capital (See Smith, 1776). Although, some of 
Smith’s arguments have been disregarded over time, some have been completely accurate. As can be 
witnessed from trends of world growth, economies that diversified away from primary commodities such as 
China, Thailand, India and ‘the east Asian miracles’ have witnessed exceptional growth. However, it is Smith’s 
second observation, which is less debated that is most applicable to many developing countries. He contends 
that for subsistence economies such as in Africa, the applications ‘of the import of manufacturing’ remains 
short since the capacity to generate such outputs in raising innovation and ingenuity is severely limited. This 
argument is still critical for the ‘economic development’ debate in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
4 Capital factor accumulation in simple terms is the process of accumulating capital or stocking of wealth to 
enhance growth and productivity. In all economic models, it is believed that the more capital one accumulates 
the richer a nation becomes. 
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growth (see for instance Cobb-Douglas production function; Harrod and Domar 
model; Dual-sector theory by Lewis and Solow’s growth theory) 4F5. Because of these 
models, aid and loan financing to developing countries were justified. In support of 
this view, Solow (1956) purported that the biggest constraint to development was 
capital, hence the need to provide financing that would cause a ‘big push’ to stir 
productivity in developing economies (see also Acemoglu, 2009; Busch, 1968).6  
The majority of economic planning and policies implemented post- 1960s were 
implemented based on the theoretical assumptions within the neo-classical school of 
thought. There have been several studies utilising empirical evidence and analyses, 
which pinpoint the challenge of neo-classical models to adequately tackle the 
imperfections of the market system and prescribe the real causes that shape growth in 
African countries (Clarke, 2012; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Donaldson, 2005; Easterly, 
2006). In the next section, the researcher assesses economic development policy 
choices by governments in RRA countries, starting from 1980-until now.  
1.2.2 Reforms Post-1980s in Resource-rich African Countries 
Prior to the neo-liberal reforms in the 1980s, there were falling growth rates and 
currencies, expanding public debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio and 
declining economies under the nationalism era (Akabzaa, 2009). The World Bank’s 
Strategy on mining in 1992 purported that for RRA countries to reverse the decline in 
their mining sectors, they had to follow the path of institutional and economic reforms 
to increase foreign direct investments (FDIs) as per the recommendations made by the 
                                                   
5 See Cobb and Douglas (1928); Harrod (1939); Lewis (1980); Solow (1956). 
6 Although, the argument on aid may have been justified in Africa, it may also have contributed to the 
corruption and weakened accountability of many developing States and in some cases resulting in the RC 
(see Moyo, 2011).  
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Berg (1981) Report. Early reformers such as: Ghana, Uganda, Zambia and later 
Tanzania for example came aboard the process of economic recovery, commonly 
referred to as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).  
According to Kirkpatrick and Weiss (1995), the SAP was contoured on exchange rate 
devaluation combined with expenditure switching, tax reductions, and reduction of 
public expenditure in developing economies. Within a decade after the reforms, the 
majority of the reformers did not experience exponential growth as touted by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (UNCTAD, 2011; World Bank, 1992). 
Heidhues and Obare (2011) explore some of the lessons of SAPs and their effect on 
Africa. They conclude that in many countries, the SAPs implementation was devoid 
of good governance and the quality institutions which were needed to support the 
nature of the market system. As a result, although FDIs in the mining sector increased 
in some of the early reformer countries, it did not improve general output or gross 
national income (GNI) significantly in most of the countries referred to – nor 
anywhere else, until after 2000s (World Bank, 2013; Heidhues and Obare, 2011).  
From 2002, there was a rise in GDP per capita and GNI of developing African 
countries, which have been attributed to the market system’s reforms, i.e. the SAP, 
and the rise in global demand for metallic and non-metallic minerals from China and 
India (see Salinas et al., 2011 on an extensive review of economic reforms in Africa; 
and the Economic Commission for Africa- African Union Commission- ECA-AU, 
2011 report on mining and Africa’s development).  
Figure 1.1 represents a stylisation of the facts of GDP per capita, gold and copper 
prices to illustrate the impact of mineral resources on GDP growth in three mineral 
economies- Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia. A timeline of the two main economic 
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systems is also included in the graph to highlight periods where growth was high in 
the three countries.  
 
Figure 1.1: GDP, Gold and Copper Prices for Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia (1950- 
2015) 
Source: Maddison Project Database (2018) and World Bank (2016), World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database 
A critical assessment of some of the elements of growth post-2002 according to the 
ECA (2013) shows that the current increase in growth trends is also heavily influenced 
by mineral rents (Ibid, Economic Report of Africa, p. 20- 30). As such, Africa’s 
growth trajectory although linked to market reforms is also highly inter-dependent on 
the rise in mineral prices. Refer to the trends of GDP, gold and copper prices from 
(2002- 2015) of Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia in Figure 1.1.  
According to Bannon and Collier (2003) and Rosser (2009, 2006), mineral wealth 
should translate to increased growth and development because it enables the 
converting of mining revenues into other forms of capital and assets. In most parts of 
Africa however, mineral wealth has not had significant impact on development with 
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non-resource rich countries having a higher aggregate human development index 
(HDI) than resource-rich (non-oil) producing countries. Figure 1.2 compares GNI and 
HDI of resource-rich (non-oil) producers with (non) resource-rich countries. The 
trends show a higher GNI for resource-rich countries, which may correlate with 
mineral rents than for non-resource rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
Moreover, aggregate HDI values for non-resource-rich countries are significantly 
higher than resource-rich (non-oil) producers.6F7    
 
Figure 1.2: Compares GNI (current US$) and HDI of Resource-rich and (non) 
Resource-rich Countries in SSA (1990- 2015) 
Sources: Word Bank (2016); UNDP (2016) 
On balance, (non) resource-rich countries in Africa did grow but growth was not 
phenomenal; also, economic growth has not trickled down as much as the theory of 
the market suggests.7F8 In summary, high volatility of mineral prices may lead to 
                                                   
7 The resource classification was grouped into resource-rich (non-oil) producers and non-resource rich 
countries. The classification of countries is based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012 definition 
of a resource rich country. The country must be developing and must be either a low income or lower-middle 
income country with at least 20% of revenue from mineral resources or revenue of total fiscal revenue and 
exports (see Annex 1.1). 
8 The argument on whether growth is good for the poor or that growth trickles down to the average poor 
person is highly contested. What resonates from the economic literature (Tungodden et al., 2004; Dollar and 
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significant output volatility and adversely impact overall macroeconomic 
performance, which in most cases as some have argued, undermines institutions and 
growth (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009).  
Assertively, claims can be made that policies under neo-liberalism have not yielded 
significant growth in the African region despite the increased output of minerals and 
its positive correlation with growth (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). The move to pro-poor 
policies through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in the 2000s showed 
the weaknesses of the neo-liberal model (under the SAP), and also attested to the 
growing consensus that although, logically, mineral wealth increases GDP 
contributions, the kinds of policy mix and the motivation by leadership and 
governance are critical for growth (ECA-AU, 2011; UNCTAD, 2009).  
Additionally, the type of extractive seeking institutions and the leverage of elitism (in 
the context of the political economy of the State) affect whether mineral wealth would 
benefit the citizenry and develop a country (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002, 2012; 
Isham, 2005; Mendes et al., 2014). Why have policies of past economic systems failed 
to yield significant growth in the African region? Moreover, since Africa is mineral-
rich, can optimal mining be pioneered as a catalyst for transferring mineral wealth to 
growth and equitable development through a sustaining system and strategy? 
1.2.3 Market Reforms and the Concept of Sustainable Development 
Agreeably, market reforms have had some positive impact on certain economies with 
evolving forms of state capitalism in countries such as: Singapore, China, India, South 
Korea, etc. This has thus reinforced the favourability of the market system in 
                                                   
Kraay, 2002), and especially many World Bank reports is that growth generally is good for the poor; however, 
slow growth does not necessarily reduce poverty and in some cases worsens the fate of the poor. Since many 
countries in SSA have witnessed slow and declining growth; it is logical to conclude that growth has not 
trickled down as much. 
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maximising welfares, i.e. depending on the mix of various policies under the market 
approach (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). However, generally, it has been acknowledged 
that the system fails to allocate resources equitably, correct for market failures, and in 
many cases, extends social and economic inequalities (Chang, 2002; Ferguson, 1994; 
Stiglitz, 2013). It is imperative then to ask whether such a system can sustain the 
agenda to accumulate based on a largely unregulated global macroeconomic 
orthodoxy for sustained growth and a green revolution?  
In the 1980s when the emphasis was on growth fuelled by neo-liberal orthodoxy, the 
over-exploitation of capital from natural (and specifically mineral) resources led to 
calls for stricter environmental governance, and later the concept of sustainability. The 
earlier works of Robert Heilbroner and Adolph Lowe in the 1970s showed the 
importance of the ‘economic environmental nexus’ in the analysis of the process of 
economics and its systems, coupled with the famous ‘limits to growth’ report by 
(Meadows et al., 1972).  
Meadows et al. (1972) affirmed the nexus and concluded using computer simulations 
of world population, industrialization, pollution, food production and resource 
depletion that the current economic system of exploitation is unsustainable “unless 
there were substantial rapid reductions in consumptive behaviour, in combination with 
technological progress” (Turner, 2008: p 38). Responses to curb the unsustainable 
ways of capitalist production, and the impact on the biosphere led to the development 
of the concept of SD to deal with the inefficiencies of the market system.  
SD emerged as a solution to bring sanity to the limits and the inability of growth to 
transcend to tangible development outcomes. However, the popularity of the term did 
in no way guarantee a smoothening and general acceptance of its interpretation 
(Sanwal, 2003). The reason was initially because of its non-theoretical foundations, 
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and the moral injunction it placed on society, to transition it, into an applicable and 
robust concept with economic merit. Overtime, its acceptability moved beyond the 
definitional issues and its lack of theoretical core, to how the concept can be 
transitioned into tangible outcomes9. There are however well-founded criticisms for 
some of the interpretations of SD which are discussed extensively in relation to Africa 
in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. Since the post 2000s have become 
intellectually accepting of the concept, the ‘murmurs of disenchantment’ as used by 
(Lele, 1991) has faded, with a shifting view of the need to integrate the systems of the 
economics, environment and social, and to effectively preserve inter and intra-
generational equity in their share of natural resources. 
1.3 The Development of Sustainable Development 
The first global governance responses to the unsustainable concerns of the growth-
centred approach of the market system included: the 1972 United Nation’s Conference 
on Human Environment (UNCHE); the World Conservation Strategy (WCS) 
(International Union for Conservation of Nature- IUCN, 1980)8F10 and the 1987 World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). The WCED’s key argument 
was that the pursuance of economic gains for development has led to the eroding of 
environmental resources to levels that the planet and its people could not bear for too 
long (see earlier arguments by Meadows et al., 1972).  
                                                   
9 See for instance, Pearce and Atkinson (1997); Beckerman (1994); Pearce (1994); and Lele (1991).   
10 The beginning pages of the IUCN (1980) report illustrates a diagram of three arrows within a thin circle (see 
IUCN, 1980; cover page). Annex 1.2 shows the diagram with the three arrows. The diagram on the cover page 
summed up the aims of the Strategy which were: maintenance of essential ecological processes and life-
support systems; preservation of genetic diversity; and sustainable utilisation of species and ecosystems. It 
also suggested the effects of man’s activities were disastrous on the thin circle of the bio-sphere (Ibid). Thus, 
man’s activities had to be constrained, and come to terms with the reality of resource limitation and the 
earth’s carrying capacity. However, although the Strategy built a compelling case for preservation and 
conservatism, it failed to address the pertinent question of how economic growth could be achieved within 
the earth’s limited resources. 
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In the pursuit of development that is sustainable, the Commission postulated that a 
‘win-win’ situation could be achieved for industries concerned with energy and raw 
materials, if the economics of their activities is integrated with the curtailment of its 
adverse environmental impacts (WCED, 1987). This balanced solution albeit from an 
environmental perspective gave birth to the concept of SD. The late 1990s and early 
2000s witnessed a shift in the debate on ‘sustainability’ or SD11 from the primary drive 
of environmental protection to ways in which economic growth can be integrated with 
environmental and social concerns (see WCED, 1987). 
In adapting the concept of SD and its principles in mining, it has been noted that SD 
encompasses improvement in the well-being of human life and the protection of the 
environment (Rankin, 2011). However, this also does not mean entirely that the 
economics of the project must be compromised since it is the ‘surplus’ that would 
enable the sustainability of the other elements, i.e. environmental and social 
dimensions; nor is it to justify that mining should be irresponsible about the 
environment in which it takes place. The point is not for multi-national corporations 
(MNCs) or shareholders and owners of capital to profit but for there to be a fair balance 
of profit amongst stakeholders, and enough economic rents left to counteract the 
negative externalities from mining (Cawood, 2011; Di Boscio, 2010). 
1.3.1 Mining and Sustainability 
Since the concept of sustainability evolved from the camp of the ecologist, is mining 
‘sustainable’ in a natural resource-constrained world where the act of mining opposes 
the core tenet of environmental sustainability, which is preservation? 10F12  Some schools 
                                                   
11 The two terms are used interchangeably throughout the Thesis. 
12 See Rankin (2011) on SD and mining. 
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of thought have argued that ‘sustainability and mining’ depends largely on how one 
views the finite nature of mineral resources (Rankin, 2011; Tilton, 2003).  
Tilton (2006; 2003) asserted that to answer the question of mining’s sustainability, it 
is imperative to look at the nature of resource ‘depletion’. Tilton (2003) provided two 
fundamental frameworks for assessment of the threat of mineral depletion in the 
context of the sustainability of mining, i.e. using the fixed stock or the opportunity 
cost paradigms.13 Tilton and Lagos (2007) also argued that the fixed stock paradigm 
is not indicative of resource availability since it connotes the finite nature of resources 
and hence a deterrent to the concept of sustainability.  
Gordon et al. (2007)12F14 concluded that economic scarcity of minerals (under the 
proponents of the opportunity cost paradigm) presented a favourable alternative of 
mining’s sustainability since technological innovations in the minerals industry has 
the propensity to increase reserves and stocks of minerals unlike using the fixed stock 
paradigm (also in Tilton 2003).  
Cowell et al. (1999); Hilson and Murck (2000); and Howitt (1992) theorised that SD 
is possible if the industry makes changes to incorporate (or internalise) environmental 
and social concerns into mining’s core business set-up.15 Employing the case of 
Comalco Mining Company, Howitt (1992) purported that it was possible for the 
                                                   
13 The fixed stock paradigm suggests the finite nature of ore bodies i.e. a given quantity is available in the 
earth’s crust and hence can be physically exhausted. The opportunity cost paradigm proposes price and the 
opportunity cost of using the resource as a better determinant of depletion (or in terms of economic scarcity).     
14 Gordon et al. (2006) aligned themselves with the fixed stock paradigm and have contended that because 
of the finite nature of minerals, technologies should be geared to the recycling, re-use of minerals and 
substitutes.  
15 Hilson and Murck (2000) offer guidelines for mining companies interested in improving the sustainability of 
their operations. They recommended that Companies should improve planning and environmental 
management; use cleaner technologies; increase stakeholder participation; form partnerships and as well 
improve the training of mine personal in order to work towards improved SD goals.   
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mining company (in their assessment) to transition from the pure traditional economic 
approach to eco-efficiency and make economic gains.  
Conversely, other commentators such as Crowson (2001) have strongly advocated that 
sustainability in mining before true profitability is deleterious for the mining industry. 
According to Crowson (2001), one must factor the different dimension effects of cost 
in relation to the global, regional, and the type of mine in determining economic rents, 
followed by sustainability considerations. Further analysis by Memary et al. (2012) 
on sustainability in mining to an extent supports some of the assertions by Crowson 
(2001). The authors analysed the copper and smelting industry in Australia in the past 
70 years and concluded that despite tighter environmental regulations (towards carbon 
dioxide emissions), and declining ore grades, with improved and newer technologies, 
economic gains (or economic rents) had dissipated in some aspects of the value chain. 
Therefore, it can be said that improvements in one dimension of SD can erode the 
gains made in another dimension (Giurco and Cooper, 2012). 
1.3.2 Sustainable Development in Industries 
In sustainability, there are two positions of seeing ecological preservation- the position 
of strong sustainability and that of weak sustainability16. The distinguishing factor 
between the two positions is the ‘substitution or substitutability of capital’. Strong 
sustainability is premised on the fact that natural capital or mineral resources must not 
be substituted but must remain intact since extraction would lead to eventual depletion. 
Whilst weak sustainability, which has a neoclassical economics approach considers 
natural resources as immutable and is transferred from one state to another, such as 
                                                   
16According to Pearce (1994), measuring SD depends on whether you belong to the camp of weak 
sustainability or strong sustainability. Weak sustainability asserts an indifference to the form in which natural 
capital is passed so far as it remains constant or is no less than what existed before; the latter asserts that 
critical natural capital should remain intact and must not be allowed to decline.   
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from ‘minerals’ which is a basic natural capital to for instance manufactured and 
financial capital.  
Forum for the future, in viewing SD in this context, argued that the five capitals 
framework17 “is the best way to manage these capital assets in the long-term, since it 
represents a dynamic process through which organisations can begin to achieve a 
balance between their environmental, social and economic activities” (Forum for the 
future, 2007: p.2). Furthermore, within each of the five capitals, there are 12 features 
of what a sustainable society should be and thus projects by various industries can be 
evaluated based on the features identified. It achieves this by firstly designing its own 
SD frameworks based on the identified 12 features, and secondly assesses whether 
they are sustainable or not. Hence, the model posits a ‘win win’ strategy for industries 
(Forum for the future, 2007).  
The shortcoming of this model is that it assumes as given governance or leadership, 
which falls under ‘human capital’ to be benevolent in making appropriate investments 
in the various capitals. This is however subjective to the type of leadership or tied to 
the broader governance regime that exists. In a practical sense, an extrapolation of the 
model to the national level in mineral economies would be problematic since the 
element of good governance (and leadership) in mineral development is vital in 
achieving the objectives and goals of SD (IIED-MMSD, 2002; Collier; 2007, Cawood, 
2009)18. Poignantly so, without the governance and effective regulatory frameworks 
                                                   
17 This approach was contextualised into the ‘five capitals’ model from the works of Paul Ekins (1992) and 
Jonathan Porrit (1997; 2000). The model posits that all organisations use five types of capital to deliver their 
products or services. These include: natural capital, human capital, social capital, manufactured capital and 
financial capital. In the model, capital is transitioned from one form to another. Natural and human capitals 
are the two sources of wealth in which manufactured and financial capitals can be derived (Porrit, 2005). 
Thus, in this model capital is inherently never destroyed. The economic view of sustainability proposes that 
consumption of natural capital must always be lower than investments by society and economy into the 
other types of capital.  
18 Cawood (2009) contends that for countries such as South Africa which he used as a case study in his Thesis, 
to pursue a sustainable path for growth, optimal mineral development had to be implemented. However, it 
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to support the complex and conflicting concerns in mineral economies towards a 
sustainable path, optimal mineral development remains elusive for RRA countries.  
On the global scale, there have been many international principles, initiatives and 
codes of ethics aimed at SD outcomes or goals of poverty reduction, environmental 
sustainability, sustainable consumption and production in both developed and 
developing country contexts. The application of some of the international standards 
and SD initiatives are usually administered from a top-down approach and may not be 
in sync with the interests of mineral economies or not specific to the nation or the 
developing region’s context.19 An example of this is how CSR frameworks are 
implemented by mining companies in Africa without recourse to local guidelines 
because in most instances, adequate frameworks that monitor implementation are 
usually non-existent. This often leads to haphazard and mis-aligned frameworks, 
which are driven by the different mining company’s objectives and strategies (Di 
Boscio, 2010). Hence, there is a need to re-strategise mining initiatives and identify 
better indices that address the context and uniqueness of the mining industry, and 
where mines are located. 
All things considered, it’s widely acknowledged that the physical nature of mining 
makes it an unsustainable activity (Rankin, 2011; Whitmore, 2006). Rankin's (2011) 
book on ‘Minerals, Metals and Sustainability’ clearly affirms the fears of the industry 
which is that mining is unsustainable and the two words ‘sustainable mining’ are an 
oxymoron at best (see also Whitmore, 2006). However, this is largely dependent on 
                                                   
must be steered by the governance ‘structures’ that exist in country. He asserts that optimal mineral 
development should comprise of both optimal extraction techniques in mining to optimally maximise 
benefits, as well as the optimal use of the goods and services extracted for social and environmental equity. 
19 See Chamaret et al. (2007) on ‘top down/ bottom up approach for developing sustainable development 
indicators for mining: application to the Arlit Uranium Mines (Niger)’. More so, the recent Rio+20 conference 
which was held in June 2012 acknowledged this aspect of SD and the need to devise indicators and targets 
that specific to the real needs of recipient nations (see United Nations, 2015c).   
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which view one ascribes to, i.e. whether the fixed cost or opportunity cost paradigm 
and the geographical perspective of the advocator.  
To conclude, in many instances, the use of profit or economic rents from mining in the 
long-run can benefit both current and future generations, and enable the determination 
of whether mining is sustainable, as an economic activity (together with the discovery 
of alternate substitutes) or not. Because of the unique context of mineral economies in 
Africa, the priority of poverty reduction and growth requires a weak sustainability 
approach and a ‘dimensions’ view specific to the regional, local and national levels be 
used to direct the course of sustainability in mining. The strategic role therefore of 
governments in realising this becomes fundamental if mining is to be a sustainable 
activity. The Thesis expands on this in Chapter Three. 
1.4 Research Problem 
This section defines the policy problem and research questions that guide the Thesis 
in light of the discussions on economic theories, mining and SD. Despite natural 
resource abundance, many RRA countries have not closed the infrastructure gap and 
continue to have large development and growth needs. The fundamentals of the 
production function as laid out by Adam Smith and later modelled by Cobb and 
Douglas 1420  are clear on how nations can grow, i.e. through the reinvestment of surplus 
value. However, there are also endogenous factors, such as innovation, human capital 
and investment in education and culture  that must be factored, when steering the 
political economic discourse of RRA States (see Ghatak, 1995; Schumpeter, 1934). 
Therefore, it can be stated that the shortcomings of the market system and its reforms 
                                                   
20 The Cobb-Douglas model explains the relationship between inputs, i.e., capital, labour and total factor 
productivity. It suggests that impact on the inputs in an economy affect the relevant yields or growth (see 
Cobb and Douglas, 1928). Although the model has been refined in later years, it remains one of the 
fundamental arguments to explain the production function in firms and at the macroeconomic level in 
economics.   
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may be absolved of having failed so long as RRA countries have not re-strategised 
and adapted the market system to their unique context (see discussions in Chapter 
Two). 
Specifically, on mining, due to the interconnection between global and national mining 
environment, when countries do not have the wherewithal to implement resilient 
macroeconomic policies, such countries tend to lose out. The needed actions like 
effective governance, strong fiscal discipline and administration of fiscal policies are 
pre-conditions to ensure the long-term sustainability of mineral rents and to address 
the manifestation of the RC. As such, the Thesis recognises the research problem in 
RRA countries as originating from two strands, (1) insufficient understanding of 
mining and SD at the microeconomic level, and (2) the unique constraints or 
challenges of optimising a national level SD Strategy for mineral economies in Africa.  
On the first point, the size of the profit at the microeconomic level is influenced by 
who has more to lose and what each stakeholder might receive at the end of the 
project’s life-cycle. Also, governments are seldom astute about using a life-cycle 
approach to rent capture and in utilising their share of profit to create a self-sustaining 
mineral wealth for increasing growth and development.  
In terms of the second strand, acknowledging the problem at the macroeconomic level 
involves managing resource wealth using key fiscal discipline and investment 
frameworks to foster growth. Since the mining industry has significant multiplier 
effects on the whole economy, building critical SD linkages with other sectors and 
with macro-fiscal instruments can lay the foundation for sustainability of mining in 
RRA countries (see Holland, 2014; Leeuw, 2012). In this regard, there would be firmer 
and more structured macroeconomic fiscal discipline which is important for mining 
leading to sustainable development.  
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Accordingly, RRA countries should consider the effective interaction between the 
economics and governance structures of their economies, which speak to both SD and 
not just mining, but achieving optimality in their mining processes. This has yet to be 
pursued in the mining and SD literature. However, before that can be realised, the 
fundamentals of the current neo-liberal agenda (market system) must be re-interpreted 
to developing RRA countries’ contexts and their unique characteristics.  
Generally, it can be stated that the current translation of SD in mining in Africa has 
been fraught with challenges (International Institute for Sustainable Development- 
IISD, 2011; ECA, 2012). However, at all costs growth and development must go ‘hand 
in hand’ if RRA countries are to make inroads into poverty reduction and development 
with the progressive use of mineral rents. Thus, intuitively, reinterpreting mining, 
which is optimal is fundamental to driving the goals of SD in mineral economies. 
‘Optimal’ mining or optimal mineral development (used interchangeably) simply 
means ensuring the longevity and profitability of mining from exploration to closure 
and de-commissioning while concurrently investing mineral rents for optimal use and 
the sustainable economic development of extractive States.15F21 This approach identifies 
that one of the core problems of (mining and sustainability) stems from a lack of 
understanding that firstly, rent generation and capture happen at the microeconomic 
level, hence there is need for effective management of the expectations of all 
stakeholders involved in the mineral production function, followed by rent 
management towards greater accountability.  
Considering the above arguments, the research contends that the current interpretation 
of SD requires more thought in the African context to ensure profitability and long-
term sustainability of mining. Thus, the key research questions intended to be 
                                                   
21 Both ‘optimal’ mining and sustainable economic development concepts are explored extensively in Chapter 
Five of this Thesis.  
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answered are (1) to what extent optimal mining and SD are linked in resource-rich 
African countries since mineral resources are non-renewable and physically 
unsustainable? (2) Can the current market system be refined towards a sustainable 
path for optimal mining in resource-rich developing countries? 
1.5 Aims and Objectives 
The research’s main objective is to interrogate the concept of SD and its applications 
within Africa’s mining industry and economies. It aims towards the development of a 
‘Strategy’ that is efficient and provides a better measure for SD and optimal mining in 
Africa.  
The following specific objectives are expected to be achieved: 
I. Assess how the concept of SD is being operationalised and what are the 
challenges in mining jurisdictions; 
II. Within the ambit of the case study method of analyses, develop measurable SD 
indicators, which take cognisance of the geo-political manifestation of 
sustainability, and attempt to measure the balancing act of SD at the national 
level through an SD Index for mining in Africa;  
III. Based on the manifestations of SD in sub-objective (II), analyse what is optimal 
mining in the context of SD and develop a national Strategy for sustainable 
economic development that would be essential for growth and distribution of 
net equitable benefits; 
IV. Utilising the Strategy (as a framework), assess the applicability of the Strategy 
in gold mining economies in Africa. 
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1.6 Research Methodology and Data Collection Methods  
In order to achieve the research objectives, the under-listed are pursued:  
➢ A review of both primary and secondary literature taking into consideration 
data on SD, mining and the environment, and economic theory and economic 
systems that have dominated the political economy of resource-rich countries.  
➢ A mixed methodology of qualitative and quantitative research techniques is 
employed to address the research problem. Here, interdisciplinary approaches 
are employed to help to reduce in-built biases such as spectrum, distinction and 
exclusion, which are common with the case study method of assessment.  
The second part of the methodology focused on the development of the Composite 
Indicator or Index (CI). The method is based on ordinal rankings and aggregation 
around global and national indexes and national level assessment of SD and mining 
instruments in four selected countries. The methodology for the CI development and 
selection of countries are discussed in Chapter Four. The CI used the traditional 
conceptualisation of equal weights for the measurement of SD. There has been sparse 
research on aggregated measurements to interrogate how the concept of sustainability 
is interpreted. Although, some of the methodological assumptions may not necessarily 
be proven, it may provide some insights into the state of whether true sustainability 
(as currently interpreted by industry) is realisable for RRA economies and to what 
extent countries can follow an SD path.  
The methodology behind the SD index is discussed with a java-based modelling 
software called IFCAD to generate SD triangles for the four countries. The IFCAD 
software is used to graph the scores on SD in the case study countries. Data gathered 
for the study are from numerous sources, including data from the World Bank, IMF, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), African Development Bank (AfDB), United 
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Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), African Union (AU), other 
international institutions, and national reports of the country case studies selected for 
the assessment. Majority of the sources have been itemized in Annexes 4.3- 4.5.  
1.7 Research Design: Mapping the Conceptual Framework 
The outline of the conceptual framework which guided the entire Thesis is illustrated 
from Chapters One to Nine in Figures 1.3 and 1.4. The descriptions and motivation 
which guided each Chapter follows in Section 1.8. 
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Figure 1.3: Outline of the Conceptual Framework and Research Design (Part A) 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2016) 
Conceptual Framework for the Thesis 
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Figure 1.4: Outline of the Conceptual Framework and Research Design (Part B) 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2016) 
Devising the SED Strategy Implementing the Strategy 
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
The Thesis is organised into nine chapters with a summary provided on each chapter 
below: 
Chapter One: Mining and Sustainable Development in Mineral Economies: The 
Quest for a Growth ‘Strategy’ in Africa 
This introductory Chapter assesses the general context of economics and SD in RRA 
countries. It identifies the overall problem of inadequate growth to meet Africa’s 
development needs. It also provides the purpose, the scope, methodology, aims and 
objectives of the research, and the rationale for a revised view of SD for RRA 
countries. Its major thrust is for a ‘Strategy’ to ensure the growth and development of 
mineral-rich gold producing countries in Africa. 
Chapter Two: Economic Systems and Elements for a Refined Strategy for 
Resource-Rich African Countries 
This describes the three main economic systems- traditional, command-socialist and 
the market, and how the latter two have been influential in determining the choice of 
economic policies in RRA countries. It outlines key features that are still fundamental 
for the effective functioning of any self-sustaining system. These features are also 
crucial in defining a ‘Strategy’ for RRA countries. 
Chapter Three: Sustainable Development and ‘Issues’ in Mining 
This Chapter situates the current discourse of sustainable development in Africa and 
narrows the spectrum down to the context of its applicability to gold producing 
countries in Africa. To what extent have SD principles been imbibed in policy 
implementation and what have been the outcomes of SD in mining in Africa? 
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Chapter Four: Measuring Sustainable Development at the National Level  
The four countries’ (The Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Tanzania and South 
Africa) SD approach to mining are discussed in light of an indicators’ framework for 
measuring SD. The aim is to draw practical lessons on how SD has been implemented 
and the challenges faced by countries in achieving the balancing act within the SD 
systems. Its conclusions lead to the need for understanding how optimal mineral 
development is crucial for developing RRA countries.   
Chapter Five: Optimal Mining and Sustainable Development- Establishing the 
Link for Growth and Development  
This Chapter takes into account the deficit in economic sustainability in mining, 
introduces and rationalises Sustainable Economic Development (SED) by discussing 
the challenges of SD in Africa. The concept of optimal mining is also introduced and 
hinges on rent generation, capture and management. The fundamentals within the 
three aspects of optimal mining are explicated. The next step in the Chapter draws on 
the linkages between the concept of optimal mining and SD. It suggests that the 
‘bridge’ between the two concepts is SED vis-à-vis how to adequately garner and use 
mineral rents. It finally argues for the need for an SED Strategy hedged on investments 
at the national level for the growth of RRA countries. 
Chapter Six: An Optimal Investment Strategy for Resource-Rich African 
Countries’ Growth and Development  
This Chapter develops the ‘Investment Framework for Resource-rich Africa’s 
Development’ (IFRAD) Strategy for the SED of RRA countries in light of current 
process considerations and requirements. The national Strategy is inter-dependent on 
relevant international investment principles and policy instruments aimed at 
supporting RRA economies’ sovereignties and the ‘right to development’ using 
mineral resources. The Chapter further narrows in on the ‘first’ part of the Strategy, 
which is the policy perspective and framework for Africa’s growth and development.  
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Chapter Seven: Implementation Plan for the IFRAD Strategy in Mineral 
Economies in Africa 
The Chapter presents the ‘second’ part of the Strategy, which is the requirements (or 
success factors) for transitioning the Strategy. A ‘how to guide’ (or plan) on 
implementing the IFRAD Strategy based on a country’s level of mineral development 
is also presented. This is discussed together with policy objectives and instruments for 
realising SED within each process of the IFRAD Strategy. SED is crucial for RRA 
countries’ growth; however, certain pre-conditions and success factors are 
fundamental for the effective implementation of the Strategy.  
Chapter Eight: An Evaluation of the IFRAD Strategy in the Case Study 
Countries 
In Chapter Eight, the framework devised in Chapter Six, and the requirements in 
Chapter Seven are used to evaluate the IFRAD Strategy in the four gold producing 
countries. It discusses in brief lessons and the schematics for applying IFRAD for 
emerging, semi-matured and matured gold mining economies in Africa. The 
implications from the assessments are discussed and specific recommendations in 
which the Strategy can be implemented by each country are highlighted. In 
concluding, some recommendations on improving the mineral investment 
environment in Africa at the national and regional levels are highlighted.   
Chapter Nine: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This gives a general summary of the Chapters. It discusses key conclusions and gives 
recommendations for further research to advance the view of SED for RRA countries’ 
growth and development. The development of the IFRAD Strategy for SED as the first 
process means that future research in the area would have to consider a second level 
investment Strategy for the extractive sector at the microeconomic level for the mining 
industry. This will close the loop in the process of SED for mineral economies in 
Africa.  
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1.9 The Scope and Limitations of the Research 
The scope of this research covers resource-rich African countries that are into the 
production of the ‘strategic mineral’ gold. The preference for choosing countries 
producing ‘gold’ over non-metallic and or oil producing countries is because of the 
influence that petro-dollars have on economic growth, which often creates a false 
impression of the stability of an economy.  
Furthermore, gold plays a significant role in most economies and remains a significant 
contributor to foreign exchange earnings and as a store of value. Despite the recent 
decline in gold prices (post- 2008), gold has remained a vital component of the rural 
economic development of mineral economies, in addition to other minerals such as 
diamonds, manganese, platinum-group metals, bauxite, industrial and other rare 
minerals. Additionally, the selection of gold is based on its unpredictability of 
earnings/rents, which influence the development structure of RRA economies by 
making growth highly volatile. Thus, what are the challenges of SD in gold mining 
countries and how can the concept be appropriated to facilitate the holistic 
development of RRA countries?  
In selecting gold producers in Africa for the assessment, the following criteria were 
employed:  
➢ Resource richness in gold and levels of gold production; 
➢ The Fraser Institute’s (FI) mineral potential: best versus current practices;   
➢ Performance on social, economic, environmental and governance indexes, 
consisting of the human development index (HDI), gross capital formation (for 
economic diversification), environmental performance index (EPI), and the 
worldwide governance indicators (WGI) respectively. 
The highlighted criteria led to the selection of: Ghana, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Tanzania and South Africa for the case study analysis. For the purposes of this 
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Thesis, Tanzania and the United Republic of Tanzania are used interchangeably, since 
it refers to the same country. The selected countries represent distinct stages or levels 
of emerging, semi-matured to matured mineral economies in Africa. To cover the 
distinct levels of mineral development, only four countries were considered due to the 
extent of the analysis of the Strategy and its implementation in Chapter Eight. The 
justification and methodology for the selection of the countries are provided in Chapter 
Four; the classification based on the levels of mineral development, i.e. emerging, 
semi-matured and matured are discussed in Chapter Seven as part of the 
implementation process of the Strategy. 
In terms of limitations, the Thesis recognises that the nature of this undertaking is very 
sensitive since it connotes the challenge of resource-rich African countries to capture 
mineral rents for long-term growth. A major limitation was proving that SD in the 
mining industry has been sub-optimal. This was because the data and literature to lay 
claim to some of the facts (in terms of its depth and breadth) were limited (scanty and 
unavailable). Furthermore, information sources with regards to assessing indicators 
for quantifying environmental damage and pollution in most RRA countries were not 
readily available in certain instances (with exceptions to South Africa and to an extent 
Ghana). Even for these countries, current data was limited and not readily available. 
As such, the Thesis relied on some global measures of relevance to the African context 
in assessing sustainability.  
Another limitation is the generalisation of the findings since four countries were 
understudied for the assessment. Nonetheless, because the Strategy discussed in this 
Thesis considered the distinct levels of mineral development, future research can aim 
for replication by understanding the context, tweaking and identifying where in the 
process of the Strategy that countries fit, and tailor to their unique context.  
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1.10 Conclusion 
The Chapter presented the background to this Thesis. It canvassed the research 
methodology and design, structure, scope and limitations of the Thesis. In terms of the 
review of the literature, it discussed some of the challenges of economic policy 
implementation in RRA States, and the recent SD discourse. The Chapter posited that 
effective interactions between ‘economics’ and ‘governance’ are critical to the growth 
of RRA economies. However, beyond the governance element, the current market 
economic system’s lack of capacities has also hindered growth ends, coupled with 
implementation deficiencies in human capital and lack of innovation in RRA 
countries. It concluded with the realisation that SD as a discourse would have to be 
refined to the needs of RRA countries albeit from an optimal mining perspective. 
Because the Chapter pointed to the fallibilities of the market system, the next Chapter 
reviews current economic systems to identify whether the market system has merit for 
mineral economies, and what elements or features can be integrated with some of the 
goals of SD in the development of a ‘Strategy’ for RRA economies. 
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Chapter 2  
Economic Systems and Elements for a Refined Strategy for Resource-Rich 
African Countries  
“For my part I think capitalism, wisely managed, can probably be made more efficient for 
attaining economic ends than any alternative system yet in sight, but that in itself is in many ways 
extremely objectionable” (John Maynard Keynes, 1931: p.321). 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The rationale for this Chapter is to assess the merits and demerits of economic systems 
and which of the systems have merit for RRA countries’ development. Some simple 
criteria for measuring sustainability or ‘longevity’ in this case is explored and used to 
make comparisons of economic systems and which is the most effective for Africa. 
Toward the concluding sections, the Chapter justifies why the shift to neo-liberalism 
under the market system has been lauded by policy-makers and suggests ways for 
improving the system for optimal mining and the growth of RRA countries.  
2.2 Characteristics of a ‘Good’ Economic System 
As a starting point, it is important to mention that SSA has been party to three main 
types of economic systems, i.e. the socialist or command, traditional, and capitalist or 
the market.16F22 Of the three systems, studies have confirmed that the adoption of the neo-
liberal agenda (under capitalism) from the 1980s until now continue to shape Africa’s 
state of affairs (Austin, 2010; Heldring and Robinson, 2012; Settles, 1996). This is 
despite the fact that implementation has been complex with the convolution of mixed 
                                                   
22 Heilbroner (n.d); Reynolds (2005); Schnitzer (1999) and others have identified varying types and hybrids 
such as between the market and socialism; and extreme forms of socialism and the market termed 
‘communism’ and ‘laissez faire’ respectively. Also, there are several types of market economic systems with 
varying degrees of influence of socialism as practiced in some developed countries like the United States, 
Britain and Canada. 
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subsistence and traditional ways, imprints of colonial legacies and survivalist 
tendencies (Clarke, 2012). However, to get an overarching view of the nature of 
economic systems and influences, the Chapter considers the three systems and some of 
the hybrids, such as the Islamic economic system and the variations of the mixed 
socialist and capitalist economic systems.    
According to Grossman (1974), an economic system is a “functionally related set of 
institutions tasked to accomplish a set of goals or purpose which usually reflects the 
desired outcome or (output) of the collective whole in an economy based on an 
established set of principles” (Ibid: p. 5). It is the combination of institutional forces in 
making decisions on the distribution and allocation of scarce resources in an economy. 
Implicit in the theory of economic systems, is the notion that the various components 
such as the [economic units, agents and institutions] interconnect and interact with a 
certain degree of consistency and coherency toward a desired outcome (Grossman, 
1974: Chapter 1; Eckstein, 1971).  
In Grossman’s (1974) comparative analysis of economic systems, he contextualised the 
evolutionary, adaptability and sustainability essentials for a good system by suggesting 
ten performance criteria for defining the paramount or best system. From his 
assessment, the following criteria of: plenty, growth, stability, security, efficiency, 
equity and justice, freedoms, protection of the environment, sovereignty and value 
systems were pre-requisite for an effective system (Ibid, p. 3- 14). A sound balance 
between the criteria in any system can enhance its adaptability to a changing world 
context.   
Since Africa’s growth path has been linked to a paradigm shift in economic systems 
and an increase in mineral rents during the last two decades, the next section would 
comparatively analyse the three general economic systems of traditional, command- 
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socialist and the market as identified by Heilbroner (2011; 1999; 1994; n.d.) and 
Reynolds (2005) in the context of its institutional arrangements. Here, what is 
considered are the forms; principles; advantages and disadvantages and its 
sustainability in current economic dispensations.  
2.3 Comparative Analysis of Selected Economic Systems 
This section contains a qualitative analysis of the merits and demerits of the three 
general economic systems in the world. The sub-Saharan African region has 
implemented three types (socialism and capitalism) with the traditional system being 
inherent in the socio-cultural ways of being. In addition, the hybrid systems such as the 
Islamic Economic System and the mixed economic systems are discussed in light of 
what should constitute a good economic system for RRA countries.  
2.3.1 The Traditional Economic System 
The oldest system to further the progress of development has been the traditional 
system. As the name suggests, it typifies an economic system that is shaped or 
characterised by rules and ideologies, which is part or inherent in the norms of societies. 
The institutional arrangements set in this type of system are informal and through 
repeated use of certain solutions to the economic problem of ‘resource allocation’, it 
becomes adapted into the way of doing things overtime (Reynolds, 2005). Reynolds 
(2005) makes a succinct point which exemplifies the nature of this type of system. He 
asserts that:  
“Traditional economies tend to depend upon a deontological ethic. Duties to other 
members of the family, tribe or clan and reciprocity are the primary allocative 
mechanisms. The forms of production that individuals engage in are based on the 
processes that have worked in the past. Social institutions such as religion may 
evolve to reinforce the traditional ways” (Ibid: p. 68).   
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In this type of economic system as is being postulated by Reynolds (2005), the forms 
and principles are informed by the primary element of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘duty’. Since 
the form and principles are based on the accepted notions, which are determined by the 
type of society, as such, there is no universal or predetermined structure to this system. 
Rather, reciprocity is the commonality in all traditional systems. Thus, Heilbroner 
(1999) has contended that as a result of obligation, a person is bound to follow in the 
suit of his predecessors’ profession.  
Observably, this type of system, although having been mixed with the command and 
market systems, is quite common to a certain degree in many parts of the developing 
world, especially in Africa and Asia (Reynolds, 2005). In Africa, traditional systems 
and cultural obligations are endemic which explain why the capitalist system may not 
have fully transitioned. This is in part due to the traditional and social institutions which 
shape the political economic dynamics of resource-rich States in Africa (see Clarke, 
2012).  
The major advantage of this system is the sense of community and belongingness which 
benefit all in the society. Its drive is propelled by a ‘moral incentive’ on the part of 
everyone to promote an attitude of goodwill towards one another. However, such a 
system becomes stifled when there is a need for expansion of society since it cannot 
adapt or respond quickly to dramatic changes in technology and the environment 
(Heilbroner, 1999). The sustainability of this system therefore becomes compromised 
when efficiency in terms of output is needed to allocate resources, over duty and 
reciprocity to serve the ‘interest’ of growing populations.   
2.3.2 The Market Economic System 
The market system which grew out of the feudal system from the 12th to the 15th century 
in England and France has been one of the most influential systems of economics in 
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modern economic dispensations (Wallerstein, 1976: Chapter 1; Allis, 2008; Heilbroner, 
1999).17F23 This system is organised such that decision-making by individuals determines 
the allocation of the factors of production or resources. Putting the institutional 
arrangements in capitalism in context- they hinge on private property; profit motive or 
incentive; price mechanism; freedom of enterprise; competition; individualism; the 
protestant work ethic, and limited government intervention, i.e. depending on the type 
or the form of government control (Schnitzer, 1999).  
According to Loucks and Hoot (1943), capitalism can be defined as “a system of 
economic organisation, which is featured by private ownership and use of private profit 
of man-made and nature-made capital” (Ibid; p.35). Two major principles under ‘the 
market’ can be traced: (1) self-interest propelled by the institution of competition and 
(2) surplus value, which is contingent on a re-investment of profit for the creation of 
more surplus value (Ibid). However, in interpreting the ‘market system’, it is difficult 
to draw a line between its economic institutions and principles since they work hand in 
hand to define the system (Heilbroner, 1999). 
Merits of capitalism are that it is self-regulating and allows for the creation of surplus 
value and accumulation of wealth, hence, leading to a corresponding and general rise 
in living standards. It is through the accumulation of surplus value and the profit 
motive, which is reinvested in new forms of capital, new technologies and research and 
development (R & D) that allows the capitalist mode of production to be ‘more’ 
efficient than the two other systems- command-socialist and traditional (Loucks and 
Hoot, 1943; Grossman, 1974; Schnitzer, 1999).  
Heilbroner (1999) observed that it is the lure of gain, and not the whip of authority, that 
steers the economy in the capitalist system.  The instruments of the market system are 
                                                   
23 See Loucks and Hoot (1943) and Wallerstein (1976) for a detailed account of the ‘market system’. 
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its factors, such as land, labour and capital, which act as the 'agents' of production, with 
land being owned by landowners, who receive rent; labour being provided by workers, 
who receive wages; and capital being controlled by capitalists, who receive profits. 
Entrepreneurs are the agents of change and democracy permits such change (Ibid).  
Conversely, one key disadvantage is that it fails to allocate resources equitably because 
most economic resources are privately owned, and a laissez-faire type of government 
extenuates social and economic inequalities. Other demerits arise from poor allocation 
of property rights, which tends to create a class structure and eventually class struggle 
as argued by Marx (1867). Karl Marx contended that inherently, capitalism which is 
self-regulating is unsustainable without government intervention and contains within 
itself the possibility to self-destruct (Ibid).  
Heilbroner (1999), in discussing Ricardo’s (1817) thoughts on political economy of the 
market, also observed that landlords forever receive unearned rents, workers work for 
a wage and are forever condemned to subsistence. Thence, the capitalists run the show 
for profits and forever run the risk of losing savings.  
The industrial revolution and colonialism further exposed the weaknesses of the market 
system. Capitalism has undoubtedly negative impacts on individuals because the 
system does not address poverty problems. It is also a thriving platform for a class 
system and a negative impact on the biosphere and the environment; hence the clarion 
call for equity and environmental protection as a core developmental objective 
(Grossman, 1974; Heilbroner, 1970; Reynolds, 1971; WCED, 1987).  
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2.3.3 The Socialist Economic System 
The meaning and distinction between what is socialism, communism and command 
have been contested in the literature18F24. The theory suggests that socialism emerged out 
of a combination of capitalism's economic failures and the oppressive nature of the 
class system. Many commentators questioned the equity of the market system and 
started to promote a more socialist approach, e.g. some thoughts on the matter included: 
➢ Landlords are parasites - Ricardo (1700s); 
➢ Expanding economic output by State planning, where the scientist and engineer 
had to play key roles - De Saint-Simon (1760 - 1825); 
➢ For a good society, a minimum income must be guaranteed to all - Fourier 
(1772 - 1837); and 
➢ Laissez-faire policies result in unemployment and misery for a large part of the 
population - Sismondi (1773 - 1842). 
 
Mill’s (1806 - 1873) insight at the time was remarkable. He predicted a phased 
transition from capitalism to socialism, namely: 
➢ Stage 1 - Benign socialism, where mankind turns its energies to serious matters 
(justice and liberty as part of economic growth); 
➢ Stage 2 - State would prevent landlords from reaping unearned benefits (by 
limiting ownership powers and taxes); 
➢ Stage 3 - Worker associations will change the relations between enterprise 
organisations and workmen (by the formation and strengthening of unions and 
using numbers as a competitive advantage); and  
➢ Stage 4 - Workers will 'win the day' causing capitalism to gradually disappear. 
 
Applying some of Mill’s (1849) assertions to Africa almost two centuries later, it is 
still startling because of its relevance. Two obvious questions arise from it, that is: (1) 
is this what is happening in current dispensations? and (2) are some parts of Africa in 
the early stages of Mills’ Stages 3 and 4?  
                                                   
24 See Kornai (1992), ‘The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism’; Schnitzer (1999) for an 
extensive account of the command-socialist systems. 
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The early commentators set the scene for Karl Marx, who gave structure to socialist 
thinking. Marx (1867) expressed the following views: 
➢ Capitalism and private property were evil; 
➢ Socialism and State production were good; 
➢ Mankind's goodness must prevail over greed; 
➢ Capitalism is inherently unstable and would self-destruct; 
➢ Capitalism is morally wrong as a social structure; and 
➢ Capitalism will eventually be replaced by communism. 
    
 Marx died in 1883; however, his economic theories are still widely studied. He created 
an international working-class movement by not proposing a sustainable economic 
system, but by focusing on the weaknesses of capitalism with statements like capitalism 
has a "...vampire thirst for the living blood of labour..." and capitalism came into the 
world "...dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt..." Heilbroner 
(1999), quoting Marx. 
Socialism principles rely on (utopian) optimism on the good of all mankind with no 
self-interest, resentment of the class system and a humanist approach to economics. 
This meant a cure to the social ills of capitalism (Heilbroner, 1999).  
Merits of socialism include the ease to develop and implement new policies; possibility 
to alleviate unemployment and poverty problems; and perfect socialism allows for a 
just distribution of wealth. Demerits of socialism is that it is incompatible with the 
freedom of the individual and socialism can only work in a human-less model since 
economic freedom of non-interference is needed to achieve efficiency for economic 
growth. Socialism embraces the same governance challenges as capitalism, such as, it 
does not address associated poverty-related issues, but attempts to correct distribution 
of wealth. It is therefore unsustainable as was evidenced by the fall of communism in 
late 1900s, and the many failures in Africa between 1950s and 1990s. It is like a utopian 
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dream applied to economics. The next section considers the hybrid forms of socialism 
and capitalism, and traditional economic and religious belief systems. The point of 
these discussions is to glean elements of what should constitute a good system. This is 
achieved in the final sub-section 2.5.1.  
2.3.4 Hybrid Systems 
Rosser and Rosser (1998) discussed other forms of evolving economic systems tied to 
traditional religions with modern technology. Per the authors, traditional socio-cultural 
systems and religions such as Islam and neo-Confucius are evolving as emerging 
traditional economic systems (Ibid). However, due to the nature of economic systems 
in general and its relevance to Africa, the assessment considers Islamic economic 
system and the mixed socialist and capitalist systems.  
Socialist-Market and Market-Socialist Economic Systems have gained ascendancy 
in most noticeably China and the Nordic States. Like most former socialist States, the 
mixed system of China (socialist-market) is run by the principles and blue print laid 
out in “Das Kapital” by Marx (1867). The arrangements of the system are similar to 
the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), which is premised on authoritarian rule, 
coupled with terror to restrict economic freedoms, mobilise resources (through land 
seizures) and to devote large capital shares for capital formation. This is achieved 
through a highly centralised administrative structure which implemented ‘five-year 
plans’ dictated by the head of government. China has currently implemented nine of 
the five-year plans and in 1992 shifted to formally integrate the market economic 
system into its economic structure. In an article by China through a lens (n.d.), it was 
stated that the main aspects of the market reform were to build on the shortcomings of 
the socialist era by encouraging private ownership, economic diversification of 
businesses, the establishment of an open economy for unrestricted trade in goods and 
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services, and to promote the effective distribution and allocation of resources. On the 
other hand, the Nordic countries’ (i.e. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
etc.) form of social democracy within a capitalist State also show type of (market- 
socialist) system. Here the ‘invisible hand’ operates unhindered. However, in areas of 
healthcare, education and its labour force, the State intervenes by providing social 
incentives such as subsidies for free health care and education for some classes of 
citizens. Provision is also made for strong ‘worker’ rights to help lower-waged workers 
and the unemployed. Re-distribution of income of all sorts is achieved through high 
taxes on middle to upper income earners to pay for the social interventions.  
Islamic Economic System reflects some aspects of capitalist and socialist systems but 
predicated on principles of the Islamic faith. This is common practice in Pakistan, 
United Arab Emirates and majority of the States in the Middle-East.  
Per Chaudhry (1999), the Islamic economic system is premised on the following five 
pillars:  
➢ Discrimination between Halal (permitted things being lawful) and Haram 
(forbidden things being unlawful); 
➢ Equitable distribution of wealth through Zakat, Sadaqat and laws of inheritance 
(social justice); 
➢ Provision of basic-necessities of life for every citizen (social security); 
➢ Prohibition of hoarding of wealth and promotion of its circulation in productive 
channels; and  
➢ Elimination of interest (Ibid, Chapter 18). 
The basis of this economic system is on the abolition of interest (Reba or ‘no interest’) 
within its banking and financial system. If fully implemented based on the principles 
in the Qur’an, some of the advantages may include providing social justice, social 
security system, and ensuring that every citizen would obtain a fair share of the national 
wealth. To solve the problem of ‘no’ interest, the Sadaqat (voluntary giving of a portion 
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of one’s wealth to the State) and Zakat (alms to the poor) provide a means of capital 
accumulation and redistribution, which are needed for the sustainability of the system 
(Chaudhry, 1999). A disadvantage of the Islamic economic system is that, individuals 
and small private sector enterprises are discouraged from seeking profit in business 
ventures as is the case in the socialist system. The Qur’an encourages cooperative 
societies and joint stock companies to start business ventures for the good of the broader 
society where all can be party to sharing of the accumulated benefits or profits (Ibid).   
In summary on the hybrid systems, the mixed systems provide an appeal to RRA 
countries since it addresses the weaknesses of the capitalist and socialist systems. This, 
it achieves by redefining the principles to solve the weaknesses of each system to ensure 
stability, security and justice. Additionally, the Islamic economic system does provide 
another path but because of the challenge of ‘no interest’ (Reba), it will mean that 
countries accept the Islamic Faith and the practice of Sadakat and Zakat for the system 
to be self-sustaining. The Islamic economic system’s model presents another path, 
which countries will not implement holistically because it relies on the Islamic belief 
systems; likewise, countries such as, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and others 
forgoing the system and applying the hybrid models of capitalism and socialism is not 
realistic. Matters of faith, which has been entrenched as a system cannot be easily 
replaced with new systems in the case of the Islamic countries. Nevertheless, in terms 
of RRA countries, elements within the hybrid system, which best suit Africa’s unique 
context can be co-opted to enhance the current economic system in RRA countries as 
well as countries considering other alternatives to economic growth.  
2.4 Why Capitalism (Market System) as the ‘Best’ Alternative? 
The demerits of socialism have been acknowledged above, coupled with the challenges 
of the market forces in the allocation of resources under capitalism. As a result, calling 
41 
 
for renewed approaches to viewing economic systems may have to be considered in the 
context of RRA countries. To achieve this, the section analyzes which is the best 
between the market and the socialist systems. The ten (10) performance criteria defined 
by Grossman (1974) noted in section 2.2 is used as the criteria to assess the market and 
socialist systems in terms of forms, principles and the institutional contexts. This is 
done because of the predominance and historical applications of the two in SSA.  
Table 2.1 compares the two systems using Grossman’s ten performance criteria. The 
objective is to identify, which of the two is a better economic system and provides 
greater incentives for economic growth.  
Table 2.1: Applying the Grossman Criteria- Market System versus Socialist System 
Criteria Market System Socialist System 
Plenty 
The profit motive drives this system and 
constantly needs to accumulate capital for the 
system to be self-sustaining. 
Profit is motivated by the State. Thus, the pace 
for plenty is driven by the State. 
Growth 
Growth in the market system is gradual after 
re-organisation of its fundamental institutions 
for increased growth. 
Growth is directed by State. Growth is higher 
than the market system in the initial period 
and begins to wane due to challenges with 
allocative efficiency.  
Stability 
Stable but subject to business and financial 
fluctuations, often leading to regular crises 
(every 20- 30 years). 
Perceived stability since ultimately government 
allocations may cover up instability. 
Security 
Less secure than the socialist system since self-
interest motivates the need to make profit 
under this system. 
More security under this system since 
government/State monitors economic agents.  
Efficiency 
Premised on the ‘invisible hand’ allocating 
resources within an economy. Thus, it is more 
economically efficient than the socialist 
system. 
It’s less efficient as a system than the market 
because government’s allocation of resources 
is not left to the invisible hand.  
Equity and Justice 
Inequities and inequalities in incomes and 
wealth distribution are offshoot of capitalism. 
Pure capitalism extenuates poverty.   
The fairness of the system is determined by 
the State officials. However, due to the system 
of fearmongering and rewarding of whistle-
blowers, justice may not be served in many 
cases. 
This is determined by rule of law but there are 
underlying institutions that are pre-requisites 
for social justices. However, when they are 
weak, social justice becomes compromised. 
The institutions for social justice under the 
socialist system are predicated on pre-defined 
rules and laws. Then again social justice is 
precedent on the benevolence of the 
government or State.  
Freedoms 
Individuals have the right to the market 
mechanism to determine the distribution and 
allocation of goods and services. 
There is little freedom of thought and 
expression of views since the State determines 
all allocation and distribution of resources for 
the common good of society. 
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Environmental 
Protection 
Left to the invisible hand of the market. More 
recently the passing of environmental 
legislations to govern environmental assets has 
become the norm. 
The degree and extent of environmental 
protection are decided by the State but in 
concomitance with national objectives and 
availability of budgets. 
Sovereignty 
State steers resource allocation in the case of 
social goods but mostly the ‘invisible hand’ 
does the allocation of resources. 
The State is the ultimate power and decides 
the developmental objective for the nation; as 
well as how resources are distributed.   
Value system 
Individualism, profit-motive, self-interest, 
decision-making is left to economic agents, etc. 
State control; fear-mongering; self-interest is 
discouraged, etc.  
Source: Researcher’s Analysis (2016) 
Against the criteria (refer to Table 2.1), the market system provides more incentives 
for growth, efficiency and freedom of enterprise unlike the socialist system. That said, 
the success of the socialist system is also dependent on the nature of the benevolent 
State or leader of the State in stimulating efforts towards growth. However, variants of 
socialism as was practiced in the USSR and communist China showed that collective 
ownership and the distribution of productive assets resulted in tyrannical and 
authoritarian leaders who suppressed the views of the collective (Schnitzer, 1999). 
Under the market system (and pure capitalism), the invisible hand of the market 
removes such elements but is weakened by the self-interest and greed of individuals, 
who monopolize the power of the capitalist, and disadvantages the weak and poor in 
capitalist economies (see some of the noted weaknesses of capitalism in Table 2.1). 
Nevertheless, commentators such as Baumol et al. (2008); Clark (2015); Crotty (2001) 
contend that despite its flaws, capitalism fuels entrepreneurship, competition and 
innovation, which are the critical components to enhance productivity growth in an 
economy. If one uses real GDP (as an indicator) for productivity, growth in incomes in 
the past three centuries have proven robust in typical capitalist countries such as Great 
Britain, Netherlands, Italy, United States and Canada over purely socialist States. 
Figure 2.1 shows the real GDP per capita between key capitalist nations and the 
combined of the countries that were part of the former USSR.  
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Figure 2.1: Real GDP Per Capita- Capitalist versus Socialist Countries 
Source: Maddison Project Database (2018) 
*Total former USSR countries consist of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
**Data could only be obtained from 1960s for the former USSR countries to 2016. 
From Figure 2.1, there is a divergence in real growth per capita from 1980s for the 
former USSR countries, whereas growth rises for key capitalist countries dominated by 
the United States. Many reasons have accounted for this divergence, such as: 
demotivated State institutions, fear-mongering and the lack of the profit motive drive, 
which inhibits the drive to innovate (Reynolds, 2005). In the context of capitalism, it 
must be emphasised that the different variants and the dominant elements in each to a 
certain degree drives growth. To each variant of capitalism, some of the merits may be 
present in varying degrees to fuel growth. In the case of the United States, 
entrepreneurship coupled with private property rights, rule of law and competition have 
fuelled innovation unlike in some countries like modern China, where a state directed 
capitalism (or socialist-market) system perpetuates different kinds of incentives to fuel 
growth (see Baumol et al., 2008).  
Even in the case of Russia, some have argued that the unpreparedness after the fall of 
the communist era in the 1990s created windows of opportunity for oligarchies to be 
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created, which does not mean that an offshoot of capitalism is the creation of oligarchs. 
Oligarchic capitalism as noted by Baumol et al. (2008) is incentivised by corrupt 
leaders who prey on the masses to preserve their income and wealth; thus, in such 
societies, inequality and informality remain rife. According to Baumol et al., (2008), 
for good capitalism to enhance economic growth, there is need for (1) an 
entrepreneurial economy, (2) institutions, i.e. rule of law, private property, (3) 
government institutions, which correct the failings of the system, (4) incentives for 
entrepreneurs to innovate. Baumol et al. (2008) further acknowledged that:   
A small set of entrepreneurs may come up with the “next big things,” but few if any 
of them would be brought to market unless the new products, services, or methods 
of production were refined to the point where they could be sold in the market place 
at prices such that large numbers of people or firms could buy them. It is that key 
insight that led us to the conclusion that the best form of “good capitalism” is a 
blend of “entrepreneurial” and “big-firm” capitalism, although the precise mix 
will vary from country to country, depending on a combination of cultural and 
historical characteristics (Ibid, p. ix).  
From Table 2.1, there are some merits of the socialist system, however the market 
system from the above discussions show promise as the best alternative. The early 
1990s saw a global ideological shift to the market system as a more sustainable solution 
for enhancing growth because of the prosperity of early capitalists such as the United 
States, Great Britain and others (see Figure 2.1). Furthermore, reforms under the 
market and the new evolving forms of State capitalism in some emerging developed 
countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, etc. have proven the market 
system’s agenda (albeit mixed) as a favourable alternative for maximising welfares. 
This is despite the periodic financial crises, which the market system is prone to. The 
next part of the Chapter considers the key arguments and concludes on the market 
system as a favourable alternative with some recommendations.   
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2.5 Capitalism as a Viable System for Resource-Rich African Countries  
Beyond the performance criteria and the arguments presented in Section 2.4, the shift 
from the socialist incentive (from the 1960s) to the market system (post-1980s) can be 
attributed to the fallibilities of a controlled ‘State’ system, which crippled many 
countries in Eastern Europe and some parts of Africa in the past. This led for example, 
to the disbandment of the USSR in 1991 and a re-orientation of socialist thinking to an 
opened economy in the 1980s and 1990s for many Africa countries. This paradigm 
shift, although debatable led to a moderate rise in GDP per capita for some countries, 
(with about 7% average growth rate in the last decade for a few countries) after the 
implementation of the SAP in 1980s.9F25 Refer to Figure 1.1: GDP, Gold and Copper 
Prices for Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia (in Chapter One), which traced three RRA 
countries growth paths from 1950 to 2015.  
Opponents of the market system have argued that empirical evidence of global 
performance during the onset of the neo-liberalist revolution has not led to dramatic 
positive outcomes since global growth and the rate of capital accumulation have been 
slow (Bakir and Campbell, 2009).20F26 Inequality has increased with productivity growth 
having deteriorated over the years (Brenner, 1999; Crotty, 2017; Crotty, 2001; and 
Weisbrot et al., 2006). It is also known for a fact that inequality and poverty are 
symptomatic of pure capitalism (Chang, 2011).  
Even beyond this, there are also some of the inherent contradictions within the ‘market 
system’ that make firm the question asked earlier (in Chapter One), whether the system 
can sustain the agenda to accumulate especially at the global level, without creating 
masked inequalities and unemployment (see Marx, 1867; Bakir and Campbell, 2009; 
                                                   
25 This was also discussed in Chapter One. Although, the shift led to rise in GDP growth, it was also pointed 
that mineral rents may have contributed significantly to growth in RRA economies. 
26 Bakir and Campbell (2009: p. 2-6) show in their paper a divergence between the rate of profit and the rate 
of capital accumulation post-2000. They conclude from their empirical analysis that the rate of capital 
accumulation under neoliberalism followed a slow decline after 1979-80 and has yet to recover. 
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Winternitz, 1949: p. 1-16 and discussions in Chapter One). In the final analysis, the 
answer lies not in condemning the system, but the opportunity it presents in correcting 
the failings within the market system during times of crises. As noted in the earlier 
discussions, capitalism is constantly evolving, and the shortcomings provide 
governments an opportunity to ‘steer’ and minimise the negative symptoms of pure 
capitalism.   
Ultimately, because there are no suitable alternatives that can concurrently cause 
income growth and capital accumulation to facilitate global economic growth and 
development, the capitalist market system is the expected key mechanism for the 
distribution of wealth. This is despite its internal contradictions and shortcomings 
(Chang, 2011). Baumol et al. (2008) rationalised this point by asserting that 
entrepreneurial and innovative forms of capitalism must work in tandem with big-firm 
capitalism to stimulate late growth in developing economies. Capitalists "save" part of 
their profits for investment not because their "propensity to consume" is lacking; as 
capitalists, the probability of continuing their profitable business and ability to stand 
up against competitors depend on the amount of capital they command (Brenner, 1999). 
Therefore, accumulation of capital and not maximisation of luxury consumption is the 
driving force of the capitalist production- hence - its accomplished success of fostering 
competition and increasing capital for growth of national outputs in some countries.  
2.5.1 Refining the Market System for Resource-Rich African 
Countries  
With the market system being the most appropriate thus far, can the market system’s 
imperfections be re-engineered towards a sustainable path for optimal mining in 
resource-rich developing countries? The researcher opines that inherently, for the 
system to be efficient, it must be refined and work in tandem in achieving progressive 
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growth contingent on the national development objectives of African States. Since most 
countries are resource-rich in Africa, then the objectives and strategies must be centred 
on a mineral-led approach engineered by the market economic system.     
Arguably, the economics of globalisation under the market has yet to institute global 
macroeconomic structures and institutions which can transparently and resiliently deal 
with the inflow of capital and capital accumulation (across regions) without recurrent 
financial crises (Bakir and Campbell, 2009). These apparent gaps between neo-liberal 
theory and global practice especially for the current patterns of capital spending and 
savings, and usually evident in north-north relations have led to a culture of personal 
enrichment (Chang, 2011). This is at the expense of many non-hegemonic developing 
African countries that are in dire need of productive capital to grow. Therefore, any 
attempts at reassessing the market economic system for RRA countries would have to 
bear in mind some of the characteristics of a pragmatically compromised existing 
‘neoliberal’ agenda.  
Nonetheless, the review of the history of economic systems, including the hybrid 
systems identified that some of the characteristics are still relevant for a refined view 
or Strategy for the market system utilizing a humanist approach. These features must 
be able to bear up (or be sustainable) in the long term as well as control for the outcomes 
of the nexus between the economy and the environment. The following sketch of some 
of the market’s, socialist’s and hybrid’s characteristics and features which are essential 
for a refined approach of the market are enumerated below:  
➢ a robustly defined private property rights; 
➢ an interventionist State or government;  
➢ a clearly defined economic criterion, (i.e. optimality versus sustainability, and/ 
or allocative efficiency versus technical efficiency) to govern the country; 
➢ innovation to drive entrepreneurs to compete; 
➢ social and public investments to build productive capital; 
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➢ positive incentives to boost effective demand and supply;  
➢ social safety nets for social goods such as healthcare, education and 
employment;  
➢ righteousness and the principle of reciprocity; and 
➢ inclusive institutions that would ensure that the set national objectives of the 
State are met. 
These identified features would have to be incorporated in any view of a system which 
must facilitate growth in RRA countries. The research further opines that devising a 
refined Strategy for RRA countries (bearing in mind the above elements), while taking 
into consideration the integration of the goals of SD and optimal mining can assist RRA 
countries toward growth and development. This is discussed as critical for the SED 
Strategy in Chapter Six. In countries where the context, for example, like South Africa 
is unique, approaches to dispel the legacy issues of apartheid regime must be instituted 
to ensure that every citizen has the opportunity to succeed. Here, a mix of social 
interventions aimed at building human capital to eradicate inequality in all its forms are 
pre-requirements for implementation. 
A consensus in policy making is the need for country-level policy space which would 
have to be coordinated on a global level for coherence at the national level. Here, the 
UN systems’ task team on the post-2015 UN development agenda contended that a 
coherent State is firstly needed; then, mutually reinforcing policies that support the 
agenda of growth and development. The coherence of such national policies must 
however be complemented by international level (or global) policies of relevance to 
the RRA context (United Nations, 2012; 2015). Some of the SD pathways provide an 
addition to the refining of the market system’s approach for development, hence 
providing the policy space for countries to implement their national development 
strategies backed by global support.   
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For mineral economies in Africa specifically, such a refined view would have to be 
predicated on a clear understanding of the political economy of resource-rich States, 
and from a pure economic sense, a greater understanding of the economics of the 
minerals industry. This is discussed under the linkages between SD and optimal mining 
in Chapter Five. In retrospect, there exists a mismatch in terms of how the industry can 
objectively contribute to national economic development outcomes of developing 
resource-rich States in Africa, while being sustainable. Recognising the importance of 
the arguments in this Chapter for classical theories under the market system, there 
needs to be a clear understanding of optimal mining, in terms of how to generate, 
capture and manage rents, for it to lay the foundation for an SED Strategy for RRA 
countries.   
2.6 Conclusion  
This Chapter discussed economic systems and rationalised why there is merit for the 
neo-liberal approach under the market system. In addition, since the policy 
environment in the global arena as well as in most countries has shifted to the market 
system, nation States in Africa should resort to this system; albeit with a refined view 
for sustainable growth. Considerations for such a refined or re-engineered market 
system were stated for an SED Strategy for the continent. In this light, the next Chapter 
discusses the principles of SD and the applications of the concept in Africa. It presents 
the challenges of SD in mining countries, the current and emerging issues in the debate, 
and way forward for mineral economies in Africa.   
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Chapter 3  
Sustainable Development and ‘Issues’ in Mining 
“No single blueprint for sustainability will be found, as economic and social systems and 
ecological conditions differ widely across the globe. Each nation would have to work out its own 
concrete policy implications” (WCED, 1987: p. 11). 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter discusses the literature on SD and narrows down to mining and 
sustainability in industry and mineral economies in Africa. It traces the evolution of 
SD and mining, and the foundations of the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable 
Development (MMSD) report which interpreted the meaning of SD for the industry. 
It discusses some of the elements of what SD means for mineral economies, and the 
challenge of realizing the concept when the pre-conditions for SD are weak with sub-
optimal governance frameworks. Also, it postulates that the interpretation of SD in 
terms of the triple bottom line model is challenging for States where the surplus value 
for re-investments is critical for optimal mineral development. The Chapter also lays 
the foundation for taking stock of SD and its applications in Chapter Four.  
3.2 Sustainable Development and Mining- What has been done so far? 
After the first global responses (see discussions in section 1.3 of Chapter One), the 
Brundtland Commission (WCED, 1987) introduced the new concept of SD. It proposed 
the importance of ‘needs’ and ‘limitations’ on the part of both developed and 
developing economies in cooperating to meet the challenge of underdevelopment, 
poverty, and environmental protection.21F27 Many studies and research to transition the 
                                                   
27 MacNeill (2013) who first coined the term SD in 1987, argued that the Commission found that the 
environmental-protection agenda, which nations adopted before and after Stockholm (i.e. IUCN, 1980; UNGA-
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new concept of SD became the focus of development economics and scientific 
communities.28 In furtherance to this, the United Nations (UN) declaration in 1992 set 
the tone for the principles and framework for SD. Out of the [18] principles that were 
originally developed, only [5] had a direct relationship between mineral resources, the 
environment and economic development. These five are noted below: 
➢ development today must not undermine the development and environment 
needs of present and future generations; 
➢ nations have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources, but without 
causing environmental damage beyond their borders; 
➢ nations shall develop international laws to provide compensation for damage 
that activities under their control cause to areas beyond their borders; 
➢ in order to achieve SD, environmental protection shall constitute an integral 
part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it. 
Eradicating poverty and reducing disparities in living standards in different 
parts of the world are essential to achieve SD and meet the needs of the majority 
of people; and 
➢ the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution (UNCED, 1992). 
Interestingly, the focus of the principles by UNCED was on environmental protection 
amid the pursuance of certain ‘harmful’ economic activities, of which mining was a 
chief suspect. Thus, in coming to terms with the new framework and principles, MNCs 
realised that mining issues were somewhat subsumed into general issues of 
environment, and therefore, needed to bring to light how mining can contribute to the 
SD agenda in industry.  
                                                   
UNCHE, 1972) tackled only the symptoms of environmental degradation; it completely ignored the sources. 
From his testimony, the Commission realised that the sources were to be found not in the air, soil, and waters, 
which were the focus of the environmental-protection agenda, but in a whole range of perverse public 
policies, especially fiscal and tax policies, energy policies, and trade, industry, agriculture, amongst others 
(MacNeil, 2013). 
28 See for instance various publications by the CSERGE series at (http://www.cserge.ucl.ac.uk/index.html); 
other studies sponsored by governments such as the Australian SD framework (see Mudd, 2009); and 
Canada’s Whitehorse Mining Initiative- Towards Sustainable Mining launched in 2000 (The Mining Association 
of Canada, 2015). 
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3.2.1 The Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Initiative 
The Global Mining Initiative was initiated by Rio Tinto, Anglo-American, BHP 
Billiton Freeport-McMoRan, Newmont and the World Mining Congress. Emphasis 
was placed on the establishment of a two-year Mining, Minerals and Sustainable 
Development (MMSD) research initiative (from 2000 to 2002) after the Agenda 21 
Conference in Rio where the principles of SD were developed. This was organized by 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and housed by 
the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).  
The purpose of the MMSD initiative was to facilitate the movement towards a shared 
agenda involving all the main stakeholders, since ‘Principle 4’ of the Rio Conference 
declaration stressed the need to “protect and manage the natural resource base for 
social and economic development” (UNCED, 1992; IIED- MMSD, 2002).23F29  
The established consensus on SD during the writing of the MMSD report was that the 
integration of SD under the ‘pillars’ of economic, environment and social within a 
governance framework represented the point of true sustainability. 24F30 This definition 
adopted from Barbier (1987) and Munasinghe (1992) studies is highlighted in Figure 
3.1.  
                                                   
29 The objectives of the MMSD were to: assess the global mining sector and its transition to SD; identify how 
services provided through the mineral supply chain can be delivered in a SD manner; propose elements to 
improving the minerals system; and build platforms for analysis and engagement of all stakeholders in the 
sector (see IIED, 2002:42). 
30 Munasinghe (1992) conceptualised the three elements of SD as encompassing the social, environmental 
and economic aspects. Harris (2003) identified what the three dimensions are and the goals, which direct 
each system. Towards the end of Harris’s (2003) paper, he synthesized all three perspectives into a common 
framework and concluded that each system poses challenges which are social and institutional as well as 
economic. Above all, the institutional and governance elements will have to be adapted to all three 
perspectives in SD.    
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Figure 3.1: Sustainable Development within the Matrix of Governance 
Source: IIED-MMSD (2002) 
From the figure, the point of true sustainability is where the economic, natural and 
social systems intersect within the framework of governance. The sphere of the 
economic system maximizes well-being through efficient use of all resources and 
enhances the conditions for increase in returns and investments from mineral wealth. 
The social sphere balances a fairer distribution of costs and benefits on both society 
and mining companies. The environmental sphere, which has been maximised by the 
proponents of SD seeks better stewardship of natural resources and remediation of 
past damages along the mineral value chain. This is facilitated through good 
governance, which is aimed at synchronising the interests and stake within the three 
systems of SD (IIED-MMSD, 2002). 
Although, there have been applauses for the laudable efforts of the MMSD, Crowson 
(2002) asserted that the MMSD is "…no more than a recycling of currently 
fashionable ideas and phrases, preceded by an alarmist sketch of the world today and 
laced with some crudely misleading economic history." Crowson (2002) posited that 
the MMSD has "dignified" NGOs as civil society and further purported that if 
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implemented, the MMSD's current recommendations would be ‘less effective, not 
more, in contributing to the general welfare’ (cited in Whitmore, 2006, p. 234). Such 
reactions after completion of the report were very common in quarters that dispelled 
the notion that sustainability could be achieved by an industry long devoid of controls 
(Ibid).  
In spite of the assertions by Crowson (2002), The MMSD+10, which was an update 
of where the industry currently stands argued that the dialogue and policy space have 
improved for the industry (Buxton, 2012). The International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM), which was instituted to transition the recommendations of the 
MMSD has also taken a new approach to viewing the concept. In a recent ICMM 
report, it was highlighted that the council would take the approach of a ‘contribution 
analysis’ and net benefits of minerals in improving society on the whole as its current 
interpretation of SD (ICMM, 2012a).  
The focus on ‘contribution’ is a tougher but fairer approach (ICMM, 2012a, p.5). The 
ICMM (2012a) argued that SD must be envisioned in the political and social arena, 
where a mining licence is both legal and social. Legal in the sense that the operation 
is considered because the negative impacts are defined and adequate steps can be put 
in place to mitigate, and not just the traditional positive return on investments (ICMM, 
2012a, 2012b). The social dimension should also be a consideration, in that the project 
has approval from communities in which operations take place (ICMM, 2012a). 
3.2.2 Post-2015 Development Framework  
Before delving deeper into SD and its challenges in mineral economies, the section 
considers the global view of SD and the consensus at the global stage. Where do global 
SD concerns currently lie? From current assessments in UNCSD (2012); and United 
Nations (2005, 2012, 2015a), the approach of striking a balance between the three 
55 
 
systems is still the view of global governance systems, with the discourse currently 
systemised under the post-2015 development framework. As a replacement to the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Rio+20 agenda passed the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in September 2015 signed by 193 countries (United 
Nations, 2016). Seventeen (17) SDGs with 169 targets have been endorsed by world 
leaders with the view to achieving all these goals and targets by the year 2030 (United 
Nations, 2015b).31  
This new Agenda 2030 provides a successor framework for the Millennium 
Declaration and the MDGs; and is a plan of action for social inclusion, environmental 
sustainability and economic development, according to the Columbia Center on 
Sustainable Investment- (CCSI and UNDP, 2016). Mining’s contribution to the SD 
goals have been clearly affirmed in a recent study by the CCSI in partnership with the 
World Economic Forum (WEF) and the UNDP (see CCSI-UNDP, 2016). The studies 
mapped out the direct and indirect linkages between mining and the SDGs, with 
current industry best practice and examples that are in the process of contributing to 
the goals. The atlas of the report also identified certain opportunities of how mining 
companies can collaborate with other stakeholders to leverage on common resources 
with the aim to avert negative disasters from mining activities. In so doing, the positive 
contributions of mining activities can enhance the fulfilment of the SD goals (Ibid). 
Per the CCSI-UNDP (2016) report, all the 17 SDGs have some relevance to mining 
activities and within the different stages of mining’s life cycle. Some of the goals have 
a more direct relevance to each of the different stages within the value chain, whereas 
                                                   
31 The post-2015 development framework, which led to the SDGs argued that the goals should be developed 
within the framework of “unified but differentiated” principles, in order to address regional and national 
circumstances and local priorities (United Nations, 2015c). Thus, the differentiated targets within the SDGs 
are meant to cover the different levels of development of each country.  
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others may be indirect or may differ. Thus, contribution to each goal may take “a 
different form depending on the phase of the mining activity and this should be 
considered when assessing where the main opportunities for contributions are” (CCSI-
UNDP, 2016: p.11).  
Table 3.1 adapted from the CCSI-UNDP (2016) report summarises the 17 goals and 
categorises, which goals have a direct and indirect impact on the mining industry. 
Table 3.1: Categorising the SDGs’ Impact and Mining 
Summarised Sustainable Development Goals Impact 
Goal 1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere 
 
Direct 
Goal 6 Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation 
Goal 7 Access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy 
Goal 8 Sustainable economic growth, productive employment and decent work  
Goal 9 Sustainable industrialization and foster innovation 
Goal 12 Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns 
Goal 13 Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts 
Goal 14 Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources 
Goal 15 Sustainable land use  
Goal 16 Peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development 
Goal 2 End hunger, achieve food security, and promote sustainable agriculture 
Indirect 
Goal 3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages 
Goal 4 Equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities 
Goal 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls 
Goal 10 Reduce inequality within and among countries 
Goal 11 Sustainable cities and human settlements  
Goal 17 Strengthen implementation and global partnership for SD 
Source: Adapted from (CCSI-UNDP, 2016) 
In terms of the goals, a thorough assessment reveals some of the SD challenges which 
were defined as regional goals in the ECA’s sub-regional studies towards the post-
2015 development framework. Some of the challenges identified by the ECA, 
included inadequate guidelines to operationalise the various aspects of SD, 
particularly issues of environment and the artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) 
sector; implementation deficiencies; and ineffective regulations for the SD of the 
sector generally (see ECA, 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2013d). It can broadly be asserted 
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that the concerns from the sub-regional assessments are reflected in the global SD 
goals and targets.32  
All in all, although the evolving concept of SD (currently at the goal and agenda setting 
stages) has stipulated principles for global resource governance, the overriding 
challenge of how to support countries at various levels of economic development to 
work together to end extreme poverty, transition to a low-carbon world energy system, 
ensure food and water security, reduce high fertility rates, and make the world’s cities 
productive and resilient to environmental stresses still remain outstanding 26F(Jeremić 
and Sachs, 2013).33 
Specifically, for RRA countries, the complexity of natural resource-led growth with 
its unique challenges coupled with the interrelationship with the environment at the 
various levels- global, regional, national, and local complicate the agenda of SD. This 
is obvious for the goals that are of direct relevance to mining, see goals 1, 6- 9, and 
12- 16 (in Table 3.1). Even at each stage of mineral development for RRA countries, 
the complex interaction is compounded by challenges of political-economy issues of 
weak governance, lack of technical capacity, and institutional rigour to deal effectively 
with the use of rents, as was rightly asserted by the (ECA, 2012b).   
3.3 The Challenge of Sustainable Development   
The priority of meeting SD goals has been of high relevance to the mining industry, 
with the post-Wold Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) outcome leading to 
                                                   
32 In the context of gold mining at the ASM level, the SD goals especially the directly relevant ones may have 
a tremendous impact on the business of ASM operators in their use of mercury and other extraction 
techniques. However, in the CCSI-UNDP report, the ASM sector was not included in the analysis, as such, there 
is need for detailed studies on the impact of the SDGs on the ASM sector since it is an important component 
of rural economic development in the African context.  
33 The fair balance is amongst the greatest challenges of SD in our time amid striving to achieve the targets 
set by the global governance bodies. 
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the founding of the ICMM with 18 gold mining industry players as key drivers when 
it was formed (IIED-MMSD, 2002). To a considerable extent, SD has changed the 
business as usual approach of the industry with many of the industry players reporting 
on voluntary initiatives to support efforts toward sustainability.  
For instance, concerns by governments and increasing capacity of developing 
countries to monitor mining companies have been spearheaded by many developed 
countries’ efforts such as the Dodd Frank Act by the United States and the Extractives 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) on transparency in the payment and use of 
mining revenues, International Finance Corporation (IFC) performance standards, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) due diligence on 
mineral supply chains, etc. Although this perpetuates a paternalistic culture of 
guardianship on the part of developed to developing countries, some of these 
initiatives have enhanced the capacity of stakeholders to hold governments and 
companies accountable (refer to Annex 3.1).  
Also, through the MMSD initiative for example, the ICMM has developed ten (10) 
SD principles, which also take cognisance of the economic, social, environmental 
concerns of sustainability and mining’s role in fulfilling SD goals and ends (ICMM, 
2003). However, the ICMM’s regulation of the sector will be tested in the phase of 
scaling back goals 6, 7, 13 and 15 (refer to Table 3.1).  
In terms of providing some detailed discussions of the challenge of SD, the next 
section’s discussions narrow down the arguments in two strands - the nature of 
industry’s sustainability and the contribution of mining at the national level in the face 
of sustainability challenges in Africa.  
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3.3.1 The Mining Industry’s Sustainability 
Since the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) report (WSSD, 2002), 
companies have strived to achieve sustainability by benchmarking their activities with 
global voluntary initiatives and principles to monitor the impact and effect of mining 
activities. A significant example is the Global Reporting Initiative’s minerals and 
metals supplement (GRI+MMS). However, with growing decline in mineral reserves, 
lower ore grades from current and new mineral projects, and the added burden of skills 
shortage, the risks associated with mining have escalated, making profitability difficult 
when cost optimisation strategies are not well instituted (KPMG, 2014a; Holland, 
2013; Sustainalytics, 2011).  
Observably, during the boom years, social risks, such as increased regulation, social 
licence to operate (SLTO), skills shortage and resource nationalism were on top of the 
agenda for sustainability by mining companies (see Ernest and Young- E & Y, 2015). 
Even in the midst of the seemingly rising mineral prices after the financial crises of 
2008 (see Figure 3.2), the cost of producing minerals, or for instance an ounce of gold 
had risen exponentially compared to a decade ago (Fulp, 2015; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers- PwC, 2013). This is in addition to the extensive list of risk 
factors stemming from economic, environmental and social costs, which in turn make 
the sustainability of mining difficult.  
For example, the analysis of mining revenues and costs from PwC’s Mine Editions 
2013- 2017 confirms the excessive costs incurred (largely from labour, reinvestment 
of capital and other working costs). Data from Mine 2013 edition shown in Figure 3.2 
breaks down the mining revenues and costs borne by mining companies, whereas 
Figure 3.3 highlights the poor posture of industry from the financial data of the top 40 
global seniors from between 2012- 2016.     
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Figure 3.2: Mining Revenues and Costs- Top 40 Mining Companies (2005-2012) 
Source: Adapted from PwC (2013) analysis of Mine: A Confidence Crisis. 
**The re-investment expenditure represents the ‘net investing cash flow’ from the cash flow statement. It is 
inclusive of ($138Bn) which was reported as being spent in that year plus other investment expenditures made 
to ensure the long-run and continuity of mining businesses. Data for the assessment was extracted from the 
PwC 2013 report). 
From Figure 3.2, it can be inferred that certain direct stakeholders that lay claim in the 
production function might not necessarily be receiving a fair share of the mining 
revenue pie.34 The higher the costs in operation and management- the lower the profits 
obtained from the production function. Interestingly, net profit for the year 2012 was 
highest in the last five years for miners. The year 2015 however saw a negative net 
profit coupled with lower mining revenues compared to the boom years (see Figure 
3.3).  
                                                   
34 The SD agenda and its call for global environmental governance has brought to bear issues of sustainability 
and inclusion of environmental expenditures for cleaning-up and the rehabilitation of mining areas in 
integrated financial reports. However, interestingly, the majority of the financial reports do not integrate 
environmental accounting in their financial statement, nor do they typically report their environmental 
expenditure in their financial accounts statements. Typical integrated reports by mining companies are usually 
sectionalised under strategy, governance, orebody (mineral resource and reserves), sustainability and 
financial accounts, which are then co-opted into a report.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Mining Revenues of the op 40 Mining Companies (2 05-2012) 
Source: Adapted from PwC analysis (2013) in Debrah et al. (in press) 
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Figure 3.3: Some Financial Data of the Top 40 Mining Companies (2012- 2016) 
Source: Adapted from PwC (2017, 2016, 2015, 2013) Mine editions. 
*ETR- Effective tax rate 
From Figure 3.3, market capitalisation in 2016 showed a rise from 2015, with effective 
tax rate at 44%. Although mining revenues were higher during the boom years, current 
gains as a result of rising commodity prices signal a boost in investor confidence (see 
analysis of price to earnings ratio in PwC, 2017). Despite these, PwC (2017) postulates 
that the market is bouncing back amidst a rise in commodity prices, particularly for 
gold and copper.  
Consequently, it is important to note that expanding risk factors increase the size of the 
shareholders of the mining pie, as well as mining’s cost of extraction, making it difficult 
to balance the management of environmental and social costs. Holland (2013) and 
Crowson (2001) concerning mining revenues and profits have also brought to bear the 
less dominant issue about the profitability of the industry being compromised.35 This 
is especially so, in an era where CSR and corporate citizenship of minerals have been 
heightened. Here, shareholders, governments, communities and citizens are holding 
                                                   
35 See Holland (2013) arguments on the need for the gold industry to concentrate on growing the mining pie 
(earnings) together with all vested stakeholders. 
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mining companies accountable for social and environmental due diligence that were 
previously neglected.  
All in all, although industry attempts are laudable, the rising differential costs may 
reveal the cracks in the current economic models of profitability if demand and supply 
trends and government attitudes in terms of sustainability do not change for the 
industry. 
3.3.2 Sustainability in Mineral Economies in Africa 
Generally, mining contributes significantly to the SD of mineral economies. The 
ICMM (2014) pointed to the immense economic contribution of gold and other major 
metallic minerals, such as copper, bauxite, steel, tungsten, columbite-tantalum to the 
resilience of emerging economies in Africa. Per the ICMM (2014) report, mineral 
economies benefit generally in the context of about 60%- 90% in FDIs, 30%- 60% in 
export earnings, 3%- 20% in mining revenues or receipts, and 1%- 2% in direct 
employment, with many indirect multipliers across the value chain and in the economy 
(Ibid; p.18).  
Governments, using fiscal instruments and sometimes local content policies (although 
not highly effective) are maximising the fiscal space to harness rents for development. 
Additionally, governments are also mitigating the environmental consequences of 
mining’s impact through firmer environmental legislations and to effect equity in the 
distribution of mineral rents (Ramdoo, 2016). However, the greatest challenge of 
sustainability in RRA countries has been trying to secure an optimal and fair balance 
between fiscal instruments in taxation, social concerns, and environmental regulations 
in the face of the volatility of mineral prices and rents. 
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During the aftermath of the Rio Declaration, environmental regulations, laws and 
policies were prioritised to off-set the externalities from mining. Major concerns about 
the impact of mining on the environment led to the crafting of the National Strategies 
for Sustainable Development (NSSD) in 2005 onwards to provide environmental 
safeguards in economies to drive sustained growth (United Nations, 2005). However, 
as to whether mining countries have been fully successful in pursuing the agenda of 
sustainability and the implementation of its principles have been a key point of 
contention- the Thesis discusses this in the next Chapter. 
3.3.3 Conclusion on Sustainable Development in Africa 
In the JPOI and the Rio+20 reports (UNCSD, 2012; ECA, 2013; WSSD, 2002), it was 
acknowledged that economic development has been constrained in Africa due to 
poverty, conflict, lack of infrastructure, technological improvements and institutional 
quality; thus, preventing the full transitioning of the concept of SD. Apart from these,  
the pre-conditions for SD such as good governance and leadership are weak leading 
to implementation deficiencies (ECA-AU-AfDB, 2012; ECA, 2012b).  
According to the ECA-AU-AfDB (2012), SD outcomes can be enhanced in Africa, 
through: 
➢ Better integration of the principles of SD into policies and programmes at the 
national level;  
➢ Progress in the formulation of programmes that will operationalise SD in 
countries; 
➢ Providing guidelines for a system of SD indicators that can enable 
measurement and comparability of countries;  
➢ Strong institutional and research capacities and support to strengthen SD 
pillars; 
➢ Reforms in current educational curricula to support understanding and 
operationalising of SD at all levels; 
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➢ Improve cooperation and coordination among national agencies and all 
stakeholders in a nation for coherence;  
➢ An accessible information network that provides platforms for sharing 
challenges and progress made in SD; 
➢ An integrated regional SD framework and action plans to guide national efforts 
in realising SD at all levels; 
➢ Increasing stakeholder engagement and participation on SD issues to raise 
awareness and safe spaces for open discussions of SD; and 
➢ Intervention in capacity-building to facilitate the SD process. 
All things taken into consideration, because of the lack of the enumerated interventions 
noted above, many countries have failed to fully integrate the concept of SD into their 
mineral economies. To further buttress this point, Table 3.2 showcases a list of mining 
countries that have integrated the NSSD principles or ratified Agenda 21 principles in 
their development frameworks. The rationale for presenting the table is to identify 
whether current national development policies have incorporated an integrative and 
cohesive sustainability agenda/ framework specific to mineral economies in Africa. 
Table 3.2: National Sustainable Development Policies in Mineral economies 
RRA COUNTRIES 
SD FRAMEWORKS: 
NSSD/ PRSPS/NDP‡ 
SD FRAMEWORKS 
SPECIFIC TO 
MINING†  
MINING SD 
INDICATORS @ 
NATIONAL LEVEL† 
MINING SD 
INDICATORS @ 
PROJECT LEVEL† 
Botswana ✓ S ✓ x 
Burkina Faso ✓✓ ✓ x x 
DRC(Congo) ✓✓ ✓ x x 
Eritrea ✓✓✓ ✓ x x 
Ethiopia ✓✓ ✓ x x 
Ghana ✓✓✓ ✓ x x 
Guinea(Conakry) ✓✓ ✓ x x 
Ivory Coast ✓✓✓ ✓ x x 
Kenya ✓✓✓ ✓ x x 
Liberia ✓✓✓ ✓ x x 
Madagascar ✓✓ ✓ x x 
Mali ✓✓✓ ✓ x x 
Mozambique ✓✓✓ ✓ x x 
Namibia ✓✓✓ S x x 
Niger ✓✓ ✓ x x 
Sierra Leone ✓✓ ✓ x x 
South Africa* ✓✓ S S S 
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Tanzania ✓✓✓ ✓ x x 
Zambia ✓✓ ✓ x x 
Zimbabwe ✓✓ ✓ x x 
Source: Author’s research from the NSSD Reports (see ECA, 2011) 
‡ NSSD- National Strategy on Sustainable Development-✓/ PRSPS- Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers-
✓/NDP- National Development Plan-✓; † ✓- Yes, has a Mining Law, but does not have a specific (or cohesive) 
SD framework to integratively deal with issues from the mining sector; S-Has specific SD strategy tailored 
towards the needs of the Sector, X- No, does not have a sector specific indicators framework to monitor 
progress in mining. The above data on countries that are RR is extracted from the Fraser Institute’s Mining 
Survey; however, the Researcher embarked upon the actual assessment of countries in terms of availability of 
SD frameworks. 
Some of the resource-rich countries like Central African Republic, Cote D’Ivoire and Mauritania were not 
included in the in the assessment due to language barriers and lack of data available on their mining sectors.  
* South Africa has had its own medium-term development frameworks. Thus, it didn’t receive the black tick 
mark for alignment with the PRPSPs. Its aligned its development frameworks with mining (see Annex 8.3a). 
Tracing from the Table 3.2, a significant majority of RRA countries do not have 
holistic and integrated SD specific strategies to tackle mineral-related externalities and 
as well effectively harness rents. Although, they do have an overarching mining law 
or framework (and its supporting laws, such as environment, health and safety and 
other mining support regulations) for the minerals sector, the laws are siloed in 
approach and implementation.36  
In the final analysis, it must be pointed that the transition of SD from its initial 
conception in 1987 by the Brundtland Commission to the SDGs is a huge feat, coupled 
with the principle of inter-generational equity between present and future generations. 
This notwithstanding, as a concept, SD’s interpretation has been limited by the 
balancing components definition found in the triple bottom line, which often leads to 
issues of trade-offs within mining systems. As indicated in the opening quote, regions 
and countries would have to define what sustainability means to them and re-interpret 
the concept to suit their own context (WCED, 1987, p. 11). 
                                                   
36 James Otto’s contribution to the UNCTAD series on Mining, Environment and Development also sheds light 
on the challenge of integrating environmental regulations into mineral governance (See UNCTAD, n.d.). 
Sometimes, working from different departments with different mandate and goals can be streamlined if 
cohesive plan of inter-sectoral cooperation exists. In a similar instance like land use planning, Mbaya (2016) 
suggests an integrated national policy to guide sectoral policies in land management. Such frameworks should 
be devised for the mining sector in Africa. 
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3.4 Emerging ‘Issues’ on Mining and Sustainability  
With the above discussions in mind, this final part of the review gleans the critical 
issues from the mining and sustainability debate. From the previous discussions, five 
critical issues in the mining and sustainability debate can be gleaned. These are:  
a) the definitional challenges within SD and mining discourse, i.e. who is defining 
SD and whether it’s in conformity with the realities of countries; 
b) that ore bodies are scarce, finite and hence unsustainable;  
c) environmental degradation caused by mining are detrimental to ecosystems, 
when mining regimes are weak;  
d) the profitability of the industry being at stake; and  
e) the sharing of benefits equitably and how the benefits should be used.F37  
To contextualise the debate, the themes are further grouped and discussed under four 
headings: definitional challenges in SD, geographical reach of SD- global, national 
and local levels, profitability of the industry in the face of sustainability and the 
environment and development nexus.   
3.4.1 Definitional Challenges in Sustainable Development 
The first issue is premised on the contested and broad nature of what SD means or 
how it should be defined or (interpreted) by the mining industry. Persistently, the 
challenge for mining and sustainability has been how to arrive at a ‘common interest’ 
definition or an ‘economic’ definition of SD to facilitate the profitability of the 
industry (IIED-MMSD, 2002). In the MMSD and even the current global SD agenda, 
the triple bottom model is the interpretation of sustainability which highlights 
concerns within the economic, social, environmental, and governance dimensions (see 
Section 3.2.1). Practically, the understanding of this interpretation is bent towards a 
combination of two issues generally, both ‘environment and economics’, ‘social and 
                                                   
37 See Breaking New Grounds: Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development on three of the identified 
themes (IIED-MMSD, 2002: p. 80).  
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economic’ and ‘environment and social’ or other variations of the two combinations 
in terms of application. Even in cases where there can be an intersection of all 
dimensions, there is a possibility that the profitability of the industry could be 
compromised due to imbalances within the three elements when the governance 
dimension is weak.31F38 Currently, the focus of SD has been maximising the concerns in 
the environment and social systems thus weakening the effect of the economic 
dimension. 
3.4.2 Geographical Reach: Global, National and Local Levels 
Another gap in SD and mining is the interconnected and interdependent nature of the 
mineral value chain in terms of processing and product development within the global 
mineral system. Rapid growth in consumer demand and production as a result of 
globalisation has given SD a cross boundary geographical reach with both physical 
and economic manifestations. Inferably, because resource-rich developing countries 
have ratified many international initiatives set-up particularly at developed countries’ 
standards, these initiatives are becoming models or systems for the developing. In 
many cases these standards are super-imposed based on certain conditionalities (or 
pre-conditions) tied with aid funding, and thus, may often lack context in the face of 
weak governance.  
Until recent efforts at SD and mining by the ECA and the AU with the African Mining 
Vision (AMV) and other localised mining initiatives, many SD attempts at the regional 
and national levels have been driven by the larger global SD agenda. Some of these 
initiatives have little context (or have higher ethical standards in terms of execution) 
in the countries that these policies are geared towards. The recent global SDGs is an 
                                                   
38 See Memary et al. (2012) and Pearce and Barbier (2000). Also refer to arguments on total factor productivity 
in mining by Humphreys (2001).  
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exception because of its multi-regional approach and the incorporation of some of the 
issues in the Common African Position (CAP) on the Post-2015 development 
framework report.  
The CAP’s recommendations ensured that key SD concerns of the region were 
considered in the formulation of the global SDGs (see AU, 2014a). In spite of these, 
global and regional pollution of ecosystems as it pertains to mining necessitate the 
reasons for global governance. However, the question remains, in whose interest or 
real needs are being addressed or defined in SD? The researcher posits that SD is an 
appropriate framework; however, the ‘balanced components’ definition remains 
problematic to the industry, when some of the minimum pre-conditions for economic 
development, governance and institutional quality have not been met by RRA 
countries.  
3.4.3 Profitability of the Industry in the Face of Sustainability 
Due to the risky and highly capital-intensive nature of mineral economic activity, the 
approach for mining companies would require greater compensation for going ahead 
with mining operations in regimes of political and physical uncertainties. Different 
mineral resources offer different scenarios for costs (Giurco and Cooper, 2012; Mason 
et al., 2011), but with increasing internalisation of environmental and social benefits, 
there would be the likelihood that in some countries mining would be unfeasible (Ibid). 
This also means that in resource-rich countries (that have understood) the impact of 
rents, a portion of the receipt of adequate compensation for all stakeholders must be 
re-invested for the sustainability of the project before exhaustion - this is having a 
lifecycle approach to rent management. The major point here is that, the key principle 
that can integrate all the concerns in SD is a re-investment of ‘surplus value’ obtained 
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from mining. This is to allow for greater sustainability concerns on the part of 
government and the industry.  
In the theory of the markets, what allows sustainability of capital is re-investment of 
surplus value (profit) as was discussed in Chapter Two. However, rarely would one 
find ‘wealth funds’ dedicated solely to minerals in which African governments strictly 
adhere to its fiscal rules for mining revenue investments (except for the cases of 
Botswana, Libya and Algeria to a certain extent). Although not the only way, it is such 
macroeconomic discipline that can strengthen the use of mineral rents for long-term 
economic growth in light of SD principles. 
3.4.4 Environment and Development Nexus: What to Prioritize?  
Understandably, some developing countries in their current stage of development 
require and are needful of mineral rents to develop, grow and thereby reduce poverty. 
Therefore, mineral economies should weigh the options and the impact of economic 
rents as it pertains to sustainability. There is a divide between what developed 
countries want and need and what developing RRA countries really need (Jasanoff 
and Martello, 2004). Moreover, depending on one’s disposition as an ecologist or 
economist one would tend to interpret SD in that context (Lele, 1991). Annex 3.3 show 
various perspective of the North and South in terms of sustainability. Based on the 
different perspectives, it is the researcher’s opinion that the call for environmental 
sustainability should not tramp the fact that poverty and underdevelopment is a real 
phenomenon in developing countries that depend on the export of mineral 
commodities for profits and rents. Hence, there should be a reasonable balance 
between meeting the objectives of environmental and economic development in SD, 
and providing effective solutions to transforming exhaustible resources during the life 
span of minerals’ extraction.  
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Finally, the dearth of data on SD pin points to the need of collecting data and 
identifying relevant indicators to better measure SD and define the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for economic development and environmental stewardship in 
Africa’s unique context. This was also argued in the summary report of progress 
towards SD in Africa by the ECA-AU-AfDB (2012). 
3.5 Conclusion 
In concluding this Chapter, it is imperative to emphasise a few points. First and 
foremost, it is a truism that ore bodies are unsustainable, and as such it is an injunction 
on all countries not to waste resources (WCED, 1987). However, some developing 
countries in their current stage of development need mineral rents to develop and 
optimally invest mineral rents for long-term sustainability. 
 Secondly, the different manifestations and the geographical reach of SD points to the 
peculiar goal-maximising objectives of each region, country and locale. Hence, the 
necessity for key stakeholders to arrive at a common interest definition of what SD 
should mean for them and their unique context. At the industry level, since mining’s 
profitability considering SD concerns are being integrated into the ‘mining pie’ (see 
Figure 3.2), issues of CSR and social licence to operate of mines must be a critical 
part of the mining business agenda. This means that sustainability issues must be well-
defined to factor the concerns of all encumbered and to ensure that mining is profitable 
and benefits all stakeholders. 39   
Finally, due to the strong global influences toward the global level impact of SD in the 
‘development’ discourse, there remains a gap in terms of adequate national level 
benchmarks for insuring the local impacts of SD by mining activities (this was stated 
                                                   
39 Chapter Five considers this argument in detail. 
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as an objective of this Thesis). Therefore, there should be calls for better indicators for 
measuring SD in mining and a re-definition of SD for mineral economies. Would a re-
assessment of the current view of SD in terms of practical applications lead to the 
conclusion of the weaknesses in achieving the balancing act for RRA countries? And 
would that mean that mineral–rich countries must reassess how SD is interpreted in 
policy applications? 
To answer these questions, the next Chapter applies the MMSD interpretation of SD 
to gold mining economies. It aims at discussing the goodness of fit of the concept in 
four selected countries and to draw lessons of SD applications in Africa vis-à-vis 
considerations for optimal mineral development.   
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Chapter 4  
Measuring Sustainable Development at the National Level  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 This Chapter measures SD at the national level in four gold mining countries (Ghana, 
Democratic Republic of Congo- DRC, South Africa and Tanzania). Using a 
sustainability indicators’ framework, a Sustainable Development Index (SDI) for the 
countries is developed in relation to mining. The aim is an attempt to quantify SD, 
draw practical inference on how the concept has been implemented and the challenges 
in achieving the balancing act within SD systems. Some of the recommendations made 
in Chapter Three on developing specific indicators to track SD progress for mining 
are achieved in this Chapter. However, it concludes on the need to understand optimal 
mineral development for RRA countries. The Chapter is structured as follows: the first 
part presents the criteria and selection of countries for the assessment; the second, 
discusses the process for the selection of indicators for the sustainability framework 
coupled with the methodology for measuring SD; the final part discusses the SD 
performance in the four countries and the lessons learnt from the assessment.  
4.2 Selection of Countries for Quantifying Sustainable Development 
The section traces the criteria used in selecting the countries. The goal of the criteria 
was to identify four gold producing countries, three leading and a bad practice mineral 
regime in Africa. As established earlier on, the focus of the selection is resource-rich 
‘dependent’ and ‘significant’ countries in SSA. This is defined in terms of actual 
reliance of 25% or more of fiscal mining revenues to output, excluding grants, and 
mineral exports to total exports (Lundgren et al., 2013). This qualification was used to 
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identify the initial set of countries for consideration in the selection. Annex 1.1 
provides the justification for the classification.  
Here, also, the Fraser Institute’s  (FI) 2015 set of RRA countries, which included new 
entrants such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Madagascar, and resource significant 
countries like South Africa were included (Jackson and Green, 2015). Thus, the initial 
pool of mineral-rich, SSA countries for the assessment was 22.  
The criteria for the selection of countries were as follows:  
➢ Criterion one used the FI’s Survey of Best Practices- Mineral Potential Index 
and Current Mineral Potential Index to plot best to good practice regimes. Here, 
the mid-points of these indexes were used to create a quadrant consisting of a 2-
tier system of best to good/ worst practice regimes in SSA. 
➢ The second criterion used gold production quantities (above 10,000 kilograms) 
to further filter the selection of countries.  
➢ Criteria three and four were based on social, environmental and economic 
indicators relevant to mineral economies to further filter countries in the selection 
process. In criterion three, social and environmental indicators, which comprised 
of the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Environmental Performance 
Index (EPI) by the UN and the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy 
(YCELP) were used. The fourth criterion was on economic diversification. Here, 
a simple economic indicator, i.e. gross fixed capital formation was the proxy due 
to challenges in identifying a standardized diversification indicator for the 
selection.40 A simple rank-sum method was applied to the three indicators to 
determine weights that would assist in ranking countries for further selection. 
➢ The final criterion used the percentile scores of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) developed by the World Bank and Natural Resource 
Governance Institute (NRGI) for the final selection of countries.  
                                                   
40 Usually, the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index is used but because the HH has not been calculated for all 
countries, the gross fixed capital formation was used as the proxy. 
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4.2.1 Criterion One: Mineral Potential- Best vs. Current Practices 
In applying criterion 1, the point of departure was to plot mineral potential (best 
practice versus current practice) from the FI’s assessment. Here, (18) SSA countries 
out of the 22 RRA countries were selected from the pool. This was to aid in identifying 
the pure mineral potential of each jurisdiction. From this plot, two-tier sets of countries 
are defined. Tier ‘one’ is a set of countries found within the upper right quadrant of 
Figure 4.1. These represent (best to good) countries beyond the mid-point of 0.40 and 
0.35 of the two indexes. Tier ‘two’ are (good to worst regimes) found in the lower-
right quadrant of Figure. 4.1. This was defined by the researcher as representing the 
mean threshold for both indices. 
 
Figure 4.1: Mineral Potential- Best Practice vs. Current Practice 
Source: Jackson and Green (2015)- Fraser Institute data (2014/2015)  
From Figure 4.1, the list of countries from the FI’s assessment and the two-tier sets of 
mineral-rich countries are illustrated in Table 4.1.   
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Table 4.1: First Selection- Resource-rich Countries and the Tier System 
18 Countries (Initial set of countries 
before plotting in fig. 4.1) 
17 Countries (After the plotting) 
Best Practice vs. Current Practice 
Tier One Tier Two 
Botswana Mozambique Botswana  DRC 
Burkina Faso Namibia Burkina Faso Guinea (Conakry) 
DRC Niger Eritrea Mali 
Eritrea South Africa Ethiopia Niger 
Ethiopia Tanzania Ghana South Africa 
Ghana Zambia Ivory Coast Zimbabwe 
Guinea(Conakry) Zimbabwe Madagascar  
Ivory Coast  Mozambique  
Kenya  Namibia  
Madagascar  Tanzania  
Mali  Zambia  
Source: Jackson and Green (2015)- Fraser Institute (FI) data (2014/2015)  
 
From plotting the 18 countries on the graph in Figure 4.1, 17 countries were further 
selected (see the blue and green highlighted countries in Table 4.1). 
4.2.2 Second Selection of Countries 
Of the 17 identified countries in Table 4.1, 10 gold producing countries (5 in each 
Tier) are further selected using the world gold production data from United States 
Geological Survey- USGS (2015) (Annex 4.1 presents the results). The cut-off for 
inclusion in the selection was above 10,000 kilograms of gold production. After 
applying this criterion, the countries filtered to the next stage were: Tier 1- (Burkina 
Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Tanzania and Ethiopia) and from Tier 2- (DRC, Guinea, 
Mali, South Africa and Zimbabwe).  
4.2.3 Applying the Third and Fourth Criteria 
Criteria 3 and 4 represented concerns (i.e., economic, environment, and social) central 
to mineral economies. To apply the criteria, the rank-sum method is used to aid in the 
ranking and weighing of countries on the three indicators- (HDI, EPI and gross fixed 
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capital formation). The rank-sum method gives pre-determined weights to each 
indicator. Table 4.2 shows the ranking procedure in determining the weights.  
Table 4.2: A Simple Rank Sum Procedure for Weighting 
Source: Researcher’s Analysis (2016) 
In the rank-sum method, each criterion is weighed based on the level of importance of 
the assessor, with a final cumulative weight determined by each rank over the total 
sum of the rank. This is done from (1) - highest importance, (2) high importance and 
(3) important. 33F41 The aim of applying the weights was to rank and select best to worst 
practice regimes in Africa. Six countries were finally selected out of the 10 countries 
(see Table 4.3). 
                                                   
41 The HDI is ranked (1) highest importance because of its measure of the state of poverty and income of a 
country, followed by the EPI (2) high importance, and (3) important for economic diversification.  
Criteria 3 and 4 
Straight 
Rank 
Rank Sum Method 
(t) ∑ 𝑡5𝑖=1  
(Normalised) 
New rank/∑ 𝑡5𝑖=1  
Economic diversification 3 1 0.1667 
Human Development Index (HDI) 1 3 0.5000 
Environmental Performance Index 2 2 0.3333 
   6 1 
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Table 4.3: A Matrix of the Rankings and the Final Selection of RRA Countries  
Gold producing 
Countries  
Criteria 3: Social and Environmental Indicators   Criteria 4: Economic Diversification Indicator  ALL 
Rank   
 
Selected 
Countries 
considered for 
final selection 
HDI 
(2015) 
Rank 
Weighted 
Score (0.5) 
Environmental 
Performance 
Index (2014)  
Rank 
Weighted 
Score 
(0.3333) 
Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation 
(current US$) 
(2015) 
Rank 
Weighted 
Score                   
(0.1667) 
Total 
Avg. 
Weighted 
Score 
TIER ONE COUNTRIES 
Burkina Faso  0.402 10 5 40.52 4 1.333 3379617287 7 1.167 2.500 7th 
  
Ghana (2nd) 
Ghana  0.579 2 1 32.07 7 2.333 8941182455 4 0.667 1.333 2nd Tanzania (3
rd) 
Ethiopia  0.442 6 3 39.43 5 1.667 24178835094 1 0.167 1.611 6th Ivory Coast (5
th) 
Ivory Coast 0.462 5 2.5 47.6 3 1.000 6390531738 5 0.834 1.444 5th   
Tanzania  0.521 3 1.5 36.19 6 2.000 15740268486 3 0.500 1.333 3rd   
TIER TWO COUNTRIES 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
(DRC)  
0.433 7 3.5 25.01 9 3.000 5689970227 6 1.000 2.500 8th 
  
South Africa (1st) 
Guinea (Conakry)  0.411 9 4.5 28.03 8 2.666 884788621.2 10 1.667 2.944 10th Zimbabwe (4th) 
Mali 0.419 8 4 18.43 10 3.333 2185484679 8 1.334 2.889 9th DRC (8th) 
South Africa  0.666 1 0.5 53.51 1 0.333 64761539004 2 0.333 0.389 1st   
Zimbabwe  0.509 4 2 49.54 2 0.667 1995427000 9 1.500 1.389 4th   
Sources: Researcher’s Data Analysis (2016); Data from: (UNDP, 2016; YCELP, 2014; World Bank, 2015) 
Table Interpretation: The weights determined in Table 4.2, i.e. (HDI- 0.5, EPI- 0.333 and economic diversification- 0.1667) are applied to columns 4, 7 
and 10 respectively. The rank obtained by each country based on their scores on the indicators is multiplied with the weight to obtain the weighted 
score. Column 11 averages the weighted scores for the three indicators- HDI, EPI and economic diversification for the final rank of countries. The 
countries are finally ranked based on their final scores with the best three countries in each tier (in the final column) progressing to the final selection. 
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4.2.4 Final Selection of Resource-Rich African Countries 
The six countries selected from Table 4.3 are presented in Table 4.4. These are the 
three best performing countries in Tiers 1 and 2.  
Table 4.4: Gold Producing Countries that Qualified for the final Selection 
First Tier Second Tier 
Ghana (2nd) South Africa (1st) 
Tanzania (3rd) Zimbabwe (4th) 
Ivory Coast (5th) Democratic Republic of Congo (8th) 
Source: Researcher’s Data Analysis (2016) 
The final criterion used the worldwide governance indicators (WGI) to decide on two 
countries within each of the Tiers for the assessment (see Table 4.5 for the scores). In 
Tier 1, Ghana and Tanzania qualified for the final selection due to average percentile 
scores of (54.6) and (34.7) on the WGI’s percentile rank for 2015.  
Table 4.5: WGIs’ Percentile Scores for the Final Selection of Countries 
First Tier Second Tier 
Ghana (54.6) South Africa (58.9) 
Tanzania (34.7) Zimbabwe (11.6) 
Ivory Coast (31.1) 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
(6.5) 
Sources: Data from: World Bank- WGI (2015) 
South Africa and the DRC are selected in Tier 2 because South Africa’s score on the 
WGI is the highest amongst the three countries. The DRC’s regime scored the lowest 
on the governance indicators (6.5/100) out of the three countries in Tier 2. Considering 
that the DRC has one of the lowest GDP per capita (US $384.51) based on 2015 
estimates by the World Bank and the need to consider worst practice jurisdictions, it 
is selected over Zimbabwe for the assessment (World Bank, 2015).  
All in all, four countries- Ghana and Tanzania (Tier one) and South Africa and the 
DRC (from Tier two) are selected for the assessment. The next section discusses the 
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theoretical underpinnings behind how SD was measured, the selection of indicators 
for the assessment and the mathematics behind the aggregation formula that led to the 
SDI.  
4.3 Theoretical Framework and Methodology for Sustainable Development 
Assessment 
The discussions in Chapter Three (see sections 3.3.1- 3.3.2) alluded to the current 
interpretations of SD as the balancing components of SD systems by industry. 
Recently, the MMSD+10 (together with the ICMM’s) interpretations has been further 
premised on the net contributions or benefits of mining to the three systems in 
fulfilling SD ends.34F42 Since, this interpretation of sustainability has been co-opted by 
industry for mining; the Thesis’ theoretical framework for measuring SD is also 
premised on the balancing components between the economic, natural or environment 
and social systems within a governance framework (see Figure 3.1 of Chapter Three). 
Some of the theoretical discussions to buttress this view of SD are traced from Chapter 
Three’s evolution of SD and conclusions on sustainability in mining.  
Due to the multi-dimensional nature of the systems of SD as was earlier asserted, the 
indicators framework for assessing sustainability has been selected to aid in the 
assessment. In terms of sustainability assessments, there are many keen approaches 
taken to assess SD such as: pressure-state-response frameworks; indices, and 
indicators. The indicators’ framework approach is selected because of two reasons: 
(1) the multi-dimensionality of SD and (2) quantifying SD from an aggregate or 
composite perspective requires a method such as an indicators’ framework. This is to 
assist in measuring the process and outcome indicators of mining’s sustainability.  
                                                   
42 Within this purview, policy and research studies have pointed to the crust of SD as encircling the pillars of 
social, environmental and economic systems in the context of well-functioning institutions and governance  
(Barbier, 1987; Munasinghe, 1992; United Nations, 1995). 
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A framework of national sustainability indicators covering the systems within SD is 
developed to assist in the measuring of SD in the selected four gold mining countries.  
The next section discusses the measurement process and the indicators, which were 
finally selected for measuring SD progress in gold mining economies. 
4.3.1 Selection of Sustainable Development Indicators  
The process for the selection of the indicators was based on a global and regional scan 
of SD and mining issues of relevance to Africa. The chart (Figure 4.2: An Assessment 
Map for the Selection of SD Indicators) was used to trace how the final indicators to 
measure sustainability were selected.  
 
Figure 4.2: An Assessment Map for the Selection of SD Indicators 
Sources: Method adapted from (UNCSD, 2007, 2012; United Nations, 2005; Pintér et 
al., 2005; ECA, 2012)   
Based on the chart (see Figure 4.2), the steps for the selection were as follows:  
➢ Scan global, regional and national documents; 
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➢ Identify priority issues within the geographic reach of global, regional and 
national; 
➢ Codify the priority issues, while identifying regional SD goals; and 
➢ Based on the issues and goals, identify the most relevant indicators at the 
national level to measure SD. 
From the scan, relevant global issues of concern and current SD and mining issues 
faced by mineral economies are illustrated in Figure 4.3. The list is coded as Global 
(Economic, Environmental and Social) and National (Economic, Environmental and 
Social) issues - (GEC, GE, GS and NEC, NS and NE) respectively.   
 
Figure 4.3: Global-National Priority Issues of Relevance to RRA Economies 
Sources: United Nations (2015c); ECA-AU-AfDB (2012); ECA (2013a, 2013b, 
2013c, 2013d); Buxton (2012); Azapagic and Perdan (2000); Republic of South 
Africa-DME (2009); Akabzaa (2009); Magai and Márquez-Velázquez (2011) 
4.3.2 Matrix of Sustainable Development Indicators at the National 
Level 
From the priority issues (in Figure 4.3), 23 core indicators, which comprised of (8) 
economic indicators, (7) environmental indicators, and (8) social indicators were 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL ISSUES 
Economic Issues Environmental Issues Social Issues 
NEC 1: Sustainable Economic 
Development & Growth 
NEC 2: Investments into Physical 
& Economic Infrastructure 
Development  
NEC 3: Distribution of Revenues 
& Wealth (Value Sharing 
Between Governments & 
Communities  
NEC 4: Investments (Mineral 
Investments into Pension Fund 
from Mineral Revenues, 
NEC 5: Communities, Pollution 
Prevention (Impacts Mine 
Closure) 
NEC 6: Poverty Alleviation 
NEC 7: External & Domestic 
Financing of Development 
Projects  
NEC 8: Rural & Urban 
Development 
NEC 9: ASM Promotion 
NEC 10: Managing the Resource 
Curse 
NEC 11: Transparency in Mineral 
Revenue Usage 
NEC 12: Beneficiation & 
Processing of Minerals  
NEC 13: Resource Nationalism                              
NE 1: Biodiversity Loss 
NE 2: Environmental 
Pollution from Mining 
NE 3: Global Warming and 
Other Environmental 
Impacts 
NE 4: Land Use, 
Management & 
Rehabilitation 
NE 5: Environmental 
Management Systems 
NE 6: Resource Use & 
Availability 
NE 7: Effective 
Environmental Laws 
NE 8: Green Procurement 
 
NS 1: Creation of 
Employment 
NS 2: HRD, Education, 
Skill Development, 
Training, Promotion of 
Science & Technology 
NS 3: Good 
Governance & 
Institutional Reforms 
NS 4: Equal 
Opportunities and 
Non-Discrimination 
NS 5: Human Rights, 
Business Ethics 
NS 6: Access to Basic 
Service Delivery- 
Healthcare, Water, 
Electricity & Waste 
Management 
NS 7: Social 
Infrastructure 
Development 
NS 8: Stakeholder 
Participation 
NS 9: Wealth & Income 
Distribution 
NS 10: Dealing with 
Historical Legacies  
NS 11: Socio-Political 
Issues- Bribery & 
Corruption 
 
 
 
Social Issues 
GS 1: Human Development 
GS 2: Stakeholder Engagement 
GS 3: Community Development & Revenue Sharing  
GS 4: Human Rights  
GS 5: Social Licence to Mine 
GS 6: Culture & Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
GS 7: Governance and Good Institutions 
GS 8: Compliance on Global Social Frameworks-CSR 
GS 9: Health and Safety 
 
Environmental Issues 
GE 1: Environmental Management and Governance 
GE 2: Sustainable Production & Consumption  
GE 3: Pollution and Risk Management 
GE 4: Biological Diversity and Habitat Loss 
GE 5: Cleaner Technologies and Production 
GE 6: Emissions and Environmental Sinks 
GE 7: International Standards and Compliance  
 
Economic Issues 
GEC 1: Resource Revenue Management 
GEC 2: Macroeconomic Stability  
GEC 3: Mineral Availability and Depletion 
GEC 4: Investments- Ethical Investments 
GEC 5: Inter-Generational Equity in Natural  
Resource Usage 
GEC 6: Responsible Mineral Development  
GEC 7: Artisanal & Small-scale Mining  
(ASM) Issues 
 
 
 GLOBAL ISSUES 
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further defined. Table 4.6 gives an overview of the core indicators in each of the 
systems for national sustainability. The regional SD goals tabled through a lengthy 
scan of the challenges and issues facing the continent by the ECA have been co-opted 
into the indicators’ framework (see ECA 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d). The Global 
SDGs were not used because the proposed regional SD Goals reflect the regional view 
of what the continent wants to achieve.  
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Table 4.6: Sustainable Development Indicators at the National Level 
CORE INDICATOR GLOBAL-REGIONAL-NATIONAL ISSUES REFERENCES SD GOALS (African Region) 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM (E) 
E 1: Macroeconomic Stability GEC 2; NEC 1: Growth policies- Fiscal, Taxation, Investments; FDIs; GDP; General accounts. 
Collier (2011); IMF (2012a); Okonjo-
Iweala (2010); WEF (2013, 2011); World 
Bank (1992) GOALS 1 & 2 
 
 
 
GOAL 8 
 
 
 
GOAL 9 
 
 
 
GOAL 12 
E 2: Investments into Capital Development 
GEC 4; NEC 2, 5, 6: SD Concerns (mainly investments into any social project is considered as 
economic spending hence captured in this section)- Economic development, poverty 
alleviation; Investments Into development projects- road and railway systems public works; 
Capital Infrastructure Development; Employment creation; Social investments into 
communities; Social infrastructure; Research and development; Science, Technology and 
Innovation Policies; Cleaner technologies and production. 
Söderholm and Svahn (2015); WEF 
(2013); ICMM (2014, 2012a); Humphreys 
(2001); Hilson and Murck (2000)      
E 3: Resource Nationalism (RN) Issues 
GEC 1; NEC 13: Considers mining industry players' view of government approaches to RN issues 
such as: uncertainty over environmental regulations, regulatory duplications, legal systems and 
tax regimes; Other issues include: mandated beneficiation, greater shares in LSM, increasing 
taxation (royalties, corporate taxes, state ownership, and nationalisation of mines.                                              
 AU (2009); ECA-AU (2011); Matshediso 
(2005); Ward (2016) 
E 4: Mining Sector Linkages 
GEC 1; NEC 12: Policy coherence of mineral policy framework with other sector policies; Local 
beneficiation policy; Procurement and local Supply chain. 
Solderholm and Svahn (2014); Dougherty 
(2011) 
E 5: Transparency and Management of 
Revenues 
GEC 5, 6; NEC 3, 4, 10, 11: Public revenue management; Transparency in the use of mineral 
rents; Equitable distribution of revenues and wealth (benefit sharing) with communities.  
Solderholm and Svahn (2014); AU (2009) 
E 6: ASM (Economic) Issues 
 
GEC 7; NEC 9: Incoming revenues from ASM; Legal provisions for ASM. 
 
Buxton (2012); Hentschel et al. (2003); 
Hilson (2009, 2003); Hoadley and 
Limpitlaw (2004) 
E 7: Sustainable Production GEC 3: Sustainable production and consumption of natural resources.  
Azapagic (2008); Hamilton and Ley 
(2010) 
E 8: Trade and Investment 
GEC 4; NEC 1: Intra-regional trade with other African countries and trade with developed 
countries; Investments into mineral development funds; Equity markets; Sovereign Wealth 
Funds. 
IMF (2012a); Arreaza et al. (2009); ECA-
AU (2011) 
NATURAL/ ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM (N) 
N 1: Effective Environmental Regulations 
GE 1; NE 1, 2, 7: Nuisance, air and water quality; Land degradation, biodiversity, etc.; Laws and 
acts supporting environmental protection. 
Atkinson et al. (1997); Sinkala (2009); 
Republic of South Africa-DME (2009); 
UNCSD (2007)  
GOAL 8 
 
 
 N 2: Environmental Quality  
GEC 3, 6; NE 1, 2, 3, 4: Energy usage and emissions- GHGs, CO2; water, air and land pollution; 
Wastes- liquid effluents and leachates; Acid mine drainage; Biodiversity and habitat loss; GE 7; 
NE 4: Performance on environmental sustainability issues. 
Hsu and Hu (20080; UNCED (1992); ECA 
(2013a, b, c, d, e); WSSD (2002)  
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N 3: Sustainable Natural Resource 
Management 
GE 1; NE 4, 5: Water - use, security of supply and recycling; Protection of the natural system- 
forest reserves and land; Land use; Environmental management and monitoring systems. 
ICMM (2010, 2012b); Azapagic (2004); 
Daily and Huang (2001); Azapagic and 
Perdan (2000) 
GOAL 10 
 
 
 
 
GOAL 11 
N 4: Mine Closure 
GE 1; NE 4, 5: Environmental management and monitoring systems- post-mine rehabilitation 
and strategic planning for mine closure.  
Azapagic (2004); Azapagic and Perdan 
(2000) 
N 5: ASM (Environmental) Issues GE 3; NE 3: ASM Pollution- Mercury; Degradation; Regulations and management. 
Tschakert and Singha (2007); Valdivia 
and Ugaya (2011) 
N 6: Knowledge of Mineral Reserves and 
Resources  
GEC 1; NE 6: Knowledge of available mineral reserves; Horizon- effective time span until 
exhaustion. 
AU (2009); USGS (2012) 
N 7: Compliance on Global and Regional 
Environmental Sustainability Frameworks 
GE 7; NE 7: International standards and compliance on global environmental frameworks. UNCED (1992); WSSD (2002) 
SOCIAL SYSTEM (S) 
S 1: Governance  GS 7; NS 3: Institutional quality; Peace and security; Voice and accountability. 
 AU (2009); ECA-AU-AfDB (2012); 
Ibrahim Index on African Governance 
(IIAG) (2016) 
GOALS 1 & 2 
 
GOAL 3 
 
 
GOAL 4 
GOAL 5 
GOAL 6 
GOAL 7 
S 2: Quality of Life 
GS 1; NS 2, 6: Standard of living; Welfare; Human development- income, health, quality of 
education; Job security and labour entitlements; HRD- education, training and skills 
development; Income security; Job satisfaction. 
Probst (2003); Sen (1999); UNDP (2016) 
S 3: Gender Equality and Empowerment 
GS 4; NS 4, 5: Women’s empowerment, equity in terms of access to resources- income, wealth 
and healthcare delivery services and social and political participation in all aspects of family, 
society and national governments. 
ECA (2011a); Whitehead (2003)  
S 4: Human Rights Concerns 
GS 4; NS 4, 5: Equal opportunity and non-discrimination; Social inclusion; Equality; 
Participation; Legal frameworks backing employee and workers’ rights. 
Sen (1999); UNDP (2016) 
S 5: Legal Provisions for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) 
GS 8: Legal obligations set by the State for companies; CSR Institutionalised in legal 
frameworks. 
Campbell (2012); ECA-AU (2011); Hilson, 
(2012)    
S 6: Local Content Legislations  
GS 9; NS 1, 9, 10: Job provision; Labour quotas for locals in employment; Procurement and 
enterprise development; Measures to deal with historical legacies; Health and safety. 
Hilson (2012); Klueh et al. (2007); 
Ramdoo (2016) 
S 7: Social Cohesion and Socio-economic 
Development 
GS 2, 3, 4; NS 7, 8, 11: Community development and local government relations; Preservation 
of culture and indigenous peoples’ rights; Social Licence to Mine. 
McPhail (2009); Hilson and Murck 
(2000); ICMM (2014)     
S 8: Compliance on Global Voluntary Social 
Initiatives and Frameworks 
GS 8: Ratifications of UN multilateral treaties, conventions, frameworks and strategies. WSSD (2002); UNCSD (2012)   
Source: Researcher’s Assessment (2016); References included in the Table  
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From Table 4.6, a number of SD issues pertaining to the sustainability of the business 
environment was also drawn from Azapagic (2004); Azapagic and Perdan (2000) for 
the minerals and metals sector. Annexes 4.2- 4.5 provide detailed information on the 
indicators, definitions for the SD metrics and elements used for the assessment. The 
full list of the regional SD goals in Table 4.6 is further illustrated in Annex 4.6. 
4.3.3 Measuring Sustainable Development  
Measuring SD is arduous due to the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the 
concept. However, using the indicators’ framework for assessment provides a better 
means for quantification. Often, many indices (such as the EPI and the RGI) use the 
arithmetic mean to aggregate the components of a concept. Likewise, for the mix of 
quantitative and qualitative SD indicators (see Table 4.6), the arithmetic mean formula 
is applied. Figure 4.4 visually highlights the rationale behind the SD measurement.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Figure 4.4: A Graphical Illustration of the SD Model 
Source: Researcher’s Adaptation from Munasinghe (1992); IIED- MMSD (2002)
From Figure 4.4, the measurement approach combines the three systems’ indicators 
by assuming equal weightings for each system of SD (at 100% per each system). The 
larger triangle represents the optimal balanced point- this commences from the centre 
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at (0%) to the end of the vertices (at 100%). It further assumes that, if countries are 
close to all three elements (at 100%), this then implies the ‘goodness’ of the SD 
situation in a country. The scale of (100%) for national sustainability is purely for the 
measurement process. The (23) SD indicators identified (in section 4.3.2) are ranked 
in terms of the ‘process’ indicators in some cases, together with the scores of other 
relevant indexes, which are put on the same scale then aggregated using the arithmetic 
mean formula. The mean formula for the SD indicators for each of the three systems- 
Economic System (E), Environmental/Natural System (N) and the Social System (S), 
representing individual (x) values is expressed as:   
?̅? =
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
……………..............………………………………….……….….... (1) 
In terms of the normalisation technique, ordinal rankings and the min-max method are 
applied to some of the indicators. The min-max formula is expressed mathematically 
as: 
𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
…………..…………………………...………………………...…... (2) 
Where (x) represents the indicator value to be transformed. The assessment also relied 
heavily on ordinal rankings, particularly ‘toggle-switch’ questions, such as: (Yes- 1 
and No- 0); and (Ratified and signed- 1, signed 0.5 and not signed 0). To ensure that 
all indicators are on the same scale, process and outcome indicators were scaled to 100 
before the mean values for each system were derived.43  
                                                   
43 As a caveat, composite indicators and index require many methods. In each case, the method selected is 
at the discretion of the evaluator. Because in the case of SD, several indexes exist within the various 
dimensions, some of these are pooled together. Thus, the thesis proposes the concept of super indexes, 
which draws on other indexes to inform an integrated index. A benefit of this, is ensuring that different 
instruments within SD speak to one another, minimal use of resources and engaging different agencies to 
work together to achieving a common and integrated index for SD. 
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For ease of assessment of SD, the arithmetic mean obtained for the national systems 
for (n) values, satisfying 0 ≤ n ≤ 100 for national sustainability is further simplified on 
a rating scale for the assessment (in Table 4.7).  
Table 4.7: Rating Scale for Sustainable Development 
Score Rank 
0 – 30 Bad 
30 ≥ 50 Poor 
50 ≥ 70 Average 
70 ≥ 90 Good 
90 ≥ 100 Excellent 
Source: Researcher’s Data Analysis (2016) 
 
 
The rationale for the rating scale was to aid the assessment and discussions of the SD 
quantification in the four countries.  
4.3.4 Data and Measurement Sources 
The base years for the SD measurement of the gold mining countries were (2014-
2015); additionally, where data was not available for those years, the latest available 
data was considered. Relevant global indexes were utilized especially in certain 
instances where data for national measurements were unavailable. Risk factors, such 
as political, economic, social and environment were inherent in some of the indexes, 
and thus were part of the assessment. The definitions of the quantitative and qualitative 
indexes used in some cases for the assessment are presented in Annexes 4.3- 4.5.  
Furthermore, because the indicators drew on a pool of other global measures and 
indexes, the aggregated SDI is a mix of qualitative and quantitative measurements. 
Some of the qualitative (or process) indicators were assessed based on the 
effectiveness of the mining laws, policies and strategies that have been implemented 
by each country. This consisted of assessing the existence and effectiveness of fiscal 
frameworks, taxation, investments, local content laws, environmental legislations and 
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CSR strategies with a list of probing questions that is ranked out of a 100% using a 
series of toggle-switch questions. 
4.4 Overview of the Mining Sectors of the Selected Countries 
Before the SD assessment and discussions, the state of mining in the four countries is 
presented. The rationale of this brief is to show the state of general mining and SD 
frameworks which exist in the four mining regimes. This will enhance a further 
understanding of the index for the four countries in section 4.6. Figure 4.5 graphically 
illustrates the geographic positioning of each of the selected countries on a regional 
map of Africa.  
 
Figure 4.5: A Map Showing the Case Study Countries in Africa 
Source: GIS Map developed by the Witwatersrand Mining Institute- WMI (2017) 
Ghana 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
DRC 
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4.4.1 Ghana 
Ghana is the second largest producer of gold in Africa (producing about 107 and 85 
tonnes in 2014/15) (Minerals Commission, 2015). In 2011, it had one of the highest 
growth rates in the world of 15 per cent, second to Botswana and China (of which non-
oil contributions to GDP was 8%). Gold remains the highest contributor to the entire 
mining sector (of about 90%) to total mineral exports (The Ghana Chamber of Mines, 
2016). Its services and industrial sectors are the highest contributors to GDP of 28% 
and 49.6% respectively (in 2014), while its agricultural and mining sectors declined 
in percentage share to 22% and 3.5% respectively to GDP in 2015 (Ibid).  
Ghana’s liberalisation reforms led to the promulgation of a new mining law called the 
Provisional National Defence Law (PNDCL) 153 (after the 1962 Act, 126) in 1986. 
The aim of the Law was to open the economy to new mining investments. The second 
phase of Ghana’s mining laws from the 1990s emphasised environmental protection 
and served as an addendum to PNDCL 153. Because commitments from the Rio 
Declaration were in force, environmental sustainability became a key part of gold 
mining’s sustainability in Ghana (Akabzaa, 2009).  
By 2006, the Minerals Amendment Act to the PNDCL 153 was repealed, to make way 
for a new paradigm under one mining law - the Minerals and Mining Act of 2006, Act 
703. This Act according to Bloch and Owusu (2011) set the tone for a new mining 
regime in Ghana. The Act covers all aspects of mining, fiscal regulation, security of 
tenure, licences, community upliftment, small scale mining, while working with other 
auxiliary laws, such as the Environmental Protection Act, Act 490, Legislative 
Instruments (LIs) 2173- 2177 and 2182 on local content; fiscal laws, the Mineral 
Development Fund (MDF), Act 912, and the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.  
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4.4.2 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
The DRC economy grew at a rate of 7.7% in 2015 and 9.2% in 2014, making it one of 
the fastest growing countries in the world (AfDB, 2017). The recent growth can be 
attributed to its mining sector, of which, the country is the largest producer of cobalt 
globally (about 55% in relation to global output), and the second largest producer of 
industrial diamonds. It has significant high-grade copper ores, and has the tenth largest 
reserves of gold (KPMG, 2014b: Profile on DRC). Growth in real terms has been as a 
result of its extractives and manufacturing, agricultural and services’ sectors of about 
32.9%, 20.4% and 46% (from 2015 estimates) respectively (AfDB, 2017).  
Gold remains a key part of DRC’s extractive sector, with a 30% increase in gold 
production in 2015. With new private investments coming into the sector (by 
Randgold Resources & AngloGold Ashanti), gold has been touted as a key area for 
FDIs into the DRC (Chamber of Mines- DRC, 2015). The mining industry generates 
about 64% of the entire government revenues per the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) report of 2014 (Republique Democratique Du Congo- 
ITIE, 2015). Revenue in taxes from the mining industry in 2014 was US$1.348 billion 
paid by mining companies out of US$1.770-billion. The industry also provides 
indirect and direct employment to over 55 000 people of which there are multipliers 
of a job to four additional jobs (Chamber of Mines- DRC, 2016, 2015).  
The DRC passed its Mining Code (Law no. 007/2002) to govern the regulation of 
minerals exploitation and mining in 2002. The code covers all types of high value to 
low value minerals, metals and ores. Despite achieving a modicum of transparency in 
revenue management, the country has yet to benefit from its mineral revenues (see 
Republique Democratique Du Congo- ITIE, 2015). The government’s response to the 
limitation of the 2002 code is to propose increasing the free stake of 5% to 15% in 
new mining projects, increasing income tax from 30% to 35%, royalties on copper and 
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cobalt to 6%, and slicing stability agreement review from 10 years to 5 years (Radley, 
2017). DRC’s gold mining also consists of a large segment of artisanal gold producers 
mining illegally in the East Kivu Province. Government statistics points to over 90% 
of mineral revenues from the illegal/ legal ASM gold exploiters in the sector  (ECA, 
2016c).  
4.4.3 South Africa   
As the lead gold producer in Africa of (about 152 tonnes in 2015), gold constitutes 
11% of total mining to GDP in 2015, together with coal (23%), Platinum Group  
Metals (22%), mining and quarry (13%) and other metals at (31%) (Chamber of 
Mines- South Africa, 2016, 2015). The mining sector coupled with manufacturing 
enabled the current rise of 3.3% in GDP in 2016. Although mining only makes up 
7.7% of GDP in South Africa, its direct contribution is immense, of about (17%) to 
the economy; 10.8% and 17% in total fixed and private sector investments respectively 
(Chamber of Mines- South Africa, 2016).  
The impact of falling gold prices has had significant effects and led to a gradual decline 
of South Africa’s gold industry post-2008. Some of these effects have resulted in 
unsteady and volatile nature of gold operations. ‘This is gold’ (2015) postulates that 
between 2001 and 2014 the total amount of tonnes milled reduced by 7% and resulted 
in a 61% decrease in production. However, the multipliers to the South African 
economy are very significant with the gold sector supporting between (5- 10) 
dependants for every direct mining job created (Chamber of Mines- South Africa, 
2015; “thisisgold,” 2015a).  
South Africa’s mining code, the Minerals and Petroleum Resources and Development 
Act (MPRDA), Act 28 of 2002 repositioned the sector for international 
competitiveness after 2002. The goal of the MPRDA is to provide equitable access to 
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and the SD of South Africa’s mineral and petroleum resources for the needs of society. 
Article (2) situates the fundamental principle of the Mining Law with sub sections 2 
(h) and (i) framing South Africa’s SD strategy around the development of minerals 
and petroleum for socio-economic development and within the purview of ecological 
sustainability (Republic of South Africa, 2002). As a pacesetter, the Broad-Based 
Black Socio-Economic and Empowerment’s (B-BBSEE) Mining Charter of (2004) 
and it’s 2010 amendments under Art. (100) sections (1) and (2) of the MPRDA has 
laid the foundation for a local content strategy for sustainable and equitable access of 
its minerals for development of South Africa. There has been challenges to 
implementing the new Charter of 2017. Some of these challenges are noted in Chapter 
Eight on implementing the Strategy (see Section 8.4.1 of Chapter Eight).   
4.4.4 Tanzania  
In Tanzania, gold is one of the largest sources of growth to the economy with an annual 
production of (45- 50) tonnes in the past four years. Minerals exports accounted for 
about 24% of total value of Tanzania’s export in 2015 with gold representing more 
than 90% of this share (AfDB, n.d.). The country has come a long way of rapid growth 
from 3.9% in 2013, with key contributions from other sectors including construction 
(14.1%), financial and insurance (10.8%), information and communication (8.0%), 
services (7.2%) and manufacturing sector (6.8%) in 2014 (Ibid). 
Tanzania’s gold mining sector reforms can be traced to the beginning of the economic 
recovery programme instigated by the IFIs in the 1980s. This led to two things: 1) the 
unbundling of the monopolised State Mining Company (STAMICO); and 2) the 
passing of the 1997 Mining Act and 1998 Mining Policy, according to Magai and 
Márquez-Velázquez (2011). From the mid-1990s, private players entered the gold 
sector, and this precipitated huge investments by 3 global seniors - AngloGold 
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Ashanti, Barrick Gold, now Acacia Mining and Placer Dome Inc. in the early 2000s 
(Ibid).  
Tanzania formulated a new Mining Policy in 2009 aimed at strengthening the 
integration of the mineral sector with other sectors of the economy (refer to The United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2009). As regulator, the government’s fiscal and environmental 
regime for regulating the sector have been lauded as robust, with its new Mining Act 
of 2010 enhancing transparency in the mineral rights framework and legitimising the 
activities of ASM operators. Additionally, Tanzania recently passed a Transparency 
and Accountability Act in 2015 to ensure availability and transparency of information 
on government contracts (Mining Development Agreements), revenue collection, 
spending by governments, data on capital investments into Tanzania, as well as 
revenues from mining production, exports, imports and fiscal instruments used to tax 
the minerals sector (see The United Republic of Tanzania, 2015a). The next sections 
present the four countries’ scores on the SDI and lessons learnt on SD implementation 
in the countries.  
4.5 Sustainable Development Applications in Selected Countries 
The performances on the SD indicators for the four selected gold mining countries 
(DRC, Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania) are discussed. These are centred on the 
scores within the three systems’ economic, environment and social concerns in 
mining. The governance dimensions have been co-opted in some of the systems (as 
was shown in Table 4.6). Before the general discussions, the methodology highlighted 
above is used in a country example to illustrate how SD within a system was measured. 
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4.5.1 An Example of the Measurement Using Ghana’s Social System 
Ghana’s scoring process under the social system is illustrated. This country example 
comprises of scores obtained on the qualitative and quantitative indicators. The 
arithmetic mean formula is applied to (8) core indicators under the social system to 
obtain the overall social sustainability score for Ghana. The scores for the indicators 
are presented below.  
The measure for governance (S1) was the Worldwide Governance Indicators. See 
scores in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: S1- World Governance Indicators 
Country Series Name 2015 
Ghana 
Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank 53.37 
Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank 44.71 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: 
Percentile Rank 50.00 
Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank 53.37 
Rule of Law: Percentile Rank 60.58 
Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank 65.52 
Final Score for S1 55% 
Source: Annex 4.7 
For quality of life (S2), the indices for measuring this indicator were the HDI and the 
Global Peace Index. The scores obtained for Ghana are presented in Table 4.9 
Table 4.9: S2- Quality of Life 
Country 
Human Development Index- 
HDI (2015) (0 - 1)  
Scaling 
Use in the SDI (scaled to 
100) 
Ghana 
0.579 57.9 57.9 
   
Global Peace Index- GPI (2015) 
(1- 5) 
Scaling 
Use in the SDI (scaled to 
100) 
1.84 0.368 (100- 36.8) = 63.2 
Final Scores for S2- Quality of Life 
HDI GPI 
Final Scores for S2 (Avg. 
HDI and GPI) 
57.9 63.2 61% 
Source: Annex 4.7 
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The measure for gender equality and empowerment (S3) was the Gender Inequality 
Index. See scores below. 
Table 4.10: S3- Gender Equality and Empowerment 
Country 
Gender Inequality Index 
(0- 1) 2015 
Scaling 
(1-x) 
Use in the SDI (scaled to 100) 
  Final Scores for S3 
Ghana 0.557 0.453 45% 
Source: Annex 4.7 
In terms of human rights concerns (S4), the measure for this indicator was civil and 
political liberties from the Freedom House Indicators. The scores are presented in 
Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11: S4- Human Rights Concerns 
Country 
  
Freedom House Indicators 
(2015) 
Freedom 
Rating (1/7) 
Use in the SDI 
(scaled to 100) 
Civil Liberties 
Political 
Rights    
Ghana 2 1 1.5/7= (0.2143) 
(100- 21.43) = 
78.57 
 Final scores for S4 79% 
Source: Annex 4.7 
Corporate Social Responsibility- CSR (S5) and local content (S6) indicators assessed 
the existence of expressed Local Content (LC) and CSR regulations or strategies. It 
was ranked on (100%- yes, 75%- to greater extent, 50%- average consideration, 25%- 
to a lesser extent, 0%- no consideration). The scores are presented in Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12: S5 and S6- Existence of Local Content and CSR Provisions 
S 5.1- CSR Provisions and S 6.1- Local Content Requirements 
Country 
S 5.1: Are there legal 
provisions for CSR in mining 
codes? 
S 6.1: Are there legal provisions for 
local content in mining codes? 
Ghana 50% 100% 
Source: Annex 4.7 
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S 5.2 and S 6.2 teased key CSR and LC elements for social sustainability. These are 
as presented in the Tables 4.13- 4.15. The legislative instruments whether implied or 
expressed is ranked based on the elements below. (1 for yes, 0.5 for implied and 0 for 
not included in the regime’s requirements).  
Legal provision for CSR (S5.2) is presented in Table 4.13. 
Table 4.13 (A): S5.2- Legal Provisions for CSR 
Country 
Economic 
Issues 
Beyond 
environmental 
sustainability 
Social upliftment Employee issues 
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Source: Annex 4.7 
Legal provision for local content (S6.2) is presented in Table 4.14.  
Table 4.14 (B): S6.2- Local Content Policies and Mining Law 
Local Content Provisions 
Country 
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The final scores for S5 and S6 are presented in the Table below. 
Table 4.15: Final Scores for S5 and S6 
 Country 
S5: Legal Provisions for CSR  S6: Local Content Legislation 
Are there legal 
provisions for 
CSR in mining 
codes? 
What 
elements are 
considered? 
Final 
Scores 
for S5 
Are there legal 
provisions for 
local content in 
mining codes? 
What 
elements 
are 
considered? 
Final 
Scores 
for S6 
Ghana 50 50 63% 100 54.5 87% 
Source: Annex 4.7 
The metric for assessing social cohesion and socio-economic development (S7) were 
CPIA’s Social Cohesion policy assessment and the African Infrastructure 
Development Index. The scores are presented in Table 4.16. The CPIA was used 
because of the challenges in obtaining national level data on social cohesion. 
Table 4.16: S7- Social Cohesion and Socio-economic Development 
Country 
CPIA- Social cohesion (2015) 
Africa Infrastructure 
Development Index 
(2015) 
Final 
Scores for 
S7 
Scored out of 6 
Use in the SDI 
(Normalised 
scores) 
scored out of 100 
Ghana 3.95 65.83 25.43 46% 
Source: Annex 4.7 
The status and ratification on relevant global human rights, regional human and social 
rights instruments was the indicator for S8, compliance on global and regional vol. 
initiatives. These were ranked based on the following: signed and ratified (1), not 
signed (0), signed but not ratified (0.5). The scores are presented in the Table below.  
Table 4.17: S8- Compliance on Global and Regional Vol. Initiatives 
Country 
Global Human 
Rights Frameworks 
Regional 
Frameworks- Social 
and Human Rights  
Final Scores for S8 
Ghana 80.6 100 90% 
Source: Annex 4.7 
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Ghana’s final scores under the social system are aggregated. The country had an 
overall score of 66%, which on the rating scale represent average social sustainability. 
This means, there exists room for Ghana to improve and enhance its social concerns 
in mining. Annexes 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate the measurement and scores for the four 
countries on social, environment and economic systems respectively. 
4.5.2 Measuring Sustainable Development in the Four Countries  
Taking into account Ghana’s example, the final scores for the four countries (from 
Annexes 4.7- 4.9) are presented in Table 4.18 and Figure 4.6. The aggregated SDI is 
shown in the last row of Table 4.18. 
Table 4.18: Sustainable Development Scores for Gold Mining Countries 
Core Indicators Ghana Dem. R. Congo South Africa Tanzania 
Economic System 
E 1: Macro-economic Stability 40 54 64 65 
E 2: Investments into Capital 
Development 
40 29 39 47 
E 3: Resource Nationalism (RN) Issues 69 43 52 62 
E 4: Mining Sector Linkages 31 28 84 31 
E 5: Transparency and Management of 
Public Revenues 
63 39 56 50 
E 6: Artisanal and Small-scale Mining 
(Economic Issues) 
38 38 56 50 
E 7: Sustainable Production 46 0 47 68 
E 8: Trade and Investment 41 25 50 40 
Average 46% 32% 56% 52% 
Rating Poor Bad Average Average 
  Ghana Dem. R. Congo South Africa Tanzania 
Natural/ Environmental System 
N 1: Environmental Regulations 100 100 100 100 
N 2: Environmental Quality 32 25 54 36 
N 3: Sustainable Natural Resource 
Management 
54 33 79 63 
N 4: Mine Closure 42 25 75 46 
N 5: ASM Environmental Issues  33 21 42 38 
N 6: Knowledge of Mineral Reserves 
and Resources 
38 21 67 42 
N 7: Compliance on Global and Regional 
SD Frameworks 
91 91 91 91 
Average 56% 45% 72% 59% 
Rating Average Poor Good Average 
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  Ghana Dem. R. Congo South Africa Tanzania 
Social System 
S1: Governance 55 7 59 35 
S2: Quality of Life 61 50 60 57 
S3: Gender Equality and Empowerment 45 34 61 46 
S4: Human Rights Concerns 79 14 71 57 
S5: Legal Provisions for CSR 63 50 75 46 
S6:  Local Content Legislation 87 31 100 78 
S7: Social Cohesion and Socio-economic 
Development 
46 27 66 38 
S8: Compliance on Global and Regional 
Vol. Initiatives 
90 76 88 71 
Average 66% 36% 73% 54% 
Rating Average Poor Good Poor 
Sustainable Development Index (SDI) 56% 38% 67% 55% 
Sources: Final scores extracted from Annexes (4.7- 4.9) 
Figure 4.6 graphically illustrates the above scores (from Table 4.18) on a GIS regional 
map of Africa. The aim for the figure is to provide a visual presentation of the scores 
attained by each country on the three systems.  
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Figure 4.6: Map Showing the SDI Scores for the Four Countries 
Source: Researcher’s Data Analysis (2016), Map developed by WMI (2017) 
DRC 
South Africa 
Ghana 
Tanzania 
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The system scores (in Table 4.18 and Figure 4.6) for the four countries are indicated 
in the table below (Table 4.19).  
Table 4.19: System Scores for the Four Countries 
Core Indicators 
Countries 
Ghana Dem. R. Congo South Africa Tanzania 
Economic System 46% 32% 56% 52% 
Natural/ Environmental System 56% 45% 72% 59% 
Social System 66% 36% 73% 54% 
Source: Extracted from Table 4.18 
From the SD rating, mining countries would have to aim for 70%- 100% to show 
significant progress in fulfilling SD ends.  
Under the economic system, South Africa had the highest score of (56%) although 
rated average (on the SD rating scale) out of the four countries in comparison. This 
score was similar to Tanzania’s score on the economic system. For South Africa, it 
has a clear-cut SD Strategy for its mining sector, which is pegged on its MPRDA, 
No.28 and the BBBSEE Mining Charter (refer to section 100 of the Republic of South 
Africa, 2002; Republic of South Africa-DMR, 2004). However, the current 
discontentment amongst the labour unions with government and companies, rising 
xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals (in 2008, 2011 and 2015) and the call for 
nationalisation of South Africa’s mines show weakening linkages of its mining sector 
with other sectors of the economy (see studies by Neingo and Tholana, 2016). 
Although, the scores represent a snapshot of the South African economy in 2015, the 
state of the broader economy has fared poorly in terms of growth from 2015- 2017 as 
compared to the last decade (see StatsSA, 2018 on annual growth trends for South 
Africa). Ghana had an overall poor economic sustainability score of (46%) but 
performed averagely on some of the economic indicators. The reason for the averagely 
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robust scores is because it’s MMA 703 is transparent on royalties and other forms of 
taxes payable by mining companies to government (see Bloch and Owusu, 2011). 
However, in terms of rent usage, unlike its petroleum management, gold revenues are 
counted as part of the general fiscus and distributed without a long- term investment 
strategy to ensure revenue sustainability. On indicator (E8. b) - ‘investment funds from 
gold revenues’ for instance, Ghana scored 0% but received a total score of 41% 
because of its intra-regional trade policies. Although it established the MDF in 2016, 
its object is for the socio-economic development of mining communities. The strong 
connections of GDP growth to mineral rents show that a strategic investment strategy 
for long-term development is of necessity to ensure that citizens benefit from mineral 
wealth. For the DRC, poor economic sustainability scores depict a weak link of 
mining’s transformative capacity for enhancing development. However, with 
governments current efforts on transparency (becoming EITI-compliant in 2013), 
there has been noted improvement in mining revenues’ collection and management, 
although marginally (Radley, n.d.). Overall, with regards to economic sustainability, 
the DRC performed poorly. This can be attributed to the country’s weak social and 
economic governance and endemic corruption (see scores in Table 4.18). Areas with 
predominant gold mining activities are amongst the poorest in the country with weak 
infrastructure (refer to studies by Matthysen and Montejano, 2013; Oxford Policy 
Management, 2013 on gold mining communities in the DRC). 
On environmental system, it was revealed that approaches were average towards 
environmental sustainability. This is due to the lack of technical capacity to frequently 
monitor mining activities on the environment (see similar conclusions from Sinkala, 
2009; ECA, 2009;  paragraphs 75- 79). With that said, South Africa’s experience with 
its National Environmental Management Act- NEMA (and its associated acts- water, 
air quality and bio-diversity) and targets of the BBBSEE Charter have provided a 
103 
 
strong sustainability framework for environmental preservation. Scores on N1, N3, 
N4, N6 and N7 were good for environmental sustainability. Overall, it had a good 
environmental sustainability score of 72%. However, some scholars and legal experts 
(Leon et al., 2017; Ridl and Couzens, 2010; Vermak, 2017) are of the opinion that 
delays in environmental authorisations procedures due to frequent amendments to the 
NEMA add on the potential risk for foreign investors in mining. Nevertheless, South 
Africa’s scores on environmental sustainability are a clear indication of an effective 
framework for ensuring SD ends with industry players. In Ghana’s case for example, 
environmental frameworks and strategies for protection and rehabilitation are present 
in the regime; however, the lack of technical capacity weakens the impact of such 
requirements. Therefore, Ghana’s score was average at 56% for environmental 
sustainability. In terms of environmental system, the DRC has instituted regulations 
at the national level, with ratification on global environmental instruments of 
relevance to mineral economies. For DRC’s environmental regime, there are in 
existence laws to deal with mining’s effects, thus scoring (100%) and (91%) on N1 
and N7 respectively. However, on environmental quality where the environmental 
performance index (EPI) was the proxy, its score was low at 25%. On the other 
indicators under environmental system, weak governance, and a lack of effective 
monitoring and evaluation frameworks persist leading to the poor sustainability 
performance on the index. Tanzania scored fairly on environmental system. The 
clarity in the country’s national regulations and ratification on global environmental 
frameworks pinpoint to the robust average on its environmental system scores. 
However, in terms of practical applications, the EPI depicted that environmental 
quality for Tanzania is poor at 38%. Overall, lack of effective monitoring controls on 
ASM activities (N5) (similar to Ghana and the DRC) and weak environmental quality 
affected the total national environmental sustainability score for the country.  
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On the social system’s assessment, Ghana and South Africa had average and good 
social sustainability scores respectively. Ghana recently instituted provisions for local 
content, thus scored a high average of 75% for the requirements under Legislative 
Instruments- LIs (2173- 2177; 2182). However, the country’s mining sector is weakly 
linked with the local economy (ICMM, 2015; Debrah et al., 2013). This was evident 
from the score on mineral sector linkages, where the economic aspects of local 
procurement and content for mining were weak at 31%. Also, in the context of national 
socio-economic development, contributions from mining in the past (8) years have 
been incrementally impactful (Minerals Commission, 2015). In terms of lessons, 
Ghana lacks a core integrative SD Strategy or mechanism to build the different mining 
sector agencies’ mandates into a cohesive entity. Ghana can thus learn from South 
Africa’s SD Strategy. South Africa’s overall score of 73% can be attributed to the 
country’s excellent scores on local content, scoring 100% provisions for CSR (75%), 
and global and regional voluntary initiatives (88%), compared with the other three 
countries. Its BBBSEE charter requirements have effective monitoring and evaluative 
frameworks to ensure that local content is preserved for the local economy (Republic 
of South Africa-DMR, 2010). The higher scores on the indicators for the social system 
is encapsulated in Annex 4.10 which presents the performance of four major gold 
mining companies in South Africa. In Annex 4.10, gold mining companies are within 
80- 100% reach on the BBBSEE targets (this is based on 2015 data) and have made 
significant contributions to the SD of the mining communities in which they operate. 
Tanzania’s average score of 54% can be attributed to weak governance and socio-
economic development and cohesion deficits, thus receiving average sustainability 
scores of 35% and 38% on S1 and S7 respectively. Although the country’s mining law 
supports local content because there is not an express strategy to transition the 
requirements of the law, it received a lower score on impacts on the local economy. 
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The Bomani Report (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2008) recognised Tanzania’s 
challenges with using mineral rents for socio-economic development. Over time, its 
current development Vision 2025 has also noted the cracks in social cohesion limiting 
the political will of the nation and government to function effectively (The United 
Republic of Tanzania, 1999). In terms of the assessment, Tanzania can benefit from 
addressing coordination challenges with effective guidelines for the SD of the industry 
(this was noted in The United Republic of Tanzania, 2011 on industrial policies). In 
mining also, this can be realised by building synergistic relationships between mining 
sector agencies towards achieving a common goal. In addition, by setting monitoring 
and evaluation (M & E) frameworks and targets, it can also learn from South Africa’s 
approach. Overall, the DRC had a poor social sustainability score. On social 
governance, where the World Bank’s Governance Indicators were used as the proxy, 
it scored 7%. The country has significant infrastructure deficits as well as in socio-
economic development. It thus scored 27% based on its performance on the African 
Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI) and the CPIA’s social cohesion policy 
assessment. The lack of expressed M & E frameworks and targets in the mining code 
and the absence of a LC Strategy 35F44 to foster socio-economic development have 
resulted in the weak linkages of the sector with other sectors of the economy.  
4.5.3 Sustainable Development Performance for the Four Countries 
The above discussions and scores (from Table 4.18) are graphed to illustrate the area 
of sustainability for the four countries in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. The red-lined triangle 
should match the boundaries of the black-lined triangle at the three points of (social, 
                                                   
44 On CSR under (S 5), its Chamber of Mines has initiated the development of a mining industry guide based 
on the ISO 26000 reference standard to harmonise the different CSR strategies undertaken by large-scale 
mining companies. 
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economic, and natural/ environmental systems) at 100% each. See earlier discussion 
on the methodology in Section 4.3.3. 
 
Figure 4.7: National SD Triangles for Ghana and the DRC  
Source: Researcher’s data analysis (2016) 
 
Figure 4.8: National SD Triangles for Tanzania and South Africa 
Source: Researcher’s data analysis (2016) 
From Figure 4.7, Ghana’s SD triangle (red-lined triangle) shows that it has a strong 
inclination towards social sustainability, a little above average on the environment, 
and low output towards achieving economic sustainability. The DRC’s red-lined 
triangle is below the mid-level reach of 50% on all three systems. Tanzania’s graph 
based on the scores show a tilt towards environmental system. However, South 
Africa’s SD triangle (in Figure 4.8) shows good progress towards ideal view of 
sustainability (indicated by the black-lined triangle) bordering the blue circle. All in 
all, it can be said that South Africa has made significant progress on sustainability 
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(D) South Africa (C) Tanzania 
(A) Ghana 
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ends; however, the same cannot be said for the three other countries since balancing 
within the three systems has been challenging (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8).  
4.6 Lessons from the National Sustainable Development Applications 
Despite the data limitations and reliance on international indices in some contexts, the 
above findings point to the challenge in realising SD in terms of the triple bottom line 
for countries. Also, how countries define sustainability in mining determines how 
effective mining’s contribution to SD would be for the industry and a nation. Hence, 
there is a need to redefine SD bearing in mind the peculiar and regionally common 
challenges faced by mining countries. For some countries, the pre-conditions such as 
good governance, strong institutions, infrastructure and socio-economic development 
were inadequate to support a strong SD agenda for mining (case in point is the DRC). 
There are some strides being made towards social and environmental sustainability; 
however, the findings also showed deficits in economic sustainability for the countries. 
South Africa’s MPRDA (with its BBBSEE charter) provides a blue-print to enhance 
the critical linkages of mining to the national and local economy. Considering Ghana 
and Tanzania, although they have reached some of the pre-defined minimum 
conditions for social and environmental sustainability (through national regulations 
and implementation strategies), it further requires effective benchmarks and target-
setting to build the needed economic and social linkages of the gold mining industry 
with the broader economy.    
On the other hand, the plethora of fiscal and social instruments 36F45 that are currently 
introduced in the name of SD are also placing mineral economies under pressure – not 
                                                   
45 Examples of special costs and taxes falling into this category are ownership targets; social and labour plans; 
export levies for forced value-addition; environmental taxes; schemes for targeting windfall profits; resource 
nationalism instruments; etc. 
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so much because of the governance challenges, but rather the considerable economic 
cost of compliance. This sometimes comes at a cost to national sustainability efforts 
which are weakened when similar standards for national level monitoring are non-
existent.  
Conclusively, the sustainability agenda has brought about an unequivocal justification 
for the premiums placed on environmental protection (as was argued in Chapter 
Three), together with the balancing of natural wealth for inter-generational equity and 
welfare of current generations. However, the ideal SD definition must be refined for 
mineral economies in Africa. This is because placing equal premiums within the 
processes of each system jeopardises the end goals of sustainability when the 
minimum conditions required for each system has not been met in the pursuance of 
the balancing components (see Bass, 2007). Therefore, RRA countries should consider 
alternative pathways for optimal development of mining vis-à-vis SD considerations 
that best suit their interest and unique context.  
4.7 Conclusion 
The discussions in Chapter Three showed that SD is a multi-faceted issue for mineral 
economies and suggested re-assessing sustainability in mining based on relevant 
indicators and benchmarks for Africa’s unique context. As a result, this Chapter 
defined indicators for measuring SD at the national level for gold mining countries. 
Although, there was no reason to focus solely on gold, Chapter One (section 1.9) 
indicated that gold is significant for rural and national economic development. The 
Chapter further discussed the methodology used in the selection of the countries as 
well as the indicators relevant for measuring sustainability in mineral economies.  
Evidence from the assessment of the four countries showed mixed progress in all the 
dimensions of SD. In some instances, like economic sustainability, countries 
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performed averagely to poorly. On social and environmental sustainability, the metrics 
showed good to average results for some countries (Ghana, South Africa and 
Tanzania). The lessons from the findings suggested that the balancing components 
remains challenging if pre-conditions (success factors) such as good governance and 
institutions are minimal. This confirmed some of the discussions in Chapter Three 
about finding alternative pathways to realising the SD agenda for African countries 
using mineral wealth for development.  
In a similar discussion, the IIED in Bass (2007) pointed to the need to deviate from 
the norm of balancing components or triple bottom line view of SD because of the 
inability of States to maintain the same levels of optimality within the three systems. 
Per Bass (2007), ‘...many local institutions have evolved precisely to integrate 
changing social, environmental and economic objectives in people’s daily lives, to 
make clear trade-offs where integration is not possible, and to foster equity within and 
between generations – in other words, for sustainable development… we need to bring 
on board discourses and traditions that have been missing from the sustainable 
development debate, asking ‘what is desirable to improve the quality of life?’ (p. 3-4). 
The assertions by Bass (2007) reinforces the need to explore SD and identify renewed 
ways of defining sustainability to suit the unique context and challenges faced by 
mining countries in Africa.  
In this regard, the next Chapter explores the concept of optimal mining and how it best 
fits into the discourse of SD and the critical linkages needed for the economic 
development of RRA countries, specifically gold mining economies. 
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Chapter 5  
Optimal Mining and Sustainable Development- Establishing the Link for 
Growth and Development 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter introduces optimal mining in the context of SD. The previous Chapter 
showed that SD as is currently interpreted by national economies in Africa is difficult 
to attain. As such, there is a need to explore renewed ways to adapt to sustainability 
principles.46 Chapter One’s discussions proposed optimal mining or ‘optimal mineral 
development’ as one of the ways to re-interpret SD for mineral economies. However, 
in tracing from literature, how similar is the concept of optimal mining to SD? To 
answer the above question, the Chapter aims at two things: firstly, to dissect what 
optimal mining means and draw linkages between the concept and SD. The second 
point of this Chapter is to lay the foundation for the development of a national 
investment Strategy in Chapter Six. The linkage between optimal mining and SD is 
expressed as sustainable economic development.  
The Chapter further purports that like SD, optimal mining is also an economic and 
governance issue that must be seen from an economic perspective to further 
sustainable growth ends for RRA economies. Optimal mining is discussed in light of 
how to balance regime stability with (new) policy instruments for rent generation, 
capture and the management of investments required for growth in the purview of 
Africa’s unique challenges. There are three objectives set to be achieved in this 
Chapter- these are: 
                                                   
46 Although, assumedly, some stakeholders and institutions have moved away from the triple bottom line 
definition, the majority of developing mineral economies in Africa interpret SD in this context. 
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1. Introduce the concept of optimal mining in the context of SD; 
2. Discuss the essentials for the SED of mineral economies; and 
3. Develop a checklist to guide the design of an optimal mining investment 
strategy for mineral economies.  
5.2 Reconceptualising Sustainable Development for Mineral Economies 
The assessment conducted in Chapter Four brought to bear some of the challenges in 
operationalising the SD concept in mining regimes in Africa. In some African 
countries, political uncertainty, dissatisfaction with the use of rents for development, 
and the weak presence of success factors, such as good governance, efficient 
institutions and ‘political will’ resulted in the poor to average performance on the 
sustainability indicators in Chapter Four. The weak efforts at strengthening some of 
the success factors, led to the difficulty in realising SD ends, vis-à-vis mining’s 
transformative role for economic development. Entirely on the different 
manifestations (based on the final SDI and the size of the SD triangles) in Chapter 
Four, the research opines that the triple bottom line view of sustainability may not 
necessarily transform mineral economies in achieving the goals of SD.  
At the core of the SD debate is whether the convergence of the social, environmental 
and economic pillars does not leave open critical questions of value systems and what 
a nation or government should consider as its goals. The different systems within SD 
(as illustrated in Figure 3.1, Chapter Three) must equally intersect for true 
sustainability to be realised. National goals must aim at balancing economic 
development with equity and efficiency, allowing for SD while the governmental 
systems and institutions enforce industry compliance.  
Conversely, how one defines SD would inform the premiums placed on each system, 
the size as well as the level of intersection of SD, most ideally. Usually, this would be 
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reflective of the culture of the society i.e. its systems, institutions, principles and 
ethics, which define their way of thinking and invariably lead to which system is more 
important, and eventually to trade-offs. To emphasise this point for example, Figure 
5.1, shows a stylised representation of the triple bottom line of SD and the state of 
sustainability in the sample countries that were used for the assessment - the circles 
are extracted from the average scores of the SD systems in Chapter Four. 
 
Figure 5.1: The Current Tempered Triple Bottom Line model of SD 
Source: Researcher’s Interpretation (2016)
The Figure 5.1, which is a tempered triple bottom line is indicative that sustainability 
is not realisable at the midpoint. Implementing SD remains challenging since in each 
case, the understanding of its implementation is bent towards one, or the combination 
of two spheres. This confirms the review in Chapter Three and the assessment of the 
four countries in Chapter Four. The environmental and governance issues seemed to 
take the lead in the 1980s and 1990s with a lesser focus on the economics and social 
issues. Also, the smaller nexus of all three intersecting circles further shows the 
challenge of optimising sustainability in mineral economies. That said, the importance 
of the governance dimension remains paramount in realising SD goals in mining as 
acknowledged by the IIED-MMSD (2002).    
Not Sustainable 
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Recent developments post 2000, have also suggested that the current focus is now on 
the social and environmental issues, while some are under-appreciative of the 
importance of the economic dimension as cautioned by Crowson (2001). Hilson and 
Murck (2000) and Humphreys (2001) have justified that the industry’s drive to SD 
through greater environmental and social governance can increase profitability. 
However, it is pertinently subjective because profitability depends on global demand 
factors, costs, resource discovery, economic profitability of extraction, and the 
strictness of the regulations, which govern mineral development. Therefore, the 
promotion of economic efficiency of the industry should be revisited and integrated 
with environmental and social concerns contoured on good governance.  
In his candid opinion, Cawood (2011) asserted that the economics of the project 
ultimately determines how sustainable the integration of social and environmental 
concerns under good governance would be for a mineral project. This is fundamental 
under the economic theory of the markets because if a firm or industry does not 
optimally combine its factors of production, it stands to make losses when the cost of 
production is higher than market price. This is apparent in the extractive industries, 
hence the need to optimally combine the factor inputs such as land (or minerals) in 
this context, labour, capital and enterprise.  
Optimal mineral development as is purported, implies the application of optimal 
extraction techniques, processes, and optimal (economic) utilisation of goods and 
services generated from mineral resources (see Cawood, 2009; 2011). It further 
connotes a realisation of greater economic efficiency (at the firm level) to enhance 
sustainable economic growth, equitable distribution of resources, and greater 
ecological governance between current and future generations (at the national level).  
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In the final analysis, the current view of SD in mining as interpreted by the MMSD is 
critical for RRA countries. However, who defines these goals within the ‘locale’ is as 
important as how that party interprets SD and the world view with which they 
subscribe to (see Sexton et al., 2008: for the anthropocentric versus ethnocentric views 
of sustainability). Because MNCs are party to operating within the confines of their 
jurisdictions, when SD principles and goals are not well integrated and aligned to the 
current stage of economic development of a country, it leaves room for value 
judgements and trade-offs (Gasparatos et al., 2009).  
With that being said, re-conceptualising SD for mining as a process, which commences 
with an optimal mining view can provide a unique path for using mineral rents to 
contribute to the development of RRA countries. The following sections discuss what 
optimal mineral development means in terms of the value chain and its transmissions. 
Also, the linkages between SD and optimal mining are probed with the conclusion that 
for mineral economies, at their current stage of development, the process of SED can 
facilitate overall development. 
5.3 Optimal Mineral Development in Mineral economies and Industry 
‘Optimal’ mining is embedded within the concept of SD. It presupposes a type of 
‘mining’ where the best approaches and alternatives are considered along the mining 
value chain, with strategies for maximally sharing mineral rents between the State, 
communities and mining companies (as already noted). In a paper by Cawood (2011), 
he asserted that optimal mining is the focus on the profit motive in mining while 
mitigating for the costs of mining and compensating for the impact on the environment 
and society… “as well as to allow for tangible benefits for the host country (Ibid, 
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p.3).47 This speaks to three fundamentals of optimal mining- that is extraction, capture 
and management of rents to provide the highest satisfaction for all stakeholders.  
Taking into consideration these fundamentals, Porter's (1985) model of the value chain 
is used (as the framework) to analyse the concept of optimality and SD in mining. 
What does the value chain entail with regards to mining? Vorster's (2001) paper 
contextualised Porter’s (1985) framework of the value chain for the mining sector. 
Using an adapted version, the mining value chain for illustration purposes is simplified 
and presented in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2: The Mining Value Chain 
Sources: Adapted from Vorster (2001) 
The auxiliary activities in Figure 5.2 (cited in Vorster, 2001) show the range of 
supporting activities that enhance the mineral development process. Optimal mining 
within the entire process is focused on efficient rent capture while mitigating the costs 
of mining and compensating for the impact on the environment and society.  
                                                   
47 Cawood (2009) traced the concept of optimal use through international law to establish whether South 
Africa’s mineral and development frameworks imbibe optimal use principles in mining. 
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As has been previously established, optimal mining is embedded in the SD framework. 
Optimal mining and SD are intertwined. The concept proposes the use of optimal 
techniques in extraction, use and distribution of rents at the microeconomic (firm) 
level, whereas at the national level, SD proposes national instruments that guide the 
implementation of the mining processes within and outside the mining value chain. In 
terms of the three transmissions, Figure 5.3 illustrates where optimal mining and SD 
are situated in the context of the value chain.  
 
Figure 5.3: Situating Optimal Mining and SD in the Value Chain 
Source: Researcher’s Interpretation (2017) 
From Figure 5.3, optimal mining under step (1) ‘rent generation’ proposes optimal 
extraction techniques, but this may not guarantee SD without access to skilled 
workers, technology and innovation, finance, and adequate environmental protocols 
to safeguard externalities from mining. Likewise, the elements within rent capture and 
rent management, steps (2- 3) may not result in SD without adequate optimal 
instruments for garnering rents such as the linkages within the value chain and the 
monetary and fiscal policies for harnessing rent.  
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Optimal mining is steered at the  company level (see steps 1, 2, 3 in Figure 5.3), 
whereas SD provides the overarching framework at the macroeconomic level to guide 
mineral development in the value chain (in all the steps, from 1- 3).  
Due to the importance of rents in mining, the linkages are further explored under the 
three fundamentals of optimal mining, which is rent generation, rent capture and rent 
(revenue) management in the value chain at the micro and macroeconomic levels. 
Figure 5.4 lists the transmission process in optimal mining with explanations 
following suit after the figure.  
 
Figure 5.4: Optimal Mining and SD Linkages 
Source: Researcher’s conceptualisation (2016) 
The explanations are grouped under macro and microeconomics issues of relevance to 
mining in developing mineral countries’ context. 
5.3.1 Rent Generation (Stages 1 and 2 of the Value Chain) 
In discussing the concept of optimal mining and SD, the section traces the legitimacy 
of the concept in international law. Here, it is the right of sovereignties to decide what 
is ‘optimal’ and sustainable in their regulatory frameworks. In this regard, many 
international and regional frameworks are of relevance in giving countries the 
sovereign right to utilise optimal mining instruments and SD principles in their 
jurisdictions. Because ‘rent generation’ connotes that the legal foundation should have 
been laid, some of the international instruments to support optimal mineral 
development are discussed. 
1. Rent generation   
(Stages 1 & 2) 
2. Rent capture 
(Stages 3 & 4)
3. Rent management 
(Post- Stage 4)
118 
 
Macroeconomic concerns 
Under rent generation, some of the instruments include: 
➢ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSONR) (1962); 
➢ Right to Development (A/RES/41/128) (1986); 
➢ African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981);  
➢ African Mining Vision (2009). 
The Right to Mine (RTM) which has a bearing on the international principles of Right 
to Development (A/RES/41/128) 1986 and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources (PSONR) 1962 are critical elements for SD and optimal mining (see UN, 
1986; United Nations, 1962).  
The Right to Development (RTD) is an instrument for legitimising optimal mining, 
this is because its human rights principles recognise all the PSONR tenets and further 
argues that “States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and 
international conditions ‘favourable’ to the realisation of the right to development” 
(UN, 1986, Article 3 on the RTD).  
Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992) clarified some of the implications of the adoption of 
environmental and social principles on mineral economies, such as the importance of 
environmental protection for growth and development, as well as natural (mineral) 
resources’ significance for development. This led to consideration of mining’s impact 
for SD in latter UN documents on SD. Two chapters on mineral resources and Africa’s 
development were discussed in the Johannesburg Platform for Implementation of SD 
in 2002.  
Also, in the ‘the future we want’ (UN Resolution 66/288, 2012) in 2012, there was a 
strong call for responsible mining with regards to the exploitation of  resources 
premised on the Rio Principles in Agenda 21 and to use mining as a leverage for 
maximising social and economic benefits (Ibid; p.44 on SD). It is important to note 
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the distinctions between optimal mining and SD based on these instruments. In the 
international literature, the majority of the general instruments speak to SD principles 
over and above ‘highest and best use’ (at the company level) which may be in the 
interest of African states. Thus, optimal use (mining) instruments should be asserted 
at the company level with SD providing the basis at the national level.   
Under stages 1 and 2 of the value chain (under rent generation), the structure of the 
mineral development agreements (MDAs) is important in deriving more benefits for 
developing economies with MNCs. Governments must ensure that the ‘development 
imperative’ is asserted in the MDAs, while setting environmental standards for 
monitoring. The legal instruments for community assent in ‘social licence to operate’ 
by companies must be entrenched through due process, coupled with community 
development obligations and providing standards for mine health and safety of 
workers employed in the extraction process at the firm level. 
Microeconomic concerns 
In terms of microeconomic concerns, the nature of resource extraction dictates that 
optimal extraction techniques are applied to mining projects with the factors of 
production optimally allocated for maximum profit (see arguments in Section 5.2). 
Here, understanding optimal extraction techniques by optimising on NPV and 
managing extraction costs; infrastructure development and mine planning can enhance 
the competitive advantage of mine development for a viable mining enterprise (Runge, 
1998).  
5.3.2 Rent Capture (Stages 3 and 4 of the Value Chain) 
Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Concerns  
Under rent capture, “the viability of the minerals industry cannot be compromised by 
regulation of optimal use because the minerals industry cannot contribute to SD if 
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companies cannot survive and succeed” (Cited from Cawood, 2009 and in IIED-
MMSD, 2002). Governments must therefore ensure that certain economic 
fundamentals such as the (skills and infrastructure) are readily available through an 
effective mining tax regime, while creating the environment for new technologies to 
increase output in mineral processing at the company level.  
Both SD and optimal mining instruments can be found in the forward and backward 
linkages for rent capture, including the beneficiation of minerals for local and national 
development. In stages 3 and 4, optimising on milled ore and fabricating semi-finished 
products are concerns in optimal mineral development. In this process, waste 
management and disposal of effluence from processing must be conducted within 
international standards and the mandatory national regulations set by the State. Here, 
also, protocols for optimal mineral development are needed at the microeconomic 
level, with national SD instruments to shepherd how mining businesses are conducted. 
Typical supply chains servicing the mining industry in upstream, downstream and side 
stream are functional vehicles for rent capture that precipitate the linkages between 
the mining enterprise and the local economy for SED.   
5.3.3 Rent (Revenue) Management (Post-Stage 4) 
Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Concerns 
Beyond rent generation and capture, rent management concerns lay in adequately 
determining a fair share of rent (firstly) between the investor and government, and 
secondly optimally distributing rents for SD. On the part of government, the diverse 
stakeholders within the value and supply chains influence the size and share of profit 
(or rent). At the microeconomic level, it is the ‘would be’ contending staked interests 
that define the size of the rents after all cost deductions have been made. Therefore, 
the critical question to ask before the pursuance of a mining project and to assess the 
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reaction of stakeholders is for (owners of capital) to ascertain what minimum market 
share would be sufficient to achieve significant market influence so that the project’s 
worth would be optimal (Tiess and Tieswsoh, 2011).  
In buttress with the above point, it is also dependent on the economic and physical 
scarcity of the ore, grade of the ore body, accumulation of capital, population, skills, 
technology, innovation and macro-fiscal disciplines (such as taxation and royalties) 
that regulate the rent incentive structure. As such, managing the expectations of 
stakeholders within the factors of production would require optimal use of scarce 
resources, by firstly understanding rent generation; as well as finding innovative ways 
of managing stakeholder expectations for the welfare of all.  
5.4 Sustainable Economic Development the ‘Link’ between Optimal Mining 
and Sustainable Development 
In summary on SD and optimal mining linkages, mining is ultimately about converting 
natural resources into economic rents, thus how a State uses, extracts and distributes 
rents generated must be tied to its national development strategy. The uniqueness of 
the industry warrants optimal strategies to successfully use fiscal instruments (at the 
national level) to obtain a fair bargain for rent. However, when considering the 
peculiarities of Africa’s economic development, and the economic sustainability 
deficit from the assessment in Chapter Four, it is opined that a focus on SED as a 
national ideology is warranted for the growth of mineral economies.  
Per previous discussions in Chapter Four, some of the pre-conditions for 
environmental stewardship and social development have been laid and are being 
fulfilled in mining countries. Therefore, focusing on SED provides an avenue to 
strengthen economic sustainability of mining systems in Africa. Why is the researcher 
making this assertion? From an economic sustainability viewpoint, Pearce (1988) and 
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El-Serafy (1993) have argued that the process of change for SD could be achieved if 
a minimum condition for development (welfare maximisation) can be set. When a 
low-income (or lower middle income) economy is dependent on mineral rents, and 
has set the parameters for a non-decline in its stock of natural capital (Solow, 1986), 
such as in terms of environmental protection, social equity and economic 
development, then a focus on achieving SED logically is warranted within the 
discourse of SD for mining.  
This is so because the goal of SED seeks welfare maximisation of people and of the 
biosphere as well. Realistically, governance and economic issues within optimal 
mineral development are also legitimate concerns for SED. Therefore, bearing in mind 
Africa’s unique challenges, the key economic problem of meeting welfare 
maximisation has been incorporated into the SD agenda under SED to facilitate 
development. This further implies that governments should endeavour to provide a 
strong set of SD rules and a framework for optimal mining at the national level by 
adopting SED as a national value system instead of merely pushing the burden of rent 
capture, generation and management mostly to extractive industry players. 
5.5 Defining Sustainable Economic Development for Mineral Economies 
What is sustainable economic development and what should it mean for mineral 
economies? SED is the focus on the economic perspective in SD. It aims at bridging 
the gap between optimal mining and the shortcomings of the traditional view of 
sustainable development. To provide context on SED, this section traces from 
literature the process of Sustainable Economics (SE) for sustainable growth.  
Gilman (1992) was the first to introduce the concept of SE as a ‘new’ process for 
development. He argued that the current market economic system with its underlying 
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foundation of production and consumption as the basis for growth is the bane for SD. 
Ekins and Max-Neef (1992) and Baumgartner and Quaas, (2010) expanded the 
approach of SE and have attempted to define it, provide theoretical foundations for the 
concept and its relevance for economic theory. Baumagartner and Quaas (BQ) (2010) 
premised their definition on certain four attributes as key in sustainability/ sustainable 
economics. These they identified as: 
➢ A focus on the relationship between humans and nature; 
➢ Orientation towards the long-term and inherently uncertain future; 
➢ Normative foundation in the idea of justice, between humans of present and 
future generations as well as between humans and nature; and 
➢ Concern for economic efficiency, understood as non-wastefulness, in the 
allocation of natural goods and services as well as their human-made substitutes 
and complements.  
BQ (2010) include a new dimension of economic efficiency which they understand as 
non-wastefulness (optimality) in the allocation of natural goods and services.  The 
Thesis’s point of view is that for resource-rich states in Africa, SE can facilitate the 
outcome or fulfilment of the goals of SED. SE and SED are synonymous and 
encompass various forms or strategies aimed at economic development such as local 
content, CSR, beneficiation and even environmental management of mining’s impact. 
However, the current state in terms of rent usage and management suggests that an 
optimal mining investment strategy be designed and linked to the different elements 
within SED strategies for the growth of RRA countries. 
5.5.1 Sustainable Economic Development: Rationale for an 
Investment Strategy for Mining 
Auty and Warhurst (1993) have posited for developing mineral economies to refocus 
rents usage on investments for the creation of surplus value, while instigating 
environmental management standards, newer technologies and building other sectors 
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of the economy besides mining to reduce dependence. Therefore, SED in mining 
represents two tenets: (1) stewardship of minerals; and (2) value creation.  
On both tenets, the onus to create an enabling environment lies on governments to 
enhance trust and build transparency in mineral revenue management while espousing 
the goals of economic development from mineral resources for the State. In terms of 
the two tenets, (the discussions in Chapter One) alluded to the fact that an SED 
Strategy couched on investments can ensure the long-term sustainability of minerals 
(for future generations) while concurrently remedying the effects of the Dutch-disease 
in Africa. Below is a re-interpretation of SD in the context of SED for the industry and 
how it can best contribute to sustainable growth (see Figure 5.5).  
 
Figure 5.5: An Interpretation of SD for Developing Mineral Economies 
Source: Researcher’s Interpretation (2016) 
Figure 5.5 argues that the three transmissions in optimal mining (rent generation, 
capture and management) are cogent for SED bearing in mind effective governance, 
institutional quality, environmental due diligence and local SD initiatives for 
economic development. The foundation for SED in mineral economies is an efficient 
investment regime pegged on the pre-conditions/ requirements (listed in between 
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diagrams 1 and 2) for surplus value (rent) to be optimally re-invested. Expansively, 
twelve requirements for SED are further espoused in Chapter Seven of the Thesis. 
Diagram 2 (Figure 5.5) is a projection of how optimally combining rent generation 
and capture within a management framework or strategy is essential for the SED of 
mineral economies. Additionally, the argument in Figure 5.5 is extended in Figure 5.6 
based on mineral rents (metallic resources) or ore producing countries of SSA and its 
relationship with world and SSA’s growth rates from 1990- 2015.   
 
Figure 5.6: Mineral Rents and GDP Sub-Saharan Africa (1990- 2015) 
Sources: World Bank (2016) 
From Figure 5.6, an argument for SED using mineral rents (this is under rent 
management) hinges on how different portions can be utilised in reducing the pro-
cyclicality of government spending and counteracting the effects of the RCT. A 
portion of rent (above the adjusted mineral rents trend line) can be invested in a fund 
(for future generations) or invested in a fund for development. 48 Another portion can 
                                                   
48 A success story is Botswana’s Pula Fund, which was established in 1993 by the government of Botswana. 
The fund reflects both savings from accumulated fiscal surpluses and mineral rents. IMF (2012a) discussed 
options in managing resource volatility by considering instruments such as wealth funds. In Botswana’s case, 
investments from the funds helped stabilise the economy in the 2014- 2015 fiscal years. Also, the analysis by 
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also be captured into a wealth fund to protect declining GDP (shown below the SSA 
GDP trend line), with the middle (in between the two trend lines) incorporated into 
annual budgets for spending and physical capital development. Here, overcoming the 
limitations of the Dutch-disease with an investment strategy pegged on SED can fulfil 
the traditional objectives of economic development through welfare gains for all 
citizens in a mineral economy and the biosphere. The second part of the Chapter 
focuses on the SED process and investments. 
5.5.2 The Sustainable Economic Development Process and 
Investments 
Based on the above discussions, any SED strategy must be viewed as a spiral process 
at the microeconomic level where benefits are generated, captured and maximally-
shared between the interests of governments, land owners, mineral right holders and 
indigenous peoples. A fair share of protecting the interests of the environment would 
have to be factored since all resource operations are within the confines of the 
biosphere. Figure 5.7 presents the spiral process for SED. An international investment 
regime’s provisions inform a national investment strategy and an enabling extractive 
sector policy to facilitate effective generation and distribution of benefits amongst 
interest holders, while managing the expectations of an economy’s resource 
endowments.  
                                                   
Triki and Faye (2011) showed the importance of investment funds for Africa’s growth trajectory. Although, in 
the context of SWFs a large majority of the funds are from oil revenues for stabilisation reasons, there has 
been a rise in investment funds from ores and metals (Ibid).   
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Figure 5.7: The Spiral Process of Sustainable Economic Development 
Source: Researcher’s Interpretation (2016) 
At the macroeconomic level, an integrated national level strategy is the mechanism for 
transmitting all SED strategies (which in this case focuses on investments for mining). 
Also, Figure 5.7 proposes a policy-making process embedded in regional 
harmonisation for achieving SED. This must however be subsumed into the broader 
economic integration framework to solidify the alliances of smaller countries in the 
pursuance of SED values at the regional level. The aim is for global or regional 
economic instruments to be aligned to the peculiar needs and expectations of 
developing mineral economies for SED. This must afford mining sovereignties the 
political will to decide on concerns that serve their local/national and regional interests 
for development. Specifically, RRA countries should fully exercise their RTD/ 
PSONR without criticism but with due consideration of the unique challenges that 
their economies face.  
5.5.3 Optimal Mining Investment Strategy  
Since the earlier sections discussed a focus on an investment strategy for SED specific 
to mineral economies, what factors must be inherent in an optimal investment 
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strategy? At the national level, a national mining investment Strategy for SED must 
have three clearly defined elements:  
1. The needs/ obligations of the investor and the host nation must be identified;  
2. The expected or desired outcomes must be set; and 
3. The type of investment that a host country is seeking and how it aims to achieve 
its intended expected outcomes. 
In all cases, the host nations must be able to align the type of investment with the 
national objectives or development priorities (Matshediso, 2005; Okonjo-Iweala, 
2010). Often, the needs of the investor are aligned towards profits while the investee 
nation might want to meet demand expectation by usually lowering the entry barrier 
to gain a fair share of foreign investment. Although that is usually the case in mineral 
regimes in Africa, both parties must be able to define what they want and have 
standards or criteria set to level the playing field.  
Assertively, in many parts of Africa, the environment for mining investment is not 
well-integrated with the mining and political regimes’ objectives (see ECA-AU, 2011; 
Otto, 1997; UNCTAD, n.d.). These types of political uncertainties magnify the risk 
factors associated with mining investment, as such making it a complicated process 
for investors to apportion a good share of profit (and rents) between the company and 
government.  
Since optimal mining commences at the microeconomic level and SED must be 
realised at the national level, the elements (transmissions- rent generation, capture and 
management) discussed in section 5.3 are transitioned as a checklist to guide the 
development of an optimal mining investment strategy for SED. The checklist (see 
Table 5.1) consists of what the investor and investee nation should consider and make 
provisions for, when deciding to create a sound mining investment environment.  
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Table 5.1: Common Checklist for an Optimal Mining Investment Environment 
Checklist for Mining Investor and Host Country 
(1) Rent Generation (Stages 1 and 2 of the Value Chain) 
Macroeconomic issues 
Geographical reach of SD 
Do the regulations provide for the geographic reach of mineral 
development? Have relevant international SD initiatives been 
ratified in the legal framework for monitoring and compliance 
of mining companies?  
Fiscal regime 
What is the host country’s tax system, i.e. royalties, income 
tax, corporate tax, etc.? How stable is it and how does it 
interact with that of the investor's resident country? What are 
the transfer pricing policies/ rules of the interested party State? 
Mineral Development Agreement 
(Rights and obligations of government)* 
Is there clarity on obligations (of the company) and are there 
stabilisation agreements on local economic development and 
environmental management in the legal framework? Is it 
mutually agreed and understood between the parties? 
Environmental law 
What standards must be observed and what penalties apply in 
case of failure or non-compliance? Are there international 
standards? (Are they applied by the company or by the State?). 
Is there provision for compensating future generations in law 
for environmental damages? 
Microeconomic issues 
Mineral Development Agreement-
MDA (tenure, rights and obligations of 
the company) * 
What types of bilateral and international investments treaties 
already exist and would the investor require specialised 
agreements on tenure, tax, financial arrangements and 
royalties? 
Political risk factors 
Is there stability in the investment environment, i.e. on 
environment, labour and Health and Safety (H&S)? Are there 
calls for resource nationalism and can government guarantee 
the safety of mining investments? Have previous MDAs been 
brought under scrutiny/ or to courts for adjudication? 
Socio-economic factors 
Are there infrastructure, skills and the requisite human capital 
available for mining, or are there deficits? Will upgrading or 
providing foreign expertise come at a significant cost to the 
company? Are skills and labour development plans framed in 
the context of the State’s (and local government’s) 
development objectives? Are they being addressed with the 
company?  
Technology and innovation 
Are there provisions for protection of technology and 
innovation of the company? Are there legal spaces for 
knowledge and skills transfer in technology and innovation 
management between the company and host government? 
Environmental obligation 
What are the stipulations for environmental impact assessment 
and management plans for the mining site? Are the standards 
compliable by the company? 
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(2) Rent Capture (Stages 3 and 4 of the Value Chain) 
Macroeconomic issues 
Environmental due diligence 
(Community) 
Are there industry regulators and are they transparent? Are 
there frequent monitoring of environmental standards of 
mines? Are legal reviews and appeal processes available 
against adverse environmental impacts?  
Health and Safety (Community) 
Are there national H&S standards and do avenues for 
monitoring exist? Are there institutions that conduct health 
and safety checks within the mine? 
Local Content 
Are there local content standards or strategies in the legal 
framework and are there avenues for support of local 
institutions and monitoring and compliance of the regulations 
of mining companies?  
Value Addition (Beneficiation) 
Does the country have a beneficiation strategy and are there 
standards for mining company’s compliance? Is there an 
industrial policy which is in synch with mining laws and are 
local manufacturing companies capacitated for beneficiation? 
Do the requisite skills for beneficiation exist in the country?  
Microeconomic issues 
Environmental due diligence 
(Company) 
Besides the regime’s requirements, does the company uphold 
ethical and voluntary environmental requirements in relation 
to waste generation, disposal and climate protection? Is there 
provision for compensating future generations in law for 
environmental investments? 
Health and Safety (Company- 
Occupational) 
Are internal processes consistent with the national 
requirements? Are international protocols such as the OHSAS 
18001 and others applied?  
Optimal milling and accountability 
(Company) 
These are internal matters within the company; usually, 
international standards in milling, processing and refining are 
applied- Are enhanced processes for transparency in ore 
accounting, milling and processing applied? 
(3) Rent Management (Post Stage 4) 
Microeconomic issues 
Risk management  
How would risk factors, such as pricing on the part of the 
investor be mitigated transparently? Are there establishments 
of standards and codes of practice? 
Macroeconomic issues 
Administrative law  
Are there any remedies for improper decisions of government 
officials and are there accountability mechanisms to check 
how governments use mining revenues? 
Institutional framework 
What institutions support the type of mineral investment 
environment and revenue management? 
Dispute resolution 
What laws are used to govern investment agreements and can 
disputes be resolved in a neutral forum? 
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Investment Policy (for Benefit 
Sharing) 
How would benefits be shared and invested? How would they 
be synchronised with both fiscal and trade policy? Would 
there be considerations for a Sovereign Wealth Fund? 
Risk management 
How would risk factors on the part of host country be 
mitigated transparently? 
Sources: Author’s synthesis from: (Cawood, 2009; Mann et al., 2012; Otto, 1997; 
Pritchard, 2005, 2005; PwC, 2015; World Bank, 1992)  
*Typical MDAs cover a range of mining issues and serve to protect the investor’s mining investments from 
uncertainty and high risks. However, this checklist is aimed at both demand and supply sided issues of mining 
investments for consideration by the investor and host State.  
The above elements (in Table 5.1: Common Checklist for an Optimal Mining 
Investment Environment) although reminiscent of model MDAs go beyond that to also 
consider the supply-sided aspects of what an optimal mining investment should 
resemble for host governments (see section on rent management). The point of the 
table is to guide the design and implementation of a national mining investment 
strategy in Chapters Six and Seven.  
Some of the elements (or questions) in the checklist are strategised as plans for how 
gold producing countries can devise investment strategies for the SED of their 
regimes. Besides aligning the checklist with the national development objectives of 
the State, the institutional framework to kick-start a mineral-led development growth 
through an extractive sector policy is crucial within the agenda of good governance 
(see a similar analysis by Dougherty, 2011 for the case of Botswana). The Thesis 
discusses this under the plans and mechanisms for realising the investment Strategy in 
Chapter Seven.  
5.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Chapter discussed the concept of optimal mining and SD and 
concluded that SED would be needed for the growth of mineral economies in Africa. 
The Chapter also confirmed that ‘optimal mining’ would be a key lens for viewing 
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sustainability at the microeconomic level. In exploring the concept of SED and what 
it means for mineral economies, it recommended an optimal investment strategy at the 
national level for realising SED ends. This further led to the development of a checklist 
to guide the designing of national mining investment policies and strategies at the 
micro and macroeconomic levels for Africa’s development. However, due to the 
global and regional SD reach of mining, it was pointed out in the Chapter that regional 
integration and harmonisation of policies would be fundamental for the development 
of Africa. Mineral economies may have to take a stand on regional harmonisation and 
have a unified front if SED strategies for the growth of RRA countries are to be 
internationally accepted.  
Considering discussions in this Chapter, the next Chapter focuses on developing a 
national ‘optimal’ mining investment Strategy for the SED of gold mining economies. 
It is important to point out that the Strategy from which the Framework is developed 
is distinct from the SDI that was conducted in Chapter Four. The SDI shed clarity on 
the challenge of operationalising SD in mineral economies and hence pointed to a 
refined view of SD. Thus, the following Chapters focus on an investment Strategy and 
Framework that gold mining countries can apply to optimally harness their mineral 
resources for sustainable economic development.   
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Chapter 6  
An Optimal Investment Strategy for Resource-Rich African Countries’ Growth 
and Development 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter develops a Strategy termed ‘Investment Framework for Resource-rich 
Africa’s Development’ (IFRAD) for mining countries. In traditional policy 
formulation, there are elements which inform a policy or strategy, and critical 
instruments or implementation requirements essential for its realisation (Howlett, 2011; 
Haas, 1992). The Chapter focuses on the first part, which is the elements in the IFRAD 
Strategy, with Chapter Seven discussing the requirements, policy objectives and 
instruments for transitioning IFRAD. Based on the critical points in Chapter Five, the 
Chapter uses the checklist as a guide to assist in designing the central part of the IFRAD 
Strategy. The core SD investment principles by UNCTAD (2012) are incorporated in 
the discussions. These consist of eleven (11) core principles by (UNCTAD, 2015, 
2012), which are necessary for greening investments in current development regimes 
(see Table 6.1).38F49 
Table 6.1: Core SD Principles for Investments 
UNCTAD Sustainable Development Principles for Investments 
1. Investment for sustainable development 7. Openness to investment  
2. Policy coherence  8. Investment protection 
3. Public governance and institutions 9. Investment promotion and facilitation 
4. Dynamic policymaking  10. Corporate governance and responsibility 
5. Balanced rights and obligations 11. International cooperation 
6. Right to regulate   
Source: UNCTAD (2012; p.11) 
                                                   
49 For clarity, Annex 6.1 illustrates in greater detail the core principles for sustainable investments.  
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The principles (outlined in Table 6.1) are further co-opted into an assessment tool 
comprising of an updated Competitive Investment Framework to assess the 
applicability of IFRAD to mineral economies in Africa.  
As a caveat, investment strategies in mineral economies should be driven by the mining 
sector and integrated with industrial policy or national diversification Strategy to 
catalyse mining’s linkages with the broader economy, in areas such as agriculture, 
manufacturing, and services.  
Besides the dynamics in investment regimes, the political economy context of mining 
in relation to SED strategies must be understood. A feature of political economy 
analysis is the type of motivation that drives the behaviour of institutional and political 
actors.50 For mining, powerful elites create extractive institutions that often weaken the 
governance structures necessary for growth.40F51, 41F52 Thus, when designing strategies for 
mineral economies, the underlying political economy structures must be understood, 
including:  
➢ The motivation of the economic system (or in policy making terms a conceptual 
framework),  
➢ The elements, the types of institutions whether extractive or inclusive; and  
➢ How the agents and actors influence and shape incentives for development.  
The above points influence the pre-conditions, which enable the functioning of 
strategies, and the impact of the type of economic systems. As already established in 
Chapter Two, the market system is a better alternative for mineral economies since 
proponents of “smarter” regulation propose a mix of heavy state regulation with 
                                                   
50 In terms of political economy, it is premised on institutions, formal and informal rules and the underlying 
political powers, bureaucratic agencies or social and private organizations (see p.4, Dimensions of Political 
Economy, World Bank, 2008). 
51 Dougherty (2013) expands on the impact of rent-seeking behaviour by junior Canadian gold miners 
operating in laxed mineral regimes.   
52 This is part of the mechanism that causes the RC Thesis (Isham, 2005). However, the chapter does not delve 
into this, it rather considers the elements needed for implementing IFRAD in mineral economies. 
135 
 
liberalisation (Gunningham et al., 1998, cited in Howlett and Rayner, 2007). The 
recommendations highlighted in section 2.5.1 of Chapter Two are meant to improve 
the inefficiencies of the market system while providing avenues for securing welfares 
in mineral regimes in Africa.  
Specifically, for the IFRAD Strategy, Chapter Two’s recommendations are critical. 
These recommendations must form the basis or the underlying conceptual framework 
to drive SED strategies. Figure 6.1 summarises the protocol for IFRAD. The focus of 
the figure is on investments, but the process is generally applicable to other SED 
Strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: SED Protocol for Investment Strategies in Mineral Economies 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017) 
Scholars such as Schouwstra and Ellman (2006); Howlett and Rayner (2007); and 
Candel and Biesbroek (2016) have concurred that the success of policy implementation 
or strategies is precedent on having a clearly defined objective within a system, 
conceptual framework and defining suitable instruments to achieve the set targets. 
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Here, the political economy dynamic dictates how effective the implementation 
requirements (instruments and the kinds of institutions) and rules will be in 
transitioning the IFRAD Strategy in mineral economies.  
Drawing from Figure 6.1, the next section discusses the elements for IFRAD. Points 
2- 5 in Figure. 6.1 are considered under the implementation requirements and plan in 
Chapter Seven. The next section is guided by the following: 
➢ The ‘structure’ consisting of elements, i.e. processes that must be present for 
the IFRAD Strategy to be transitioned; 
➢ A ‘how to’ guide on implementation or points of strategic assessment. These 
are strategic questions that mineral regimes may have to answer through a 
thorough analysis of their regimes; and  
➢ The assessment tool, which is designed based on the IFRAD Strategy. This is 
presented in section 6.3.  
6.2 Elements of the Strategy 
To provide a pathway for IFRAD, Figure 6.2 illustrates the IFRAD process. It depicts 
an interactive five-step process for mineral economies to assess where they are and the 
enabling environment to implement the IFRAD Strategy. 
 
Figure 6.2: Graphic Showing the IFRAD Process 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017) 
Figure 6.3 further expands the above Processes (1- 5) with a flowchart that describes 
the general structure and scheme for IFRAD.  
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Figure 6.3: Structure and Scheme for IFRAD 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017) 
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From Figure 6.3, Processes (1- 3) must be clearly defined by the State. This is done 
usually through the national development plans (NDPs) and long-term development 
framework of a country. Under Processes 2 and 3, the mining policy objectives should 
be aligned to the national development plan or long-term vision of the country. 
Processes 1- 3 can set the scene for optimal resource development in light of a country’s 
investment goals and its development Strategy.  
The common checklist for an optimal mining investment environment in Table 5.1  
provides a further guide for Processes (4- 5). Process 4 must be connected to a 
country’s industrial policy to enhance the diversification of mining into other key 
sectors. There are decision points on the type of local content, CSR and beneficiation 
strategies, which must be instituted to obtain benefits and create linkages of the sector 
with other sectors of the economy. If any of the strategies are weak or non-existent, 
levies can be designed to tax mining companies, which then goes into supporting 
training and development and into a wealth fund. Process 5 considers long-term 
investments into development and whether governments should set-up a wealth fund, 
but this will largely depend on how the fiscal and monetary policies are designed to 
counteract price volatility and meet the fund’s objectives.  
Based on the discussions of Figure 6.3, the next section discusses the IFRAD Processes 
(1- 5) in greater detail with the types of policy interventions and options needed for the 
growth and development of mineral economies.  
6.2.1 Process 1: Mining with National Development Objectives 
In Process 1, the express goal of the IFRAD Strategy must be aligned to the mineral 
economy’s development objectives. In many parts of Africa, the environment for 
mining investment is not well integrated with the mining and political regimes’ 
objectives (cited from Chapter Five of the Thesis, p.127- 128). Most mineral economies 
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have medium to long-term development plans that are neither frequently updated nor 
synchronised with its mining development plans/visions. However, the discovery of 
minerals should lead to analysis about: 
➢ The needs of an economy and the expectation of what the mineral would be 
used to achieve; 
➢ The strategic capacity, i.e. (skills, research and development and innovation) 
and abilities of the mineral economy to optimally exploit the ore-body; 
➢ The (domestic) and regional market size, in terms of consumption capabilities 
from value added mineral products; and 
➢ Finally, understanding the most efficient points in the mineral value chain 
where benefits (or rents) can be harnessed for the economy. 
The above suggested critical points of analysis would have to be complemented by 
interventions in the African Mining Vision (AMV), which seeks a “transparent, 
equitable and optimal exploitation of Africa’s mineral resources to underpin broad-
based sustainable growth and socio-economic development” (AU, 2009, p.v).  
The AMV represents an Africanized vision of the future of the continent. The dearth 
of documents and initiatives that the AMV inculcated in developing this vision suggest 
therefore a major proof of the initiative towards sustainable development. The key point 
of the AMV is to use mineral resources as a catalyst for broad-based growth and 
development by capitalising on the benefit of resource-based development strategies 
that have worked elsewhere, such as in Finland and Sweden. The essential thrust of the 
vision document is about the critical linkages with which mining can crucially play in 
an economy. The Action plan for the implementation of the AMV was drafted to 
facilitate the transitioning of the vision’s objectives. Each pillar in the Action Plan 
enunciates all concerns in SD and is integrative; hence, it is useful in inter-linking all 
sectors within mining economies for harmonised development (see AU, 2009; ECA-
AU, 2011).  
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Also, Africa’s Agenda 2063, which is the central development blue print for Africa can 
complement the AMV in reassessing development visions and plans to be integrated 
with the goals of a mineral regime. Although "...there is no such thing as a 'standard 
approach'...Policy options and recommendations must be country specific and must be 
adapted to the local economic, social and cultural environment" (GTD, 2008; cited in 
Cawood, 2011). This can further be complemented with a plan of diversification away 
from minerals. 
To ensure the right to self-determination of countries, right to development, and as well 
fulfil UNCTAD principles: 1- investments into SD; 2- policy coherence; 4- dynamism 
in policymaking and 6- State’s right to regulate, new and emerging mineral economies 
should conduct a gap analysis of their regimes, wherein key developmental challenges 
are identified with proposed solutions together with mining’s potential objectives. This 
is to ensure that the mining sector is well targeted and incorporated in the overall 
national development Strategy.53,43F54  
Points of Strategic Assessment: What are the country’s express development 
objectives as well as mining’s (potential) objectives’? Have they been aligned and has 
mining been integrated into the national development and industrial policies and 
strategies of the country? 
6.2.2 Process 2: Understanding Resource Potential of a Country 
In terms of Process 2, countries must be strategic in obtaining reliable assessments 
about the quality, grade, tonnage, densities and characteristics of the mineral resource. 
                                                   
53 It has been previously argued by Stites (2003) and others that the PRSPs is disconnected from mining 
because most of the PRSPs failed to acknowledge how mining would be used to transform developing 
economies (Cited in Pedro, 2004).  
54 Currently, countries like Botswana, Namibia and South Africa’s National Development Plans take stock of 
how mining has transformed and continues to strategical inform development outcomes. Such frameworks 
can serve as a guide for countries wanting to integrate mining into their development frameworks.  
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Geological uncertainty magnifies the risk borne by the investor, and with limited 
information gathered by geological survey departments, the bargaining powers of 
governments for negotiations are usually reduced at the initial stages (AU, 2009).  
According to the ECA-AU (2011) and African Minerals Development Centre- AMDC 
(2014)55, governments lack enforceable arrangements for mining companies to deposit 
demonstrated and measured geological data with high (or reasonable) level of 
confidence of mineral orebodies with local geological departments.  
As a general point of analysis in any mining investment Strategy, governments would 
have to: 
➢ Invest and develop the capacity of their Geological and Survey Departments 
to be able to collect, analyse, update and store information on mineral data; 
➢ Conduct, collect and assess regular data on minerals, in terms of classification 
(using either the JORC/ SAMREC44F56 or the traditional McKelvey Mineral 
Information Methods) for minerals; and 
➢ Make available open cadastre systems that readily provide information on 
mineral rights/ licences holders, and geological data on brown and green 
fields in a country. 
If the above points are integrated into a country’s mining development objective, it 
places the country in a better position to negotiate and influence the fiscal dispensation 
in Mining Development Agreements (MDAs) or mining agreements. Moreover, 
geological survey and mapping are capital intensive and governments in mineral 
economies may have to borrow from the capital markets (private development 
                                                   
55 The AMDC is the main implementing arm of the African Mining Vision. It was created in 2011 to see to the 
monitoring and evaluation of the vision’s directives amongst mineral economies in Africa. 
56 The JORC and SAMREC stands for (the Australasian Joint Ore Reserves Committee Code) and (the South 
African Code for the Reporting of Mineral Resources and Mineral Reserves) respectively. 
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financing), or alternatively, pursue joint venture partnerships with exploration 
companies to build the knowledge of the geological potential of the mineral economy.5F57 
Points of Strategic Assessment: Is there a national inventory that maps the economic 
potential of the mineral resource? Have governments set targets on acquiring 
information on the demonstrated mineral resources that are within its’ jurisdiction, and 
are there on-going projects (government-led, private exploration joint venture-ship 
with governments) and/or regional-based, aimed at building the geological information 
of mineral ore bodies in the country?  
6.2.3 Process 3: Types of Mining Investments  
Process 3 ties the quality of the mineral resource information available or the potential 
of the mineral resource (and identified reserves) to contribute to development with the 
type of mineral investments. In the third process, the host nation’s investment needs 
and goals must drive the country to assess the nature of the resource potential. Often, 
if the geological information about the orebody is reliable and within reasonable to 
high-level confidence, with minimal economic, political and social risks; then 
governments can steer the mining investment negotiations in their favour (AMDC, 
2014; Guj et al., 2013).  
Governments’ role in setting appropriate investment targets and steering the course of 
the agreement is critical. Protecting property rights and enforcing laws are mandatory 
to reduce the economic and political risks associated with mineral regimes. Every 
country needs a legal system that is trusted by its people and institutions, which settle 
                                                   
57 Often, the usual approach for business is for exploration companies to obtain exploration licence to 
conduct: geological survey and mapping, and metallurgical, economic viability, marketability, social and 
political assessment of the orebody. These companies in turn auction off their interest to seniors, or partner 
with senior MNCs to economically extract the mineral resource. Because geological surveys are under 
resourced and capacitated, they are unable to adequately negotiate better terms for geological data sharing 
with exploration and mining companies (see the Country Mining Vision, AMDC, 2014: p.79).  
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disputes transparently. Where property rights and credit are uncertain, property markets 
do not function, and investments get damaged. Markets can handle ordinary risks 
through insurance, however, governments must absorb extraordinary risks associated 
with resource nationalism issues in mining regimes (Guj et al., 2013; E & Y, 2015). 
Also, some of the core elements in typical BITs and IIAs would have to be minimised 
to enable the State’s right to regulate (see Principle 6 of the UNCTAD principles) 
without undue influence by mining companies (UNCTAD, 2012).58 The Model Mining 
Development Agreements (MMDAs)59 can serve as a guide to investment negotiations. 
Often the stability clauses, (which must be decided between the State and the MNCs) 
pose a problem for countries wanting to use the model as a framework for negotiation 
since governments may not be adequately shielded in the negotiations. Nevertheless, 
the MMDAs can serve as an informative guide for emerging mineral economies. 
For Process 3, it must uphold all 11 principles, particularly, 3 (sound public governance 
and institutions), 5 (balanced rights and obligations), 8 (investment protection) and 9 
(investment promotion) of the core SD principles for investments. Here, two things are 
essential: 
➢ Mining investments must inform SD through CSR guidelines established by 
the State; and 
➢ Governments must aim for a reasonable balance between investment 
protection (reasonable and justifiable regulations) and investment promotion 
and facilitation.  
                                                   
58 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and International Investment Agreement (IIAs) serve as a guarantee 
and protection for International Transnational Companies operating in countries. According to Mann (2008), 
approximately 25% of BITS are signed between developed and developing countries. In all cases, they serve 
as protection for investors, and sometimes afford special rights between States. 
59 The MMDAs per the International Bar Association- IBA (2012) is aimed at ensuring best practices in areas 
such as: security of tenure, macroeconomic management; legal and regulatory framework; grant of 
exploration and mining licences; community development; environmental protection; defined obligations 
and responsibilities of government and company; fiscal and taxation issues; infrastructure development and 
investor protection.  
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Besides attracting FDIs into mining, governments can either partner with foreign 
investors (as a joint venture) or run mining businesses (State-owned) with capital from 
development financiers or the capital markets. Debswana Mining Company is a good 
example of a joint venture between the Government of Botswana and De Beers 
Company. Although this is seldom the way mining businesses are conducted in Africa, 
for countries that have the capacity, sound institutions, knowledge and skills to run 
such venture-ship, it is a good option for consideration.  
Furthermore, there are some countries that have established unique partnerships, such 
as Ghana (with its diamonds sector partnership with small-scale operators); and South 
Africa (which recently apportioned funds) to commence a State operated gold mine 
(see South Africa’s National Development Plan; NPC- RSA, 2012; Republic of South 
Africa, 2011). All in all, such models are challenged by the influence of corruption and 
state capture; however, mineral economies will have to consider varied but strategic 
options when running mining businesses. Some policy requirements to overcome the 
influence of corruption noted (in Chapter Seven) would be critical to ensuring that such 
ventures are triumphant as successful mining enterprises for Africa’s development.   
Points of Strategic Assessment: What types of mineral investments exist and is the 
investment regime competitive? How are current mining investment development 
agreements structured? What new ‘potential’ and current risks have affected the regime 
and how has it affected mining investments?  
6.2.4 Process 4: Mining Sector Linkages (Rent Generation, Capture 
and Management) 
The checklist in Chapter Five is used to guide the discussions under Process 4. All the 
elements to be discussed under the three fundamentals of optimal mining (rent 
generation, rent capture and rent management) are illustrated in Figure 6.4 for mining 
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sector linkages. These have been adapted from Table 5.1 of Chapter Five. Since the 
IFRAD Strategy is aimed at macroeconomic level concerns, the microeconomic issues 
in Table 5.1 have not been included in the discussions in this sub-section. The micro 
level issues remain at the firm level and hence require a firm level strategy for the 
extractive sector in mineral economies. All UNCTAD’s SD Principles for investment 
are relevant for Process 4.  
Figure 6.4 contextualises the key concerns in the three fundamentals of optimal 
mining.  
 
Figure 6.4: Optimal Mining Transmissions for Investment Strategies 
Source: Table 5.1; Chapter Five 
The issues (or concerns) regarding the three fundamentals of optimal mining for 
IFRAD are explained in the ensuing sub-sections.  
i. Rent Generation 
Geographical reach of SD  
Due to the geographical reach of SD, SD goals and targets (commitments in JPOI, 
Agenda 21 and others) can form the basis for mining’s sustainability through periodic 
national reviews of economic, sectoral and environmental policies. A key economic 
criterion for encouraging rent generation and meeting targets for FDI is to promote 
international and regional cooperation and coordination. This fits into principles 1 
i. Rent Generation
•Geographical reach of SD
•MDAs (rights and 
obligations)
•Fiscal regime
•Environmental law
ii. Rent Capture
•Local content
•Beneficiation
•Health, safety and 
environment
•Infrastructure
iii. Rent Management
•Administrative and 
institutional framework
•Benefit sharing
•Risk management
•Dispute resolution
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(investing for SD- (CSR)), and (8 and 9), which contend for a reasonable balancing 
between investment promotion and investor protection of interests.  
 
MDAs (Rights and Obligations) 
Additionally, at the rent generation stage, investment agreements are signed between 
the investor and the host nation. Thus, there is need for clarity on the obligations and 
responsibilities of each party in the MDAs. It is also at this stage that governments must 
address governance, capacity and infrastructure constraints that magnify the risks for 
mining investments. The actions required are rule of law, independent judiciary 
coupled with sound mining regulatory frameworks that are well integrated with the 
development policy/ vision of the country.  
Fiscal Regime 
Fiscal policy requirements are captured in the MMDAs (or MDAs) and are usually in 
accordance with the legal requirements (unless under a special regime). The 
instruments must be competitive and stable to encourage investments into the sector. 
To ensure a balance between the regime’s requirements and how mineral rents are 
utilised, fiscal rules and monetary policies should be structured with a long-term 
outlook towards first, equitable sharing of rents, and second, the diversification of the 
sector by building critical linkages (up, down, side and lateral stream) within the mining 
economy. It has been acknowledged by Guj et al. (2013, p. vii); AMDC (2014); ECA-
AU (2011) amongst others that most often, mining tax regimes have inadequate skills 
and insufficient frameworks instituted to monitor the compliance of tax payments by 
mining companies. The following are the rules of thumb under fiscal regime for policy-
makers planning to implement investment strategies: 
➢ Aim for dynamic fiscal instruments that accommodate the cyclical nature of 
mining rents (such as sliding scale, or self-adjustable instruments are 
preferable over fixed percentage rates); 
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➢ An understanding of how rents are generated within the value chain with 
adequate frameworks and models that can capture rent; and 
➢ The administration system for tax collection and management should be 
skilled and capacitated to effectively collect rents.  
Environmental Management 
Including environmental due-diligence as a component of a mining investment strategy 
is critical for fulfilling SD ends. The externalities from mining require that at the ‘rent 
generation’ stage, environmental standards are laid out before extraction commences 
and for companies to have a dynamic perspective to implementing requirements on air 
quality, noise, land degradation, water quality and bio-diversity protection. Climate 
change and bio-diversity offsets are emerging issues of critical concern to mining. 
These remain an un-explored area in many mineral regimes in Africa. Governments in 
strategizing on investments may have to set-up working groups or commissions to 
discuss the impacts of bio-diversity offset and trading vis-à-vis government regulations. 
Also, environmental bonds set-up in escrows for remediation does require further 
discussions, and options of investing such funds into equity markets or asset portfolio 
management. Upon closure, the return on investments may be used for reparation and 
rehabilitation with the capital used in fulfilling other development obligations of the 
country.  
ii. Rent Capture 
Local Content  
Local content strategies must be integral to any mining investment policy or strategy. 
This provides the foundation (basis) for the linkages of the sector with other sectors 
through skills and enterprise development, supply chain and procurement services 
within the mineral value chain. Most often, local content instruments are limited by 
few clauses or articles in mining laws without a thorough analysis of how minerals can 
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be leveraged for local economic development. Few countries in Africa, such as South 
Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, and Mozambique have specific local content strategies, 
policies (or charters) to build the capacity of their mining jurisdictions.  
Also, mineral economies aiming to restructure their economies to benefit from mining 
investment must integrate their macro-fiscal frameworks with local content policies. 
Specifically, the following steps would be essential: 
➢ Analysing the value chain to understand where rents can be maximally 
captured for the local economy; and  
➢ developing the capacity of the local economy to provide the needed materials 
and services for mining; 
Here, standards must be set for sourcing and local procurement in the economy with 
penal actions in the form of levies sanctioned on companies that do not procure 
materials and services locally. Ghana recently started levying gold mining companies 
that refuse to procure certain materials locally. These levies are then used to provide 
training and support for entrepreneurs in the mining supply chain. Alternatively, the 
levies can also be put into fund (as indicated in Figure 6.3). 
Value Addition (Beneficiation) 
Considerations for domestic beneficiation (or value addition) should be integral in any 
long-term strategy for investments. In instances where domestic value added mineral 
products are utilised (such that there is local market for the products), and the skills for 
value addition are available in the economy, governments can compel mining 
companies to provide beneficiated commodities for the local economy. Where 
governments may not have the capacity to task mining companies, there can be the 
introduction of a ‘beneficiation’ levy tied to the macro-fiscal frameworks for mine 
taxation. This is with the assumption that the core competencies and skills to facilitate 
beneficiation in an economy may be absent. An example of such approach, is South 
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Africa’s new royalty regime, which penalizes companies (in the gold and PGM 
industry) that do not beneficiate their concentrates with higher royalty rates than 
companies that beneficiate (see Republic of South Africa, 2008, Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Royalty Act 28). 
Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) 
Ensuring that companies follow due process concerning health and safety regulations 
and standards set by the State are critical to greening mining investments. Standards 
set by the State and with effective M & E mechanisms can remedy the environmental 
impacts of mineral extraction on the bio-sphere. Here, governments would have to set 
parameters for: frequent monitoring and evaluation for compliance based on the State’s 
standards; coordinate with mining companies and other mining sector agencies, to 
ensure that HSE standards are aligned with national SD principles.60  
iii. Rent Management 
Administrative & Institutional Framework   
The first four Processes (1- 4), including the discussions under this sub-section can 
only be effective with robust mineral sector governance and administration. Here, 
governments must encourage public accountability and transparency, promote 
stakeholder engagement and oversight through a cautious assertion of PSONR in their 
constitutions. States must also create advisory organs in mining agencies and 
departments, as well as their integration with environment, geology, mine health and 
safety, tax (revenue) services, etc.  
 
 
                                                   
60 A good example here is the Mine Health and Safety Act of South Africa, which prescribes standards and 
critical guidelines on health and safety of the mining environment in open pit and underground mines.   
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Benefit Sharing  
The above institutional set-up (or framework) should be tied with benefit sharing, in 
that, such frameworks facilitate the transparent and equitable disbursement of mining 
revenues. Usually, it is at the management stage that governments may decide on 
apportioning rents for future generations, stabilisation and long-term development. 
Mining businesses are essential to this process because by subscribing to international 
initiatives such as the IMF’s Code of good practice on Fiscal Transparency, the World 
Bank’s Assessments of Fiscal Transparency and the EITI, a company’s revenue 
declarations (in the form of taxes and royalties) must be aligned to what governments’ 
report. Thus, in implementing the IFRAD Strategy, there must be considerations of the 
effects of different tax instruments (as has been already suggested) on the nature of 
rents. Additionally, incentive structures (in the form tax breaks) should be given to 
mining companies when local content and CSR strategies have been wholly integrated 
into core mining operations. This may lead to firmer business relationships between the 
State and mining entities. 
Risk Management 
In terms of risk management and mitigation, the State may have to consider demand-
driven approaches to minimizing risks, such as conducting mining explorations and 
assessments to determine economic feasibility of the resource endowment. 
Additionally, building capacity and enhancing mining skills development through 
initiatives for mining engineering education, technical and vocational training 
programmes in mining are needful. The physical infrastructure- transport, energy, 
financial and import or export facilities should be available and up to meaningful 
standards, to reduce the operational costs of the mining enterprise. Another factor in 
minimising risks is introducing fiscal transparency and clarity in the tenets of the 
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mining law. This removes doubts in the minds of investors, thus eliminating all 
obstacles to transparency during collection, flow and distribution of rents.  
Dispute Resolution  
Usually, when a means for dispute resolution is not expressly stated in a BIT or MDA, 
the de-facto option for resolution is arbitration through the International Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) or UNCITRAL arbitration rules. As 
governments become transparent with well-functioning rule of law, it has been 
suggested by Sauvant and Ortino (2013) that other openly transparent processes and 
courts within the regime be considered in developing countries to foster trust. It is 
important that express clauses on dispute resolution be indicated in the investment 
agreement to ensure clarity in the due-process when disputes arise.      
Points of Strategic Assessment: Have effective safeguards been established in the 
legislative framework to support mining sector agencies? In terms of building critical 
mining sector linkages, is the economy’s local content and CSR policies well integrated 
with its fiscal and industrial policies? Have governments been successful in managing 
various risks factors, which influence mining investments? 
6.2.5 Process 5: Managing Investment Portfolios: Funds 
In terms of managing investment portfolios, Process 5 is a corollary of rent 
management under Process 4. A holistic investment strategy must consider the long-
term potential of guaranteeing rents for future generations through development or 
stabilisation funds (or Sovereign Wealth Funds- SWFs). As argued by Pedro (2004), 
although most funds are applied to the oil and gas sector, the same approach of long-
term sustainability (by saving into a fund) can be applied to minerals. A case in point 
is Botswana’s Pula Fund, which was noted in Chapter Five (refer to page 125).   
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The fiscal aspects of mineral revenue management should lead to considerations of 
safeguarding portions of mineral rents into a fund to be managed by portfolio managers, 
or asset management firms in partnership with central banks or quasi-government 
bodies. Benefits of such funds include: stabilising tax revenues, supporting marginal 
mines, investment into future infrastructure development, exploration for mineral 
potential and/or development of mining technologies from the returns on the fund 
(Blundell-Wignall et al., 2008; Caner and Grennes, 2010; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 
2009). 
According to Das et al. (2009), the first set of issues to decide on whether a country 
should set-up a SWF go beyond the nominal inflow of mining revenues for the State to 
“determine whether the country has an ‘adequate’ or ‘optimal level’ of international 
reserves”. Even if the country has indeed ample enough reserves, policy-makers would 
have to decide whether or not they would use the SWFs to meet balance of payment 
needs (or savings for the long term). Should the idea of setting-up a fund be intended, 
then governments would have to consider a SWF in the context of:  
➢ The operational objectives that would guide its funding, withdrawal and 
spending;  
➢ The decision on the institutions that would guide the principles and objectives 
to regulate the funds - investment objectives, guidelines and risk tolerance; and 
➢ What to invest in, i.e. the strategic asset allocation, usually determined by an 
investment policy (Ibid). 
Sometimes the case for setting-up the fund is defeated when according to Triki and 
Faye (2011), African governments understandably keep spending from their funds due 
to development challenges. In so doing, this renders the funds useless for saving for 
future generations. However, that may be curbed by establishing ‘fund’ considerations 
such as:  
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➢ Defining the ‘criteria’ for depositing or withdrawing revenues. This can be 
linked to resource prices, total revenues or other macroeconomic 
considerations; 
➢ Identifying the finite or intended optimal size of the ‘fund’; and 
➢ Determining the legal status of the fund and concurrently, balancing between 
the fiscal rules and the discretion of the fund managers (van der Ploeg and 
Venables, 2011; Berg et al., 2012). 
Operating wealth funds must be tied with strong macroeconomic discipline, effective 
governance mechanisms, and firmer rules to guard what goes in and out of the fund. 
Apart from the wealth funds, governments may consider direct portfolio investments 
within (and outside) Africa where rents from mining can be managed by trusted entities 
who invest in (bonds, derivative markets- futures, and equities) in buoyant markets. 
This can increase intra and inter trade earnings within and outside of the continent and 
serve as a source of FDI inflows into the recipient countries.  
Point of Strategic Assessment: Considering the current level of development of the 
economy, are there established transparent institutional processes and mechanisms to 
set-up a fund? 
6.3 A Tool for Assessing IFRAD in Mineral Economies 
The elements and the essential targets discussed in the IFRAD Strategy are converted 
into a tool for assessment. The purpose of the tool is to help evaluate each process 
within IFRAD and at which stage countries should implement the Strategy. Chapter 
Eight achieves this coupled with a SWOT analysis of the current state of the mining 
sectors in the case study countries used in the Thesis’ assessment. To streamline the 
economic and fiscal aspects of the IFRAD Strategy, the competitive investment 
framework (CIF) is incorporated into the tool for assessment. The CIF’s analysis can 
guide countries on how to implement IFRAD, and whether mineral regimes remain 
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competitive for implementation of the Strategy. The economic system’s performance 
on sustainability in Chapter Four is included in the framework. Additionally, some of 
the elements under the social and environmental systems are also co-opted in the tool.  
To ensure coherency of the tool with SD, the core principles for investments by 
UNCTAD (2012) are mapped against each process of IFRAD. Discussions on the 
selection of some of the performance indicators and targets can be found in Chapter 
Four (see Annexes 4.2- 4.5). Table 6.2 presents the framework. This consists of a 
matrix of performance indicators and targets to shape the discussions on IFRAD in 
Chapter Eight.   
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Table 6.2: A Tool for IFRAD’s Assessment in Mineral Economies in Africa 
IFRAD’s Processes 
Core Principles for SD Investment 
Points of Strategic Assessment 
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1 Development Objectives 
 
Integrated development plan/ 
Mineral development objective  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
- What are the country’s express development objectives as 
well as mining’s (potential) objectives’? 
  
- Have they been aligned and have mining be integrated into 
the national development and industrial policies and 
strategies of the country? 
2 Resource Potential 
 
Knowledge of Mineral Reserves and 
Resources*  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
    
- Is there a national inventory that maps the economic 
potential of the mineral resource? 
 
- Have governments set targets on acquiring information on 
the demonstrated mineral resources that is within its’ 
jurisdiction?  
 
- Are there on-going projects (government led, private 
exploration (joint venture with governments) and or 
regional-based, aimed at building the geological information 
of mineral ore bodies in the country? 
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3 Mining Investments 
  
MDAs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
- What types of mineral investments exist and is the 
investment regime competitive?  
- How are current mining investment (development) 
agreements structured?  
- What new (potential) and current risks have affected the 
regime and how has it affected mining investments? 
Investment agreements and 
elements 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Tax stability agreements (DTT) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
4 Mining Sector Linkages 
  
4a. Economic Aspects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Have effective safeguards been established in the legislative 
framework to support mining sector agencies?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- How competitive is the current regime with other mineral 
regimes in Africa?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macroeconomic Stability* ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓        ✓ ✓
    
Investments into Capital 
Development* 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓           
    
Resource Nationalism (RN) Issues* ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓       
    
Transparency and Management of 
Revenues* 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓          ✓ 
    
Sustainable Production* ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓           
    
4b. Fiscal Aspects (CIF) 
Corporate tax rate (national)    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Branch office tax    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Income tax credits for foreigners    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Corporate tax on oil and gas   ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Minimum corporate tax    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Additional profits tax    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Tax holidays (years)    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Tax treaties    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Deduct exploration/development 
costs (years)    ✓ 
   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
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Ring fencing    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- In terms of building critical mining sector linkages, is the 
economy’s local content and CSR policies well integrated 
with its fiscal policy?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forward carry of losses (years)    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Backward carry of losses No Not 
allowed    ✓ 
   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Maximum cost deduction    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Depreciation (years) 1–25 (LOM)    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Capital gains tax    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Tax on assets    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Value added/sales tax    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Fuel tax    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Repatriation/dividend/withholding 
tax    ✓ 
   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Import duties    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Export duties    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Payroll tax    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Land tax    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Provincial (State)    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Municipal taxes    ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Royalty Rate   ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
4c. Institutional Aspects 
Agencies (Support Mining 
Investments) 
    ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   
Agencies (Monitoring and 
Compliance) 
    ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   
Agencies Responsible for Managing 
Mineral Revenues 
    ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   
4d. Social Aspects 
Local Content* ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓           
CSR Policy and guidelines* ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓
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4e. Environmental Aspects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Have government been successful in managing various risks 
factors which influence mining investments? 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental law and due 
diligence* 
✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓       ✓ ✓
Health and Safety* ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓       ✓ ✓
4f. Risks 
Financial               ✓ ✓     
Economic               ✓ ✓     
Country/ Regional (Sovereign)               ✓ ✓     
Political                ✓ ✓     
5 Managing Investment Portfolios 
  
(Wealth Funds) Investment* ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  - Considering the current level of development of the 
economy, are there established transparent institutional 
processes and mechanisms to set up a fund? Direct Investments ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Several sources: The five Processes of IFRAD; Chapter Four (Annexes 4.2- 4.5; 4.7- 4.9); UNCTAD (2012); and Cawood (1999) 
*These items and the methodology for assessment are discussed in Chapter Four of this Thesis (see pages 72- 108).  
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6.4 Conclusion 
In summary, the Chapter discussed the first part of the IFRAD Strategy. This was 
premised on earlier discussions in Chapter Five and the critical points that must be 
factored when designing investment strategies. The UNCTAD principles, which were 
pertinent for a new generation of investment policy issues were co-opted in the IFRAD 
Strategy, as well as the assessment tool for the SED of countries.  
For the IFRAD Strategy, it should be noted that due to the unique challenges and 
constraints of countries, the approaches or options should be implemented based on the 
level (stage) of current development needs. Also, it is important to note that the 
processes are interactive and non-linear. Although, there are general fundamentals 
(such as Processes 1- 4) which are essential for all mineral economies, conducting a 
situational analysis in line with a nations’ development and mineral investment goals 
can direct the resource development pathway that a mining country should pursue. The 
Table 6.2 will provide a useful tool for countries in guiding the development of optimal 
mining investment policies for growth and development. 
The next Chapter discusses the policy instruments, requirements and plan for 
implementing IFRAD in mining countries.   
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Chapter 7  
Implementation Plan for the IFRAD Strategy in Mineral Economies in Africa 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents the plan for implementing the IFRAD Strategy. It discusses the 
requirements and policy instruments necessary in realising the five processes within 
IFRAD. Following Tinbergen’s rule that at least every policy or strategy (and its 
element) must be tied to an instrument, some of the fundamentals of policy making 
vis-à-vis the unique context of mineral-rich economies are expounded (see Tinbergen, 
1952). Instead of the ‘one’ policy instrument per a policy process (according to the 
Tinbergen rule), varied instruments are provided for each process of the IFRAD 
Strategy.  
One of the main reasons for this Chapter has been the challenge of translating policies 
or laws in developing mineral economies. Implementation deficiencies arise as a result 
of a lack of understanding (or capacity) to fully implement policies, and the vested 
interests of political and institutional actors who influence the policy-making process 
in their favour. For mineral economies, it is imperative for policy-makers to 
understand the nature of rents and rent capture instruments that impact economic 
growth, and the pre-conditions (or success factors), which enhance effective 
implementation of policies in the African context.  
7.2 Plan of Implementation for the IFRAD Strategy in Africa 
In terms of implementing IFRAD, Figure 7.1 expands on (2- 5) of the SED protocol 
in Chapter Six (see Figure 6.1). The conditions are grouped under requirements for 
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IFRAD; and the instruments and rules under policy objectives; and finally, a ‘how to 
guide’ for implementation.  
           
Figure 7.1: Outline for IFRAD's Implementation in Africa 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualization (2017) 
7.2.1 Requirements for IFRAD’s Implementation 
As indicated, to get ‘implementation’ right there must be a sound understanding of the 
mineral investment environment and the interests of the institutional actors who  
implement policies in RRA economies. Schouwstra and Ellman (2006) have asserted 
that certain pre-conditions or requirements are ‘essentials’ without which a policy or 
strategy may fall apart. For the IFRAD Strategy, 12 essential requirements are gleaned 
from Africa’s regional frameworks on mineral sector governance, as well as some of 
the recommendations from Chapter Two’s discussions (see also AMDC, 2014, 2012; 
AU, 2009; ECA, 2011a; ECA-AU, 2011; ECA-AU-AfDB, 2012). These represent 
general pre-conditions without which IFRAD may be flawed in implementation. The 
key requirements for IFRAD are presented as follows:   
Requirement One: Understanding Rents and Taxation 
Dougherty (2013) remarked that the notion of rents is central to understanding the 
structure of the mining industry. He indicated that rents are surplus profits beyond the 
amount necessary to sustain production. Or, that portion of value added that exceeds 
opportunity costs of all factors of production (Ricardo, 1817). Undoubtedly, the 
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options here for technocrats in governments are to introduce tax instruments that self-
adjust in periods of down-turn and plenty; and to identify instruments that 
contextualise the political, socio-cultural and institutional issues in mining to help 
capture the indirect forms of rents during good times and provide relief during bad-
times. For IFRAD’s implementation, designing courses that take cognisance of the 
nature of rents and the instruments to adequately capture rents is a key requirement 
for implementing the Strategy.  
Requirement Two: Governance and the State’s Role in Mineral Economies  
Good governance and the role of the State in steering the course of a mineral-led 
development are essential to fully implementing IFRAD in mineral economies. 
Regional frameworks such as the AMV, Agenda 2063, African Peer Review 
Mechanism and other regional accountability frameworks uphold the importance of 
governance and the effective role of the State in realising the priorities for economic 
development (see Dougherty, 2011 and AU, 2009). Thus, the State must ensure that 
rules for good governance in the economy are upheld and effectively steer mineral 
development for sustainable and inclusive growth. As an addendum to requirement 
two, a State must establish an extractive sector policy to mainstream IFRAD. Here, 
the rights, duties and responsibilities of all stakeholders must be clearly defined within 
the extractive sector policy, as well as the enabling social, economic and 
environmental obligations of governments and mining companies toward the goal of 
SED in mineral economies.   
Requirement Three: Security of Tenure and Private Property Rights 
Land security (tenure) and the enabling framework for mineral and private property 
rights are ‘key’ requirements, which must exist for IFRAD to be effectively 
implemented. Although security of tenure has moved from amongst the top ten mining 
risks from 2008, it provides a clear indication of whether the mining regime is stable. 
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Mining Companies (or investors) rely on the stability of the regime and use this 
requirement as a litmus test for whether political risks are heightened in the country 
(FI, 2016). Here, legislative frameworks must clearly define the mineral rights 
holders’ interests, terms, duration and processes for renewal in the mineral regime (see 
IISD, 2012; Mann et al., 2012).  
Requirement Four: Requisite Human Capital for Mining 
The skills-set of the labour force, i.e. the required human capital for mining is 
paramount to how meaningful IFRAD can be transitioned in an economy. As a 
requirement, it is imperative for expert technical and administrative capacity to be 
developed by the State together with other stakeholders, coupled with harnessing 
better partnerships between research think-tanks, academic institutions and industry to 
ensure effective extraction and management of mineral resources in an economy (refer 
to AU, 2009).  
Requirement Five: Public and Private Partnerships 
The fifth requirement, which is tied to the fourth under the IFRAD Strategy is the 
needed critical partnerships between public and private institutions. Governments 
should have productive partnerships and collaboration with industry, academic and 
research institutions engaged in mining to ensure that the physical needs of industry 
can be met through research and development, while providing the enabling policy 
environment to promote mineral development in a country.  
Requirement Six: Investment Incentives 
Another requirement of relevance to IFRAD is the type of investment incentives that 
governments can provide to boost the mineral investment potential of the State. Here, 
careful application of fiscal incentives such as tax breaks, exemptions to export and 
import duties, and providing further incentives for MNCs to move beyond compliance 
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of local content and CSR obligations must be instituted by the State (refer to 
UNCTAD, 2012, 2015, n.d. on designing investment policies). 
Requirement Seven: Technology and Intellectual Property (IP) Rights 
The seventh requirement for IFRAD is the enabling legal environment to support 
mining technology and IP Rights for innovation (UNCTAD, 2012; 2015). This 
requirement is necessary to ensure that the laws of the country are favourable in 
protecting technology and IP rights. Also, technology transfer agreements and use of 
foreign technologies in business should be established and monitored through 
regulatory bodies in partnership with mining companies and support service 
companies in mining.  
Requirement Eight: Inclusive Institutions 
For the IFRAD Strategy, institutions that foster inclusivity and policy coherence for 
the development of the mineral economy are needed. For this eighth requirement, it is 
important that multi-stakeholder partnerships are established and consensus on policy 
decisions amongst mineral governance agencies achieved. For mining to be beneficial, 
institutions, defined here as formal and informal rules underlying political powers, 
bureaucratic agencies or social and private organizations must work cohesively (see 
ECA, 2012b and World Bank, 2008). Here, the organisational structures for ministries, 
agencies, and departments concerned with mining should be designed, together with 
advisory councils who work to enhance the needed synergies between development 
agencies and mining-related institutions in their decision-making.   
A network chart for building synergies and fostering networks amongst mining sector 
agencies is illustrated in Figure 7.2.  
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Figure 7.2: Mining Institutions Network Chart for Policy Design  
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017) 
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The network chart shows the institutions, policy and institutional actors in a typical 
mining economy with environment and social development agencies and actors. To 
harness effective partnerships, governments must design protocols for horizontal and 
vertical communication, as well as create advisory councils who coordinate and 
synchronise the interest and goals within the various departments.  
Requirement Nine: Natural Justice and Righteousness 
The ninth requirement essential for IFRAD is for mineral economies to implement 
principles of righteousness and natural justice in matters of dispute settlement and 
adjudication arising from mineral revenue management. Here the three principles of 
natural justice, i.e. the right to be heard through fair hearings; biased free ruling and 
judgment based on robust evidence in adjudication and in the court system must be 
clearly entrenched in a country’s legal framework to protect the integrity of the mineral 
regime to attract mining investments (refer to Craig, 2008).   
Requirement Ten: Regulations for Environmental Protection 
The tenth requirement for IFRAD is for mineral economies to ensure that measures 
for environmental protection are contextualised and clearly defined in the regime 
(Sinkala, 2009). The regime should encourage dynamic regulations, where globally 
but relevant national standards, which are applicable to the regime are developed. 
Also, the available skills-set and capacity for monitoring compliance should be in 
existence or developed to safeguard the environment (Ibid).  
Requirement Eleven: Infrastructure for Mineral Development  
The critical infrastructure for mineral development is a key requirement to realising 
the IFRAD Strategy in mineral economies. As a requirement, governments should 
partner with private developers and develop essential transportation networks, mining 
infrastructure and guaranteed source of energy supply to meet the mining economy’s 
needs. This enhances the country’s bargaining power and position to be able to provide 
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the right kinds of incentives for the investor in investment negotiations and agreement 
(see ECA, 2015, 2016b; ECA-AU, 2011).61 
Requirement Twelve: Defining the Level of Mineral Development  
Since no two mines and mining investment destinations are the same, purely based on 
translating the IFRAD Strategy, a classification scheme is essential to determine the 
level of mineral development. Based on several parameters (refer to Table 7.1), 
countries are classified as - emerging mineral economies, semi-matured mineral 
economies and matured mineral economies to assist in devising ways in which IFRAD 
may be implemented in a mining country and the type of policy instruments required. 
The above requirements are not exhaustive since for many mineral economies, the 
social-cultural environment, the type of incentives, the nature of the elites in a country, 
the type of institutions- rule of law, democracy, etc., affect the different policy 
manifestations in mining. Therefore, these 12 requirements only represent the 
necessary pre-conditions that are crucial for the success of SED strategies generally; 
and as well represent essential requirements for IFRAD’s implementation. The next 
section considers the policy objectives and instruments for realising the IFRAD 
strategy. 
7.2.2 Policy Objectives for the IFRAD Strategy 
The second part of the plan of implementation is to understand the policy objectives 
and instrument mixes needed for IFRAD’s implementation. Essentially, policy 
                                                   
61 Another dimension to investments in infrastructure, is the regional integration approach where smaller 
countries in partnership with other countries in a region can develop the requisite regional infrastructure to 
support mining in the region (see AU, 2009). This also enhances regional value chains and markets (AU, 
2015a). The AMV has advocated for sub-regional infrastructure development amongst countries (AU, 2009, 
p. 25- 26, 44- 45). Spatial development programmes can lessen the cost burden of infrastructure 
development by small countries that are needful of rents (Ibid). 
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instruments are the techniques or means through which governments achieve their 
policy objective or strategic goals (Linder and Peters, 1990; Vedung, 1998). These 
must be linked to the broader agenda or goal of the economy (Howlett, 2001). Since 
the focus of the section is on policy objectives and instrument choices, the two main 
types, i.e. the substantive (legal, economic and social) and the procedural instruments, 
which consists of (institutional and informational instruments) are discussed under 
each policy objective for IFRAD. (see Bemelmans-Videc et al., 2003; Howlett, 2011; 
on the types of policy instruments in policy-making). There are essentially four policy 
objectives for IFRAD’s implementation. These are outlined below and accompanied 
by the requisite policy instruments for implementation.  
Policy Objective One: Rule of Law 
For this objective, the legal instruments are a mix of policy instruments of laws, 
standards and frameworks that contractually bind parties. Under Process 1 (refer to 
Chapter Six and Table 7.2), the instruments consist of appropriate standards for the 
development of the mineral economy. Process 2 is on the legal requirements for 
exploration, and the requirements for reporting on the geological information and 
standards. Process 3 considers the framework or instruments for investment treaties 
and agreements. Process 4 consists of laying the legal foundation and instruments for 
local content, CSR, fiscal rules and domestic beneficiation. The last, Process 5, 
suggests instruments for establishing a fund mechanism.     
Policy Objective Two: Economic Growth 
These instruments consist of specific pecuniary incentive or disincentive  to support 
social, environmental and economic interventions in a mining economy (see Borrás 
and Edquist, 2013). Processes 1- 5 consist of: instruments that contextualise mining 
with the economy’s development objectives; controls for integrated mine 
development; trade and investment agreements; economic aspects of mine 
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management; and mobilising investments for SD through rent management 
respectively.  
Policy Objective Three: Equitable Distribution of Wealth 
Instruments like these emphasize the obligations for social due diligence including 
HSE in mining. The instruments for the five processes in the IFRAD Strategy consist 
of: (1) mobilizing investments for SD; (2) social issues in relation to exploration; (3) 
supporting mining R & D and social investments; (4) integrated mine development 
with emphasis on fulfilling the requirements of LC and CSR instruments and 
downstream processing; and (5) compliance and reporting on accounting rules and 
management systems for rent. 
Policy Objective Four: Good governance and Institutions 
A key instrument of any Strategy is the institutional elements such as the actors, 
administration and agencies in translating the Strategy. For the institutional 
instruments for IFRAD, they consist of M & E frameworks, establishing agencies and 
centres to ensure compliance on the legal, social and economic instruments (which in 
most cases are already in existence). Additionally, establishing training, and R & D 
centres for building the industry’s capacity to monitor mining’s impact. The list of 
specific instrument mixes for IFRAD’s five processes are presented in Table 7.2. 
In terms of the policy instrument mixes, comprehending the constraints and 
impediments can assist in selecting an optimal policy mix for any Strategy. Gibson 
(1999); Grabosky (1995); and Howlett (2004) have argued that certain combination of 
policy mixes affects the calculus of the instrument choice. Whereas in certain cases 
(i.e. multi-dimensional issues), this might augur well, in others, the configuration 
might change the outcome.  
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For mineral economies, the complexity and multidimensionality of mining issues 
require varied mixes, which support SED of mineral economies. More so, to deal with 
varied instrument mixes, as was indicated, identifying the level of mineral 
development is important to allow the different levels of mining countries to maximise 
on certain instruments when implementing IFRAD. Table 7.1 illustrates the 
characteristics and definition of the classified levels of mineral development, and the 
rationale behind the classification. This classification facilitates the meeting of 
requirement ‘twelve’ for IFRAD. 
Table 7.1: Classification of Mineral Economies for the Strategy 
Classification Definition Characteristics of Maturity 
Emerging Mineral 
Economies 
Emerging mineral economies are countries that 
have recently discovered minerals (i.e. in the last 5- 
20 years) and are in the process of restructuring 
their political and economic frameworks to attract 
investments.  • Number of years in mining 
• Existence and implementation of 
mining frameworks 
• Mining’s impact on economic 
growth  
• Integration of mining with local 
economy 
Semi-matured 
Mineral Economies 
Economies that have an average level mining 
experience and in mineral development; and 
(usually commenced) large scale mineral 
production within the last 50 years.  
Matured Mineral 
Economies 
Matured mineral economies represent economies 
that discovered minerals (resources) in the past 50- 
100 years (or more) and have had sound mining 
laws integrated with the political economic 
dynamics of the country. 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017) 
The classification of the levels of mineral development is based on: length of mineral 
discovery; number of years spent on developing the resource and length of existence 
of its mining frameworks vis-à-vis the mineral resource; mining’s impact on economic 
growth; and integration of mining with the local economy (see Table 7.1). 
In summary, policy instruments, which operationalise an objective are ineffective 
unless the administrators and politicians expand the menu of government choices to 
include both substantive and procedural instruments, and to understand the important 
context-based nature of instrument choices (Howlett, 2011). This is a critical point 
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since mining is a unique economic activity that requires adopting an optimal mix of 
instruments for implementing SED strategies. Thus, skilled administration that 
understands how mining works is crucial to ensuring that IFRAD and other SED 
strategies work effectively.  
7.2.3 Implementing the IFRAD Strategy for Sustainable Economic 
Development 
Considering the key requirements and policy objectives for IFRAD, how should SED 
be assessed for IFRAD’s implementation? Figure 7.3 puts into context the ‘how to 
guide’ for IFRAD’s implementation.  
 
Figure 7.3: A ‘how to Guide’ on Implementing IFRAD in RRA Economies 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017) 
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The primary step is to draw on the requirements by developing a dynamic extractive 
sector policy, which capitalises on the processes and instruments for IFRAD at the 
national level. The second step is to use the classification scheme to measure the 
different levels of mineral development and the optimal mix of policy instruments 
required for IFRAD.  
Before applying and monitoring IFRAD, the third step (see Figure 7.3) is to evaluate 
its application to a mineral economy’s unique context. Here, IFRAD’s assessment tool 
(in Chapter Six) is very important to assist countries in monitoring their progress on 
SED. What is also important is identifying the level of mineral development, at which 
stage of the IFRAD process a mineral economy is at, and to define the type of policy 
instruments needed for each RRA economy. 
With regards to the fourth step, which is applying the policy instruments, the 
requirements for IFRAD must be fully met in every mineral economy. This is 
important because the policy instruments require a varied mix of instruments specific 
to each of the three classifications of mineral development. The rationale is that some 
countries have stable and robust regimes and have been mining for longer, thus, certain 
instruments may have already been established. In such cases, some of the policy 
instruments within the processes of IFRAD can be avoided, while focusing on 
implementing the ones that are absent or needed in a country.  
Based on the Researcher’s assessment of the policy objectives, Table 7.2 prioritises 
the instrument mixes for the three classifications for IFRAD. Emerging mineral 
economies’ instrument mix are devoid of domestic beneficiation regulation initially, 
because it requires strategic skills and long-term planning based on the local climate 
for manufactured mineral products. A fund mechanism for future development is also 
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not recommended in the initial policy mix until such countries mature in the 
management of mining revenues.  
For semi-matured economies, because they have characteristics similar to matured 
economies, the recommended instrument mixes are integrated. Generally, the drive to 
prioritising certain instrument mix over others should be based on the economies’ 
long-term development objectives and how such countries aim to use mining to 
transform their mineral economies (see Table 7.2 for IFRAD’s instrument mixes).  
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Table 7.2: IFRAD’s Mix of Instruments for Mineral Economies 
Classification of 
Mineral 
Economies  
Instruments 
The Five Processes of the IFRAD Strategy 
Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 Process 4 Process 5 
Mining with 
development 
objectives 
Understanding the 
resource potential 
Mining investment 
types 
Mining sector 
linkages 
Managing 
investment 
portfolios 
Emerging 
Mineral 
Economy 
Legal/ Regulatory 
Instruments 
- International (soft) law 
- Trade and tariff policy 
- Competition policies 
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Good governance & 
equity 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and 
reporting: Rules/codes 
on the reporting of 
Resources  
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Favourable standards 
and elements in 
investment treaties/ 
agreements  
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Environmental 
management 
- Social responsibilities 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Fiscal rules 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
Economic/ Financial 
Instruments 
- International (soft) law 
- Mobilizing investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Encourage exploration 
and mine development 
- Mobilizing investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Integrated mine 
development (database/ 
open cadastre system) 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Trade and tariff policy 
- Competition policies 
- Mobilizing investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and 
reporting: Accounting 
rules 
- Integrated mine 
development 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Royalties, taxes, levies 
and rents 
- CSR/ local content and 
local participation 
- Enterprise 
development 
- Mobilizing 
investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Accounting rules 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
- Risk management 
Social Instruments 
- Mobilizing investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Environmental 
management 
- Social responsibilities 
- Government capacity to 
develop policy and 
enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent 
administration 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Mobilizing investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Government capacity 
to develop policy and 
enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent 
administration 
- Government’s capacity 
to develop policy and 
enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent 
administration 
- Integrated mine 
development 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- HSE rules 
- Social responsibilities 
- Mobilizing 
investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
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Institutional  
Instruments 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of mining 
- M & E 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of mining 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of mining 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of mining 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Training and research 
centres on Mining 
- Institutions for mining 
sector governance 
- Ensuring relevance 
and effectiveness of 
mining 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
- Fund management 
and administration 
Classification Instruments Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 Process 4 Process 5 
Semi-matured 
and Matured 
Mineral 
Economies 
Legal/ Regulatory 
Instruments 
- Enter into long-term 
supply contracts 
- Recycling policy 
- International (soft) law 
- Trade and tariff policy 
- Competition policies 
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Good governance & 
equity 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and 
reporting: Rules/codes 
on the reporting of 
Resources  
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Favourable standards 
and elements in 
investment treaties/ 
agreements  
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Realistic downstream 
processing 
requirements 
- Environmental 
management 
- Social responsibilities 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Fiscal rules 
- Act to regulate the 
management of the 
fund 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
Economic/ Financial 
Instruments 
- Encourage domestic 
supply through NMP  
- Enter into long-term 
supply contracts 
- International (soft) law 
- Mobilizing investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Encourage exploration 
and mine development 
- Own/control/promote 
mines 
- Mobilizing investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Integrated mine 
development (database/ 
open cadastre system) 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Bilateral or multilateral 
agreements 
- Trade and tariff policy 
- Competition policies 
- Mobilizing investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and 
reporting: Accounting 
rules 
- Integrated mine 
development 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Realistic downstream 
processing 
requirements 
(beneficiation) 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Royalties, taxes, levies 
and rents 
- CSR/ local content and 
local participation 
- Enterprise 
development 
- Mobilizing 
investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Accounting rules 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
- Risk management 
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Source: The Instruments under each Process are derived from the Researcher’s assessment of the policy objectives for the IFRAD Strategy 
 
 
Social Instruments 
- Mobilizing investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Environmental 
management 
- Social responsibilities 
- Mobilizing investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Government capacity to 
develop policy and 
enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent 
administration 
- Integrated mine 
development 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Encourage exploration 
- Support R&D to 
promote substitution  
- Mobilizing investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Government capacity 
to develop policy and 
enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent 
administration 
- Government capacity 
to develop policy and 
enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent 
administration 
- Integrated mine 
development 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Encourage exploration 
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Realistic downstream 
processing 
requirements 
- Environmental 
management and 
health and safety 
- Social responsibilities 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Mobilizing 
investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
Institutional  
Instruments 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness 
- M & E 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Research and 
development centres & 
STI centres 
- Mining database system 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Training and research 
centres on Mining 
- Institutions for mining 
sector governance 
- Ensuring relevance 
and effectiveness 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
- Fund management 
and administration 
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Some of the instruments (in Table 7.2) are cross-cutting because of the multi-
dimensional nature of mining and SED. As such, where there are duplications under 
the five processes, countries implementing IFRAD should consider only the most 
relevant instruments, which suit their context. Also, it is important to reiterate that the 
consideration for the extractive sector policy must be subject to a well-functioning 
mining administration system that subjects its officials to the rule of law and 
accountability in the regime.  
Additionally, the role and boundaries of the legislator, agencies and political agents 
should be clearly defined within the purview of effective governance institutions, 
equipped with sufficient resources to achieve the desired policy objectives and 
outcomes. Every citizen in a mineral economy should have within their purview and 
on-demand the measurement process for compliance, the reporting tools, annual 
reports on programmes and projects by MNCs, and the development agreements 
signed between governments and industry for scrutiny (see Cawood, 2011: p.12).  
7.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Chapter discussed the implementation plan, i.e. key requirements 
that policy-makers must understand; the policy instruments for implementing IFRAD; 
and a ‘how to guide’ on implementation. The economic concept of rents was included 
as a requirement to shed light on the impact of rents and the policy options that are 
needed if IFRAD is to be implemented. Although these general requirements are pre-
requisite for effective implementation of the IFRAD Strategy, they remain generally 
important in fulfilling the goals of mining-led development strategies in Africa. 
Furthermore, considering the spate of R & D in mechanised mining and automation, 
it is a pre-requirement for countries to start envisioning a digital mining economy 
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where machines run the entire mining process from extraction to refinement. In this 
regard, what plans, and visions are being laid out at the national and regional levels 
for the future of mining in Africa.  
The next Chapter considers the four selected gold mining countries and evaluates their 
preparedness to implement IFRAD. Due to the nature and extent of the assessment, 
brief recommendations for the different processes of IFRAD are provided, together 
with discussions on the applications of the Strategy in the countries.  
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Chapter 8  
An Evaluation of the IFRAD Strategy in the Case Study Countries 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The Chapter’s objective is to conduct an evaluation of the IFRAD Strategy in the 
selected case study countries- Ghana, DRC, Tanzania and South Africa. This is 
achieved by evaluating the countries using the SED tool devised from the Strategy, 
and a SWOT analysis of the selected countries’ mining sectors. In terms of the SWOT, 
Johnson et al. (2008) have contended that such analysis helps in strategic planning and 
assessment of current situations and how to improve options for a firm (or an industry) 
and policy planning (refer also to Humphrey, 1986).  
Chapter Seven outlined the implementation plan for the Strategy. In this Chapter, 
specific policy recommendations in improving the mining investment environment 
and applying the Strategy are deduced for each country. Lessons and schematics for 
applying the Strategy and the type of policy instruments required are exemplified with 
a map highlighting the gaps, and which processes need strengthening in each country. 
All in all, the Chapter’s assessment will assist in identifying potential bottlenecks to 
assist IFRAD’s implementation. Due to the nature of the assessments for the four 
countries, the Chapter relies heavily on annexes to cover all the stages of the 
evaluation highlighted (see Figure 8.1 for the steps to be covered in the Chapter). 
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Figure 8.1: Process in Applying the Strategy 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017)
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8.2 Classification of Gold Mining Countries in Africa 
Before proceeding to the classification of countries, it is imperative for all eleven 
requirements (discussed in Chapter Seven) to be present in the mineral economy 
intending to implement IFRAD. The next step (which is the twelve requirement) is for 
countries to identify their maturity levels in mineral development. Extracting from the 
classification’s table (see Table 7.1 of Chapter Seven), the elements are teased and 
applied to Table 8.1. The four countries being considered have been discussed in the 
research methodology section of Chapter Four (refer to pages 72- 78) of this Thesis. 
Table 8.1: Classification of Countries Based on Levels of Mineral Maturity 
Characteristics 
Levels of Mineral Maturity* 
Number of years in 
commercial gold 
mining 
Length of existence 
of mining 
frameworks 
Integration of 
mining with local 
economy 
Mining's impact 
on economic 
growth 
Classification 
Indicators 
Year of first 
commercial 
production 
Year of first 
legislated mineral 
law (post- republic 
state)  
Economic 
multipliers- Gross 
Value Added 
(direct and indirect 
impacts) ⁑ 
% of total 
mineral exports 
to merchandise 
exports  
Countries  
Ghana 
Official gold 
production records 
date from the 
1400s until now 
Mineral laws (1962; 
1986; 2006) 
2.80 11.13% 
Matured 
mineral 
economy 
DRC 
Official mineral 
production records 
begun in late 1970s 
(under the Zaire) 
Mineral law (2002) - 67.80%** 
Emerging 
mineral 
economy 
Tanzania 
Official gold 
production records 
date from the 
1800s until date 
Mineral laws (1979; 
1998; 2010) 
2.52 11.09% 
Semi-
matured 
mineral 
economy 
South Africa 
Official gold 
production records 
date from the  
Mineral laws (1964; 
1967; 1991; 2002) 
2.20 17.3% 
Matured 
mineral 
economy 
Sources: Table 7.1; World Gold Council- WCG (2015); World Bank (2016), WDI 
Dataset 
* For detailed definitions of the characteristics (see p.170) of Chapter Seven. 
⁑ The WGC (2015: p. 32- 33) refer to gross value added (GVA) as “the rise in demand and economic output 
created in other industries because of gold mining activities”. The GVA values for the DRC was not calculated 
in the World Gold Council’s assessment.  
** The average for the DRC covers (1970- 1978) only. 
From Table 8.1, the four gold producing countries- Ghana, DRC, Tanzania and South 
Africa are presented, with the last column depicting the classification based on the 
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level of mineral development and maturity. The rationale for classifying the countries 
(in Table 8.1) is explained below.  
8.2.1 Matured Mineral Economies 
The justification for classifying Ghana and South Africa as matured economies is 
premised on the long history of mining. Both countries started mining gold and 
diamonds quite early. Ghana from 1400s and South Africa from the discovery of gold 
in 1800s. These two countries have legislated mining laws within the last fifty to sixty 
years post-republic status. In terms of integration of mining with the local economy, a 
value-added multiplier analysis, which shows the direct and indirect impact of gold 
mining by the WGC (2015) indicated that both countries exceed the median of (2.52) 
with Ghana having obtained (2.80) and South Africa obtaining a value of (2.50) from 
a median of (2.10)47F62 Such multipliers show the linkages of mining with the local 
economy. Also, the two countries have above median scores of 11.13% and 17.3% 
when the percentage of ores and metals to merchandise exports are averaged from 
1970s to 2015. The SSA median is 3.67%. Countries above the median of 3.67% show 
a significant reliance on mineral exports for growth. 
8.2.2 Semi-Matured Mineral Economies 
Tanzania is classified as a semi-matured mining economy despite its long history of 
commercial gold production from 1800s. Post-independence 1961, Tanzania 
established its first mining legislation in 1979, followed by the 1998 Minerals Act and 
the current Mining Act of 2010. With the resurgence in mining after the 1990s and the 
two main global seniors’ (Acacia, formerly African Barrick Gold and AngloGold 
                                                   
62 The World Gold Council value added analysis conducted in 2015 was used to facilitate the classification. 
This was to show the integration of mining with other sectors of the economy. See definition for GVA in Table 
8.1. 
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Ashanti) dominating the industry, commercial production buoyed after 1995 (Magai 
and Márquez-Velázquez, 2011). The average percentage of ores and metals to 
merchandise exports (from 1970 to 2015) remains at 11.09%, which is above the 
regional median of (3.67%) (World Bank, 2016). With the length of its mineral 
legislations under fifty years, Tanzania is classified as a semi-matured mineral 
economy.   
8.2.3 Emerging Mineral Economies 
On the four parameters, except the GVA, which could not be ascertained for the DRC, 
it has less than twenty years of mineral development and mineral sector governance, 
post the Congo civil war. Due to the two civil wars in 1996 and (1998- 2003), which 
led to the stagnation of the economy, many facets of the economy’s infrastructure 
deteriorated. Because of the two civil wars, there have been many disruptions to nation 
building. Despite the significant impact of mineral rents to GDP growth, the economy 
is highly delinked from the minerals sector. As was noted earlier, 90% of all gold 
mining is at the artisanal level (ECA, 2016c). Thus, the DRC is classified as an 
emerging mineral economy.  
This classification (which was devised in Chapter Seven) can serve to categorise and 
identify levels of mineral development in mineral economies in Africa, and to target 
specific instruments for sustainable economic development. The next sections present 
the method and evaluation of IFRAD in the four countries.   
8.3 IFRAD’s Assessment in the Selected Gold Mining Countries  
The section recapitulates the method of analysis. Here, the four countries’ mining 
sectors will be assessed using the SWOT tool to determine the gaps and bottlenecks. 
For IFRAD, the SED tool (in section 6.3 of Chapter Six) and its points of strategic 
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assessment is used to evaluate whether the enabling environment to transition IFRAD 
is in existence. If so at which points within the SED process are crucial for a mining 
country for IFRAD’s implementation? Table 8.2 extracts the key points from the SED 
tool in Chapter Six.  
Table 8.2: SED Tool for the IFRAD Strategy’s Implementation 
Elements of the Strategy Points of Strategic Assessment 
Process 1: Integrating mining 
with national development 
objectives 
What are the country’s express development objectives as well as mining’s 
(potential) objectives’? Have they been aligned and have mining been integrated 
into the national development and industrial policies and strategies of the 
country? 
Process 2: Understanding the 
resource potential of the country 
Is there a national inventory that maps the economic potential of the mineral 
resource? Have governments set targets on acquiring information on the 
demonstrated mineral resources that is within its’ jurisdiction, and are there on-
going projects (government-led, private exploration (joint venture-ship with 
governments) and or regional-based, aimed at building the geological information 
of mineral ore bodies in the country? 
Process 3: The type of mineral 
investments 
What types of mineral investments exist and is the investment regime 
competitive? How are current mining investment (development) agreements 
structured? What new (potential) and current risks have affected the regime and 
how has it affected mining investments? 
Process 4: Mining sector 
linkages (rent generation, 
capture and management) 
How competitive is the current regime with other mineral regimes in Africa? Have 
effective safeguards been established in the legislative framework to support 
mining sector agencies? In terms of building critical mining sector linkages, is the 
economy’s local content and CSR policies well integrated with its fiscal policy? And 
have government been successful in managing various risks factors which 
influence mining investments? 
Process 5: Managing investment 
portfolios 
Considering the current level of development of the economy, are there 
established transparent institutional processes and mechanisms to set up a 
fund? 
Source: Extracted from Chapter Six- Table 6.2: A Tool for IFRAD’s Assessment in 
Mineral Economies 
To streamline the discussions, the ensuing assessments are presented under the 
following themes: evaluation using the CIF to assess competitiveness; and the general 
assessment of the selected countries. The first part discusses Process 3, and the fiscal 
aspects in Process 4 guided by the CIF; whereas, the second part, discusses in brief 
the general assessment of the five Processes within IFRAD. Due to the nature of the 
assessments for the four countries, only the results and main findings are presented in 
the Chapter. 
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8.4 Evaluation of the Competitiveness of the Selected Countries 
As regulator, a government’s fiscal regime and how competitive the regime 
requirements are, are essential to attract mining investments. The CIF, which was 
included in the SED tool is used to make comparison of the fiscal regime in the four 
countries. Table 8.3 illustrates the data calculated for the CIF. The parameters in the 
CIF for the ten (10) highest global gold producers have been averaged (for 2016) and 
the global average (for 2010) are compared with the results of the selected case study 
countries.63 Also, rating on the scores for economic system in the SDI is included in 
Process (4a) to highlight the current state of their economies.  
Table 8.3: Results on the Parameters of the Competitive Investment Framework 
Parameters SED Tool 
(Chapter Six) 
Global Averages (2010 & 
2016) 
Gold Mining Countries 
2010 CIF 
Average 
2016 CIF 
Average for 
Gold 
Mining 
Economies* 
Tanzania Ghana South Africa DRC 
Process 3: Mineral Investments 
Tax stability 
agreements 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tax treaties Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Process 4: Mining Sector Linkages 
Process 4a: Economic Aspects 
Scores extracted from 
Economic System SDI 
in Chapter Four 
- - Average Poor Average Bad 
Process 4b: Fiscal Aspects 
Corporate tax rate 
(national) 
23% 22.05% 30% 35% 
(0%- 32.5%) 
Acc. to a 
spec. formula 
for gold 
mining 
30% 
Branch office tax 25% 25.55% 25%- 30% 25% 28% 35% 
Income tax credits for 
foreigners 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Minimum corporate 
tax 
1% X 25% x X x 
Additional profits tax 3% No No 10% No No 
Tax holidays (years) Yes Yes 
Yes (and a 
lower royalty 
rate at the 
beginning of 
production) 
Yes (during 
pre-
production) 
Yes/No Yes 
                                                   
63 The countries included- China, Russia, Australia, United States (Various States), Canada (Quebec, British 
Columbia and Ontario), Peru, South Africa, Mexico, Uzbekistan and Ghana. 
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Parameters SED Tool 
(Chapter Six) 
Global Averages (2010 & 
2016) 
Gold Mining Countries 
2010 CIF 
Average 
2016 CIF 
Average for 
Gold 
Mining 
Economies* 
Tanzania Ghana South Africa DRC 
Ring fencing No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Forward carry of 
losses (years) 
Yes 
Yes (12.9 
years) 
Yes, 
indefinitely 
Yes (5 years) 
indefinitely 
after it has 
been 
assessed 
Yes, 
indefinitely 
Backward carry of 
losses  
No No No No No No 
Depreciation (years)  SL 
41.87% 
(LOM)/ 
Method SL 
100% (LOM) 
20% over the 
life of the 
mine 
Up to 50% on 
mining assets 
(1- 25) over 
the life of the 
mine 
100% (LOM) 
Capital gains tax 24% 
Yes 
(21.65%) 
x 15% 22.4% 
Treated as 
CIT 
Tax on assets Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Value added/sales tax 17% 
Yes 
(11.44%) 
0% 
14% generally 
(Mining 
exempt) 
14% 0% 
Fuel tax Yes Yes Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes 
Repatriation/dividend/ 
withholding tax 
3% Yes (11.8%) 5%- 10% 8%- 10% 
10%- 15% on 
dividends 
10% on 
dividends 
Import duties 0% 0% 0% 
Exempt for 
mining plant & 
machinery (all 
others for 
mining attract 
5%) 
0% 
Mining 
exempt 
Export duties 0% 0% 
Mining 
exempt 
Mining 
exempt 
Mining 
exempt 
Mining 
exempt 
Payroll tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes (0%- 
40%) 
Land tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial (State) taxes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Municipal taxes Yes Yes No No No x 
Royalty rate X 4.39% 4% 5% 
(0.5- 5%) for 
refined/ (0.5- 
7%) for 
unrefined 
2.50% 
Transfer pricing rules X Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Process 4f: Risks 
Moody Rating (2016) 
(Financial, economic, 
country and political)  
Not 
calculated  
Not 
calculated 
B1 B3 Baa2 B3 
Multiple Sources: (Ernest and Young, 2015; Hudson and Oshokoya, 2011; Moody’s 
Rating, 2017a, 2017b, 2015b, 2015a, 2015c; PwC, 2012); Mining Acts of DRC, 
Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania - (DRC, 2002a; GoG, 2006; Republic of South 
Africa, 2002; The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010) 
*Annex 8.1 shows the data for the gold producing countries, which were aggregated for the global average in 
the CIF for 2016. 
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From Table 8.3, Tanzania, Ghana, South Africa and DRC’s fiscal requirements have 
been highlighted. Some of the parameters in the table are discussed in light of the four 
countries’ competitiveness to attract mining investments and whether the enabling 
environment is sound bearing in mind IFRAD’s requirements. The goal is to determine 
whether the regime requirements are competitive compared to their global 
compatriots. 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) & Branch Tax 
In terms of general mining taxes, the four countries CIT is higher than the global 
average for 2010 and the average for gold producers in 2016. The average ‘branch tax 
rate’ for the 2010 CIF was the same for the 2016 global average for gold producers, 
except for DRC and South Africa.  
Royalty and Other Taxes 
Royalty rates amongst the three countries (Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa) are 
close to the global 2016 CIF average. The DRC however, has a lower flat royalty rate 
of (2.5%) for gold compared with the other three countries. With regards to other 
forms of taxes in mining, it can be seen from Table 8.3 that many gold producers rely 
on various tax instruments at the provincial and municipal levels; additionally, taxes 
for land, fuel and VAT on sales. Export and import duties are (0%) or in some cases 
‘mining’ remains exempt, except in Ghana, where import duties is (0%) for only 
mining plant and machinery. Overall, the rates and duties for the selected countries 
are competitive with the 2016 global average for gold producers.  
Investment Treaties and double tax treaties (DTTs) 
Globally, most gold producers have stability agreements or clauses in existence to 
guard against frequent regime change. Regarding investment treaties/ agreements, all 
the four countries have signed investment agreements within Africa either (between 
individual countries or within the regional economic communities- RECs) or outside 
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the continent. Ghana, DRC and Tanzania have signed DTTs with South Africa due to 
the presence of South African gold mining companies and investors in other 
productive sectors of these regimes. South Africa has one of the highest number of 
investment treaties and DTTs signed within and outside of the continent (refer to ECA, 
2016b: p. 51- 54, on the number of the investment agreements between countries for 
the four countries). Stable regimes usually have more signed treaties than non-stable 
regimes and can sometimes signal investor confidence in the regime.  
Sovereign Risks  
The level of sovereign risk may influence the rate of competitiveness and the credit 
worthiness of the State. Using Moody’s sovereign risk rating for 2015- 2017 as a proxy 
(under Process 4f), the values are juxtaposed with the overall scores on the economic 
system (in Chapter Four) to show the relationship between risks and the state of the 
economy in Figure 8.2. The timeline (2015- 2017) is used because not all countries 
were rated, for instance, Tanzania was only included in Moody’s rating system in 
2017.  
 
Figure 8.2: Sovereign Risk vs. State of the Economy 
Sources: Chapter Four (see pages 98- 99); Moody’s Rating (2017a, 2017b, 2015b, 
2015a, 2015c) 
0 20 40 60 80 100
State of the Economy (Economic System- SDI %)
Prime (Aaa)
High Grade 
(Aa1- Aa3)
Upper Medium 
grade (A1- A3)
Lower Medium Grade 
(Baa1- Baa3)
Non-investment Grade 
(Speculative) (Ba1- Ba3)
Highly Speculative 
(B1- B3) DRC (32%, B3) Ghana (46%, B3)
Tanzania (52%, B1)
South Africa (56%, Baa2)
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From Figure 8.2, as sovereign risks increase (for e.g. from lower medium grade to 
highly speculative), investors are dis-incentivised from investing in the economy. 
Riskiness has an impact on investor perceptions and the state of the economy. The 
figure also shows that despite all four countries being competitive on the CIF, when 
using Moody’s rating, (Tanzania, Ghana and the DRC) have stable but speculative 
credit rating. Usually in the rating, potential and current risks to the economy are 
factored in the calculation. Amongst the four countries, South Africa largely remains 
competitive with a slightly better score on the state of the economy than the three 
countries. From the discussions in the CIF, the four countries fiscal requirements 
remain competitive when benchmarked against global gold producers as well as the 
2010 CIF average for mining countries (refer to Table 8.3). Although some of the 
countries, such as the DRC have lower fiscal requirements through lower royalty rates 
and tax breaks for miners; ultimately, it is how stable and clear a regime’s entire 
mining requirements are (with little room for speculation), which will motivate miners 
to invest in an economy. The next section discusses the four countries’ evaluation on 
IFRAD under matured, semi-matured and emerging mineral economies. 
8.4.1 Assessment of Matured Mineral Economies 
In evaluating Ghana’s and South Africa’s mineral and development frameworks, the 
assessment considered the state of their mineral economies vis-à-vis the IFRAD 
Strategy, i.e. where they are in the SED process, and whether they should implement 
the Strategy. The five Processes (1- 5) and the evaluation of the results for Ghana and 
South Africa are presented in Table 8.4. The findings from the CIF are also included 
in the table. The ‘yes’ and ‘no’ are a summary of the results and discussions of the 
SWOT and evaluation of the SED framework gleaned from Annexes 8.2 (a- b) and 
Annexes 8.3 (a- b) for Ghana and South Africa respectively. 
190 
 
Table 8.4: Evaluation of Processes (1- 5) for Ghana and South Africa 
Processes (1 - 5) of IFRAD Ghana South Africa 
Process One: Development Objective 
Integrated Development Plan with 
Mineral Development objective 
Yes Yes 
Process Two: Resource Potential 
Knowledge of Mineral Reserves and 
Resources 
Yes Yes 
Process Three: Mining Investments 
Type of Mining Investments Competitive Competitive 
Process Four: Mining Sector Linkages 
4c. Institutional Framework  
Agencies (Support Mining Investments) Yes Yes 
Agencies (Monitoring and Compliance) Yes Yes 
Agencies Responsible for Managing 
Mineral Revenues 
Yes Yes 
4d. Social  
Local Content Yes Yes 
CSR Policy and guidelines Yes Yes 
4e. Environment  
Environmental law and due diligence Yes Yes 
Health and Safety Yes Yes 
Process Five: Managing Investment Portfolios and Options 
(Wealth Funds) Investment No No 
Direct Investments Yes Yes 
Sources: Annexes 8.2 (a- b) and 8.3 (a- b) 
Ghana’s IFRAD Process 
From the summary of the results in Table 8.4, Ghana has clearly defined policy goals 
for its mining sector and its medium to long term development plans/ frameworks have 
been integrated with its mining sector. Thus, based on the evaluation of the mining 
sector and the SWOT (in Annex 8.2a), there is opportunity to enhance the critical 
linkages needed in the sector. The economy can benefit from having in place an 
optimal mining investment Strategy that integrates some of the key processes within 
IFRAD. Because the economy is matured and have implemented many of the 
instruments under (Processes 1- 3), it can apply the Strategy from Processes 4- 5. The 
schematic in Figure 8.3 is a map of how the Strategy should be applied to Ghana’s 
unique context.  
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Figure 8.3: Schematic for Applying the Strategy in Ghana 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017)
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Although its development frameworks are integrated with the mining sector, Figure 
8.3 suggests that starting from Processes 1 and 2, the country needs to re-calibrate its 
industrial policy with productive sectors of which mining plays a significant role. 
Process 3 also shows the need to coordinate all the investment Acts: Ghana 
Infrastructure Development Fund Act 877, Petroleum Revenue Management Act 815, 
and the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act 865 with the Strategy. A decision 
point, is whether its government wants to maintain an investment Strategy that links 
the national level interventions in mining from pre-feasibility to sale of mineral 
resources. If ‘yes’, then at the stage of mining sector linkages, its CSR and LC policies 
would need further guidelines and target-setting to ensure that MNCs reach the targets 
set by the State. The three instruments-  LC and CSR, beneficiation must be contoured 
on a M & E framework to ensure compliance. Under Process 4, the Minerals 
Commission can benefit from an overarching framework to synchronize the sector’s 
regulations (2173- 2176; 2182) (see Government of Ghana- GoG, 2012a, 2012b, 
2012c, 2012d, 2012e) with the macro-fiscal frameworks. In partnership with industry 
players, Ghana’s Minerals Commission may have to: 
➢ Set ‘local’ local content targets for gold operating MNCs; 
➢ Elaborate through guidelines on CSR requirements for industry players; 
➢ Set mandatory guidelines for annual reporting on industry performance on 
the targets in the LI (2174- 2177; 2182); and 
➢ Decide on developing a L.I. for beneficiation of minerals. 
If the recommendations are adopted, then the industrial plan and the second Ghana 
Industrial Policy (GIP) may have to broaden its mandate to incorporate expert skills 
required for mining value addition (refer to Annex 8.2b). Under Process 5, the 
government recently introduced the Mineral Development Fund (MDF) Act 912 to 
develop mining communities (GoG, 2016). The MDF Act 912 is ultimately a game 
changer since it establishes a fund for SED purposes from mineral royalties, which 
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accrue to government. Here, there can be room for consideration of a wealth fund 
(should the Board) and the mineral sector institutions deem it appropriate to provide 
future generations with a stake in Ghana’s mineral resources. Thus, a decision point 
under Process 5 is whether there should be considerations for a wealth fund. The 
institutional set-up and mining sector agencies are already in place to govern such a 
fund if the government decides. 
South Africa’s IFRAD Process 
South Africa’s economic development policies have been driven by its mining sector 
and with the MPRDA of 2002 and the BBBSEE mining charter spearheading the 
integration of the sector with its development objectives. Its current long-term growth 
strategy, the National Development Plan (NDP) is aligned to its mining development 
objectives. Processes 1- 3 are well-coordinated (refer to Annex 8.3b for the 
interlinkages between the development frameworks and mining). Under Process 4, the 
clarity and extent of the MPRDA’s environmental regulations, fiscal incentives, 
beneficiation and the powers of the Minister in terms of cancelling mining rights need 
further determination. Also, the third edition of the current mining charter has come 
under scrutiny due to a lack of consensus on some of the new requirements. Of this, 
suggestions have been made for clarity on the newly introduced interventions, and 
whether the process was transparent enough to include the concerns of all stakeholders  
by the Chamber of Mines and civil society (Baxter, 2016; Creamer, 2016; Matthew, 
2017). Based on the evaluation of the five processes, it can be argued that from 
(Processes 1- 5), the country finds itself at the tail end of Processes 4 and 5. This is 
because the institutional mechanisms exist as well as the coordination of its 
development and industrial policies. Figure 8.4 showcases the schematic for South 
Africa. For Process 5, see Figure 8.4, there’s a case to be made for wealth funds for 
sterilisation and stabilisation purposes, as well future generations’ development.  
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Figure 8.4: The Schematic in South Africa's Case 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017) 
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From Figure 8.4, a decision point here is whether South Africa should consider a fund 
and if ‘yes’, would the State further consider a policy (or regulation) to manage the 
fund? A commission of enquiry to study the benefits for the economy should be 
pursued extensively. The policy instruments needed in each of the processes for Ghana 
and South Africa are itemised and illustrated in Annexes 8.2c and 8.3c. Each process 
within the schematic must be in synch with the associated policy instruments. As noted 
in Chapter Seven, for instruments that have been defined in their national development 
objectives and have been operationalised in a country, only the most relevant 
instruments (that are yet to be maximised) per each process of IFRAD should be 
considered.   
8.4.2 Assessment of Semi-Matured Mineral Economy 
Tanzania has had multiple development frameworks (industrial, investment, trade and 
poverty reduction) aimed at achieving the Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025. 
However, there have been challenges with the sequencing of development priorities 
and difficulties in mobilizing domestic financial resources, as the drawback to 
implementation of its development policies (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2011). 
Table 8.5 summarises the results of the five processes for Tanzania. Annexes 8.4 (a- 
b) show the detailed analysis for Tanzania.  
Table 8.5: Evaluation of Processes (1- 5) for Tanzania 
Processes (1 - 5) of IFRAD Tanzania 
Process One: Development Objective 
Integrated Development Plan with Mineral Development objective Yes 
Process Two: Geological Potential 
Knowledge of Mineral Reserves and Resources Yes/No 
Process Three: Mining Investments 
Type of Mining Investments Competitive 
Process Four: Mining Sector Linkages 
4c. Institutional Framework  
Agencies (Support Mining Investments) Yes 
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Agencies (Monitoring and Compliance) Yes 
Agencies Responsible for Managing Mineral Revenues Yes 
4d. Social  
Local Content Yes/No 
CSR Policy and guidelines Yes/No 
4e. Environment  
Environmental law and due diligence Yes 
Health and Safety Yes 
Process Five: Managing Investment Portfolios and Options 
(Wealth Funds) Investment No 
Direct Investments Yes 
Source: Annex 8.4 (a- b) 
Tanzania’s IFRAD Process 
From the assessment of the frameworks, there is in existence an investment policy 
with considerations for the mining sector’s development objectives recognised in its 
development vision. That said, the SWOT also revealed weaknesses and threats to its 
mining sector, which may be overcome by having an optimal investment Strategy that 
integrates mining legislation, industrial policies and the national development vision 
of the country (refer to Annex 8.4a). The review also showed that Tanzania is currently 
under Processes 3- 4 stages of the IFRAD Strategy, and essential strategies to optimise 
the needed linkages between the mining investment environment, social and economic 
development are needed. The schematic in Figure 8.5 shows a map for applying the 
Strategy in Tanzania. Starting from Processes 1 and 2, the State would have to re-
calibrate development policies and vision with other frameworks such as the National 
Investment Promotion Policy of 1996 and its industrial policy. Under Process 3, there 
is need for clarity [in terms of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent 
Sovereignty) and the Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Re-
negotiation of Unconscionable Terms)], since these instruments can reduce investor 
confidence in the country. Due to this, a decision point, is whether the government 
wants to maintain an investment Strategy (see Figure 8.5).  
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Figure 8.5: Schematic for Applying the Strategy in Tanzania 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017) 
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Under Process 4, there is need for holistic guidelines for LC and CSR, and the critical 
skills for its mining industry. Secondly, benchmarks and targets for the monitoring of 
the requirements in these guidelines are needed to ensure consensus in the varied 
approaches taken by MNCs when rolling out their CSR programmes (see Lange, 2016 
for a discussion on local content in Tanzania). From Figure 8.5, if the government 
agrees to implement the IFRAD Strategy, then the next step under Process 5, is for 
the Ministry of Energy and Mines together with all stakeholders to agree on an SED 
fund from mining to support socio-economic development ends. Here, some of the 
conditions set in (Section 6.2.5 of Chapter Six) would have to apply. The policy 
instruments needed in each of the processes for the schematic for Tanzania are 
illustrated in Annex 8.4c. 
8.4.3 Assessment of Emerging Mineral Economy 
The DRC has achieved much and to revamp the sector, the evaluation revealed that it 
may have to commence from Process 1 through to Process 5. Table 8.6 summarises 
the results of the five processes for the DRC. Annexes 8.5 (a- c) show the detailed 
analysis for the DRC. 
Table 8.6: Evaluation of Processes (1- 5) for DRC 
Processes (1 - 5) of IFRAD DRC 
Process One: Development Objective 
Integrated Development Plan with Mineral Development objective Yes/No 
Process Two: Geological Potential 
Knowledge of Mineral Reserves and Resources Yes/No 
Process Three: Mining Investments 
Type of Mining Investments Competitive 
Process Four: Mining Sector Linkages 
4c. Institutional Framework  
Agencies (Support Mining Investments) Yes 
Agencies (Monitoring and Compliance) Yes/No 
Agencies Responsible for Managing Mineral Revenues Yes 
4d. Social  
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Local Content No 
CSR Policy and guidelines Yes/No 
4e. Environment  
Environmental law and due diligence Yes 
Health and Safety Yes 
Process Five: Managing Investment Portfolios and Options 
(Wealth Funds) Investment No 
Direct Investments Yes 
Source: Annexes 8.5 (a- b) 
DRC’s IFRAD Process 
From the summary of results, restructuring the sector with a clearly outlined extractive 
(mining) sector policy which defines principles for an effective mining cadastre 
system and creating the enabling environment for linkages are needed. Although, the 
SWOT pointed to strengths of its mining sector, amidst large infrastructure deficit, 
weak governance architecture and corruption; potentially, JICA, KRI International 
and Ernest and Young (2016) have noted the ability of the natural resource sector to 
transform the economy of the DRC (refer to Annex 8.5a).  The schematic in Figure 
8.6 illustrates how the Strategy may be applied in the DRC. Annex 8.5b provides the 
analysis and interlinkages within the IFRAD processes. Starting from Processes 1 and 
2, the country needs to re-calibrate its industrial policy with a new mining policy. As 
already indicated, an extractive (mining) sector policy is required, which draws on the 
interventions in the country’s long and medium-term development visions, coupled 
with its industrial policy. A decision point, is whether the State wants to have an 
extractive sector policy. If yes, then under Process 3, all the investment policies and 
plans for industrial development would have to be anchored on the “optimal mining 
investment strategy”. The country’s Growth & Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(GPRSP) 2 argued for a ‘mining strategy’ or policy to transform the sector. This can 
be the premise for such a Strategy in the DRC (see DRC-GPRSP 2, 2011, p. 67, 
paragraph 225 of its medium-term development framework).  
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Figure 8.6: Schematic for Applying the Strategy in the DRC 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017) 
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From the schematic in Figure 8.6, if the government decides to have the Strategy, then 
under Process 4, there should be national level interventions, such as a LC strategy to 
build the critical mining sector linkages within the sector. The recent CSR guidelines 
developed by the Chamber of Mines-DRC need further determination and clarity 
hedged on the reasonable elements of the new mining code; as well as new principles 
developed for an extractive sector policy for the economy. This would enhance the 
delivery and compliance on targets set by the government. Here, mineral sector 
governance institutions must be capacitated to monitor compliance of the industry 
requirements. Process 5 suggests an SED fund mechanism for community 
development. Here, there are two decision points, whether to have the fund and 
establish operational guidelines, and whether to link the Fund’s set-up with macro-
fiscal frameworks? With regards to Process 5, many countries set quotas and levies, 
but to incentivise miners, the performance on LC and the SED fund requirements can 
be linked to the fiscal regime to encourage compliance. In summary, reforms in the 
mining sector are critical now that the country is re-setting its development agenda post-
GPRSP 2 and within the frame of the new mining code. It is thus imperative to develop 
the economy and reduce the infrastructure bottlenecks with a Strategy such as the 
IFRAD. To operationalise the objectives and recommendations, the policy instruments 
needed to transition the Strategy for the DRC is presented in Annex 8.5c.    
8.5 Lessons: Re-calibrating Mining Frameworks and Development Visions 
The above evaluation provided pathways to implementing IFRAD, while suggesting 
recommendations for operationalising the policy instruments in Annexes 8.2c, 8.3c, 
8.4c and 8.5c for the different levels of mineral economies in Africa. Table 8.7 
summarises the final recommendations for the countries and which of the Processes 
would have to be considered in each phase of the Strategy.  
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Table 8.7: Implementation of the IFRAD Strategy in the Four Countries 
Mineral 
Classification 
Countries 
Should countries 
Implement the 
Strategy? 
From which stages in the 
5-processes should they 
commence 
Matured mineral 
economies 
Ghana Yes Process 4 - Process 5 
South Africa Maybe Process 5 
Semi-matured 
mineral 
economies 
Tanzania Yes Process 3 - Process 5 
Emerging mineral 
economies 
DRC Yes Process 1 - Process 5 
Source: Sections 8.4.1- 8.4.3  
From the summary in Table 8.7, some countries (such as South Africa) have the 
requisite mineral sector governance instruments; hence, it requires government enquiry 
and interventions into new forms of revenue sustainability such as wealth funds. Ghana 
as a matured mineral economy should implement the IFRAD Strategy but framed 
within its industrial policy, while ensuring that Processes 4 and 5 instruments are 
implemented. In Ghana, the industrial policy and plan may have to be re-calibrated and 
re-aligned with its mining policy.  
In the DRC’s case, it is suggested that a gap assessment of each of the Processes be 
conducted, while devising an extractive sector policy to transition the instruments in 
IFRAD. For the DRC, it further requires re-defining principles for the SED of its mining 
sector and the overall development of the country. For Tanzania’s case, the IFRAD 
Strategy may also be needed under Processes 4 and 5, but this requires an alignment 
(between mining policies and the development vision 2025). Thus, in three out of the 
four countries, policy coherence and coordination are needed to ensure that processes, 
resources and programme and budget elements are unified in a manner that it reduces 
redundancy and duplicity of roles and functions (see Peters, 1998).  
Overall, the evaluation of the IFRAD Strategy based on the tool points to the need to 
re-align mining frameworks with the development imperative of a country. Here, the 
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requirements (discussed in Chapter Seven) although not exhaustive are critical for 
realising the IFRAD Strategy in each country. National development frameworks such 
as development visions, industrial policies, and trade and investment promotion 
policies must be unified. Considering these observations, two interventions are 
discussed in light of Table 8.7 for transitioning IFRAD at the national and regional 
levels. 
8.5.1 National Level: Policy Coordination and Institutional 
Mechanisms 
Inferably, in translating IFRAD, there is need to identify the horizontal and vertical 
elements of coordination in policy, and to build the coherency of a country’s 
development frameworks towards a common goal. Additionally, in building policy 
coherence, the OECD’s policy coherence approach can be used to recalibrate mining 
policy frameworks with development frameworks (OECD, 2012; 2008). The approach 
consists of three building blocks (exemplified in Figure 8.7) for mineral economies.  
 
Figure 8.7: Policy Coherence of Development and Mining Frameworks 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2008), Synthesis Report on Policy Coherence 
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From Figure 8.7, countries may have to firstly re-calibrate mining policies with 
development and industrial policies if mining is strategically a dominant sector. The 
second process is ensuring that all key sectors are aligned and coordinated with 
industrial policies; and the third is setting targets for monitoring and compliance. The 
point for coherency is to avoid policy and programme duplications within different 
sectors, and identify gaps, which may lead to increased costs and reduced efficiency in 
policy implementation.  
For mining countries and in relation to the implementation of the IFRAD Strategy, the 
framework in Figure 8.7 is intended as a guide for building coherency and coordination 
of its mining investment regime with development frameworks. When used 
strategically through a multi-stakeholder consensus, this can assist in gathering 
knowledge of current gaps, where inter-sectoral coordination is needed, and the kinds 
of institutional mechanisms required for policy convergence of a country’s 
development goals and visions.  
8.5.2 Regional Level: Framework for Investment Integration in Africa  
Aside from the policy coordination needed at the national level, at the regional level, 
for Strategies such as IFRAD, there should be in existence harmonised regional mining 
investment frameworks that provide regional leverage for Africa’s development. At the 
sub-regional level, there are several investment and trade frameworks by the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and between the COMESA, the East 
African Community and the SADC. The SADC currently has stipulations concerning 
investment agreement and arbitration, and financial regulations.  
Regionally, there is the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), which sets the rules of 
engagement for trade and investments amongst the AU member States. As a new 
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framework passed under the Agenda 2063 for Africa, it is in draft stages and may be 
finalised by the end of 2018. Also under the Agenda 2063, the overarching investment 
code “the Pan African Investment Code” (PAIC) is a game changer for investment 
treaties since it sets out rules for IIA negotiations, while imbibing some of the SD 
principles set by the UNCTAD for investment negotiations (refer to AUC, 2016).  
The PAIC was drafted in 2015 to balance investment protection and promotion by 
incorporating green investments. Since it covers all types of investments, there is the 
potential to build on the PAIC and to define frameworks to cover specific productive 
sectors, such as mining. Article 23 of the draft PAIC contends that “investors shall not 
exploit or use local natural resources to the detriment of the rights and interests of the 
host State” (AUC, 2016). This means that it affirms the UN fundamental principles of 
PSONR and could hence be used as an avenue to define a regional mining investment 
framework for mineral economies. Such a code can guide the fashioning of MDAs in 
Africa and how mining investment policies and strategies are structured. Ultimately, it 
can provide the impetus for regional mining investment framework which feeds into 
national level investment frameworks for RRA countries.  
8.6 Conclusion  
The Chapter set out to assess and evaluate how mineral economies are poised to 
implement the IFRAD Strategy. In three (Ghana, DRC and Tanzania) out of the four 
countries, it was suggested that gold mining economies consider firstly recalibrating 
their development and industrial development frameworks with the mining sector, 
followed by the implementation of the Strategy at the different stages of the IFRAD’s 
five Processes. A schematic for applying the Strategy was devised for the four 
countries. In South Africa, the assessment in Chapter Eight resulted in 
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recommendations of the State to decide on whether to implement the Strategy, or to 
devise a regulation to guide the operations of a wealth fund.  
It was further shown that policy coherence and coordination at the national level are 
needed for the re-calibration of development visions with productive sectors, such as 
mining in the case of the DRC and Tanzania. Overall, it was also suggested that a 
regional investment framework premised on the ‘Pan-African Investment Code’ is 
warranted to guide the harmonisation of mining investment policies and strategies. To 
enhance synergies at the regional level, the AMV which was discussed (under Process 
1 in Chapter Six) must work in concert with the PAIC. As part of operationalizing the 
AMV through the country mining visions, there should be draft proposals and an 
eventual regional framework hemmed on the PAIC for mining investments to facilitate 
harmonisation. Such regional elements are crucial to building the competitive regional 
value chains for value addition in mineral economies in Africa.   
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Chapter 9  
Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides a summary of the Thesis; makes general recommendations in 
light of the findings; discusses areas for further research; and gives a view on the way 
forward for SED and the future of mining investments in Africa. The synthesis of the 
Chapters which guided the write-up is illustrated in Figure 9.1. This is based on a six-
point pathway for devising growth Strategies.  
 
Figure 9.1: A Pathway to Devising Growth Strategies for Development 
Source: Researcher’s Conceptualisation (2017) 
From Chapter One, the Thesis’ assertions of the inefficiencies of the market system to 
yield high growth and development led to renewed efforts and actions toward SD as a 
way to cure the ills of the market system. As a result, under (points 1- 2, see Figure 
208 
 
9.1), ‘economic systems and SD’ were assessed, with SD’s impact being measured in 
Africa’s context. This was achieved from Chapters One to Four.  
New pathways through optimal mining and SED were discussed as imperative for the 
growth of mineral economies due to the challenges of operationalising the ideal view 
of SD. Chapter Five proposed the bridge between SD and optimal mining as SED and 
the next step was to discuss principles in the pursuance of SED in RRA countries. From 
the discussions, SED consisted of a two-step process of national and extractive sector 
policies contoured on a third process of understanding the issues within the 
international investment regime (see Figure 9.2, which is an extract of the spiral process 
of SED from Chapter Five). 
 
Figure 9.2: The Spiral Process of Sustainable Economic Development 
Source: Figure 5.7: Chapter Five 
The discussions in Chapter Five addressed points 3- 4 of operationalising alternate 
pathways to development.  To operationalise SED under (point 4), an optimal mining 
investment Strategy for the SED of mineral economies was devised at the national level 
for mineral economies in Chapter Six. In terms of applying the IFRAD Strategy, the 
four gold mining countries- Ghana, DRC, Tanzania and South Africa, which were 
Harmonization approach to 
globalization 
Sustainability through optimal 
development- maximized benefit 
and good governance 
Sustainable Development as a 
National Strategy 
National Investment Strategy 
Extractive Sector Policy 
International Investment Policy 
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measured with the SD indicators (in Chapter Four), were further evaluated with the 
IFRAD tool for implementation.  
Finally, a recalibration of development visions and mining frameworks through national 
policy coordination mechanisms and the promotion of a continent-wide investment 
framework for regional harmonisation of mining investments amongst mineral 
economies were recommended. This was to ensure that countries abandon a ‘race to 
the bottom’ mentality and aim at a stable mining investment regime where benefits and 
costs are equally shared between the investor and governments, and within the frame 
of optimal mining principles for Africa. This final assessment from Chapters Seven to 
Eight addressed points 5- 6 of the pathway.   
9.2 Summary of Findings from Chapters One to Eight 
The objective of each Chapter and the findings are summarised in this section.  
9.2.1 Chapter One 
The Chapter provided the background, rationale and justification for the research. It 
assessed some of the issues of SD in mineral economies and the shortcomings of 
economic theories to address the overall problem of inadequate growth and 
development in Africa. The research’s focus on SD is borne from the fact that the 
concept as a discourse has become the yardstick to assess all forms of development at 
the project, national and global levels. Hence, the main objective of the research was to 
interrogate the concept of SD and its applications within Africa’s mining industry and 
economies, with the aim to develop an effective ‘Strategy’ context-specific to Africa’s 
mining needs. The Chapter finally concluded with the realisation that SD as a discourse 
would have to be refined to the needs of countries in Africa that are dependent on 
mineral resources from the perspective of optimal mining. Additionally, in view of the 
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limitations of market system, an assessment of economic systems was suggested to 
identify core principles and elements that are essential in the development of a 
‘Strategy’ for the growth and development of RRA economies.  
9.2.2 Chapter Two 
Chapter Two’s goal was to assess the three main economic systems- [traditional, 
command-socialist and the market], and the hybrid economic systems. Because the 
market and socialist forms of economic systems are the most applied, the two were 
reviewed extensively using Grossman’s (1974) ten performance criteria of a ‘good’ 
economic system. From Chapter Two’s discussions, it was proven that the market 
system was a better alternative although the hybrid combinations also presented a potent 
system for some economies, such as China and Norway. The conclusions of the Chapter 
further reiterated the merits of neo-liberalism together with the challenges of the 
economic -environmental nexus. This set the scene for the central chapters of the Thesis 
on SD and optimal mining.  
9.2.3 Chapter Three 
To situate the discourse of SD and mining, Chapter Three discussed the evolution of 
SD and the impact of the SD Goals on mining. It delved deeper into what SD means 
generally and mining’s implementation of the concept at the industry and national 
levels. Have approaches to streamline SD been effortless for African mining countries, 
to what extent SD principles been imbibed in policy implementation, and what has been 
the outcomes? Consequently, the Chapter posited that the ‘mining and sustainability’ 
debate stem from five key issues: the challenge of definitions, the scarcity of ore bodies; 
the negative externalities from mining, the eroding of profits due to multiple 
stakeholders; and how to equitably share and use the benefits from mining. The final 
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discussions and conclusions based on the themes pointed to the need to develop a 
common interest definition for mining and to not waste mineral resources in the 
fulfilment of development obligations by mining countries. As a specific objective of 
the Thesis, it was important to emphasise calls for better indicators for measuring SD 
in the African context due to a lack of similar SD and mining frameworks at the national 
and local levels in mining.  
9.2.4 Chapter Four 
The Chapter’s objectives were three-fold: to devise mining relevant indicators to 
measure SD; apply the SD indicators to a specific mineral sector (i.e. gold mining); and 
to assess whether the balanced components view of SD is appropriate for mining 
countries. The Chapter also provided the research methodology (in terms of the 
selection of the countries for the assessment and the sustainability indicators 
framework). From the discussions, the gold mining countries selected for the 
assessment were Ghana, the DRC, Tanzania and South Africa. Also, specific limitations 
to using aggregation (simple arithmetic mean formula) for the indicators and the criteria 
for selecting the gold mining countries were deliberated. 
The findings showed some progress towards SD ends in some countries (refer to Table 
4.18 in Chapter Four). This is despite the difficulty in attaining the optimal balance 
between the three elements in the four countries. As was noted under the social system, 
South Africa’s ‘good’ rating can be attributed to the robust monitoring and compliance 
of the BBBSEE requirements in its mining charter.64 Undoubtedly, maintaining the 
balance between the three systems has been difficult in all the four countries, together 
with the balancing of natural wealth in between future and current generations. Finally, 
                                                   
64 Although, this was the case in the South African context, it has been noted that the current rendition of the 
mining Charter has been subject to many contestations and is currently under review by the DMR.   
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the Chapter contended for considering innovative ways for optimal development of 
mining vis-à-vis SD considerations within Africa’s unique context.  
9.2.5 Chapter Five 
The Chapter re-conceptualised what SD should mean for mining countries. There are 
trade-offs within the SD systems in mining; thus, the research opined that the triple 
bottom line view of sustainability may not necessarily transform mineral economies in 
achieving SD ends. For mineral economies, the concept of optimal mining/optimal 
mineral development was introduced as being interlinked with SD depending on the 
perspective one comes from. From the economic perspective of sustainability, optimal 
mineral development is the application of optimal extraction techniques, processes, and 
the optimal (economic) use of goods and services generated from mineral resources 
(see Cawood 2009; 2011). It was suggested that ‘optimal’ mining should be considered 
along the mining value chain, with strategies for maximally sharing mineral rents 
between the State, communities and mining companies. The uniqueness of the mining 
industry led to the conclusions that in rolling out SD principles in RRA countries, it 
must be premised on optimal strategies that use fiscal instruments (at the national level) 
to obtain a fairer bargain for rent and in rent management.  
9.2.6 Chapter Six 
To fulfil the recommendations of Chapter Five and a specific objective of the Thesis, 
the Chapter developed an ‘optimal’ Mining Investment Strategy for mineral economies 
termed IFRAD. As was intimated in the Chapter, elements that are essential for 
investment policies for optimal mineral development were discussed. Based on the 
critical points and discussions, the IFRAD Strategy was devised around five processes 
with key strategic points of assessment (see 6.2 of Chapter Six). The processes in the 
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Strategy were then converted into an ‘optimal’ investment SED tool to assist countries 
in measuring the competitiveness of their investment environment. This was to also 
serve as a guide in implementing IFRAD. As a caveat, it was alluded that investment 
strategies in mineral economies should be driven by the mining sector and integrated 
with industrial policy (or a national diversification Strategy). This must aim to catalyse 
mining’s linkages with other sectors of the economy. For the IFRAD Strategy, it was 
iterated that due to the unique challenges and context of each developing country as 
well as level of mineral development, the approach to having a mineral investment 
Strategy must be context-specific to each country.   
9.2.7 Chapter Seven 
The Chapter presented the second part of the Strategy. It considered the requirements, 
policy objective and instruments for each process elements within IFRAD. Twelve 
essential requirements for the IFRAD Strategy were identified from global and regional 
frameworks of relevance to Africa’s mineral regimes. The second part of the Chapter 
considered a step-wise approach to the Strategy’s implementation. It was suggested that 
firstly, countries should develop a dynamic extractive sector policy, which capitalises 
on certain elements and instruments such as local content and CSR for socio-economic 
development. Secondly, before itemising the instruments, policy objectives, which 
encapsulate the nature of SED in mining, were highlighted, together with a 
classification scheme to help countries identify their level of mineral development. 
Three classifications: emerging, semi-matured and matured mineral economies were 
defined with specific instruments that must be present for an optimal mix when 
pursuing the IFRAD Strategy in mineral economies.  
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9.2.8 Chapter Eight 
The penultimate Chapter discussed specific recommendations based on the evaluation 
of the four countries (Ghana, DRC, Tanzania and South Africa) using the tool for 
IFRAD. SWOT analyses of the four countries’ mining sectors were conducted to 
identify gaps and opportunities for boosting mineral development. For each of these 
countries, different recommendations in light of where they stood regarding the five 
Processes were suggested. For matured mineral economies like Ghana and South 
Africa, Processes 1- 3 are well anchored. For Ghana, the mining sector linkages needed 
to be contoured on the country’s industrial policy as well as the objectives of its mining 
laws and policies. For South Africa, it was intimated that its sector linkages needed to 
be reinforced with forward looking policies that address historical legacies and the 
current state of the industry.65 
In emerging mineral economies like the DRC, the evaluation suggested a reassessment 
of the entire mining framework and the crafting of an extractive sector policy to serve 
as a vehicle for the transformation of the mining investment environment. In Tanzania’s 
case, as a semi-matured mining economy, lessons for securing investments and laying 
the foundation for linkages through a local content and CSR policies were 
recommended for the SED of the economy. A scheme, which maps out the steps and 
the requisite policy instruments essential for the Processes in all four countries were 
devised. The Chapter concluded with the need for policy coordination in mineral 
economies and a regional mechanism for consolidating and harmonizing investment 
policies in Africa.  
                                                   
65 Beyond that, it was recommended that South Africa could do without the Strategy but may still need to 
decide on regulations (or an investment policy) for a wealth fund if the macro-economic conditions so allow. 
Ultimately, through empirical studies, the rationale for wealth fund can be justified for the country. 
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9.3 General Recommendations for the Thesis 
This section discusses general recommendations in light of the main objectives of the 
research. It goes beyond the specific recommendations in Chapter Eight to discuss 
regional and national recommendations for achieving sustainable economic 
development vis-à-vis Africa’s unique development context. Seven general 
recommendations are discussed for the SED of RRA economies. These are as follows:   
9.3.1 Novel Approaches to the Market System for Africa’s 
Development 
The discussions in ‘Chapter One’ alluded to the shortcomings of economic theories and 
why despite economic rents from mineral resources, rapid growth has been elusive in 
resource-rich countries in Africa. That said, the system has proven the most resilient 
since there has not been better alternatives or approaches to sustained growth to date.  
The shift from the socialist incentive (from the 1960s) to the market system (post-
1980s) was because of the failings of a controlled state system, which crippled many 
countries in Eastern Europe and some parts of Africa in the past. This shift, although 
debatable led to a rise in GDP per capita (with about 7% average growth rate in the last 
decade for some countries) after the implementation of the SAPs.66 Generally, the harsh 
impacts of the SAPs led to the shift to pro-poor policies and the fight for accelerated 
development and growth in mineral economies from the early 2000s. As such many 
medium-term development frameworks were fashioned along poverty reduction, 
accelerated growth and private sector development.  
As a recommendation, the sketch of some of the market’s, socialist’s and hybrid’s best 
features (outlined in Section 2.5.1) would be essential for the growth of frontier- 
                                                   
66 This was also discussed in Chapters One and Two. 
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emerging and semi-matured mineral economies. Also, it would be imperative for more 
comparative analysis to be conducted with practical recommendations on alternative 
paths to improving the system based on African case studies. A similar framework (in 
section 9.1) can be followed to analyse novel approaches to the market system in 
steering the growth of economies in Africa. 
9.3.2 Applying Optimal Mining Principles for Africa  
A major assertion of the Thesis was the challenge of developing mineral economies to 
transition to the ideal view of SD. This was in terms of the balancing act within the SD 
systems. Furthermore, the assessment in Chapter Four pointed to deficits in realising 
economic sustainability with justification for pursuing SED as the bridge between 
optimal mining and SD. However, industry models for sustainability remain hijacked 
by the balancing components of the three systems. So long as this remains, there will 
be frictions between the systems of SD and the business case for profitability. Optimal 
mining principles remain relevant in achieving sustainability at the micro-economic and 
macroeconomic levels. Thus, as a second recommendation, the Thesis suggests that 
mining countries institute national level interventions premised on optimal mining 
principles to steer the industry. Chapter Five expanded on optimal mining principles; 
here, the safeguards can be teased from these to ensure that the goal of SED is achieved 
in mineral economies.  
9.3.3 Sustainable Economic Development as a Goal for Mineral 
Economies 
One of the ways to realising the SED of mineral economies is through an Optimal 
Mining Investment Strategy, which draws on other SED components for mineral 
development. The assessments of the four countries revealed some gaps in terms of 
SED frameworks and how countries have not optimised some of the critical components 
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such as LC and CSR instruments. Based on these observations, it is being recommended 
that mineral economies develop proper guidelines and strategies for local content and 
CSR to build the synergies needed within the sector with other productive sectors of 
the economy. In order for this to happen, a corollary recommendation is for countries 
to conduct a needs assessment of their mining frameworks together with their 
development/ industrial policies and legislate LC/ CSR instruments and guidelines. 
Here, there is need for clear guidelines, targets and M & E frameworks to guarantee 
effective implementation of SED strategies in their mining sectors. South Africa’s 
previous BBBSEE Mining Charter can serve as a model guideline to be tweaked to the 
unique context of mining countries in Africa.  
9.3.4 Linking Sustainable Economic Development Instruments  
Based on the discussions in Chapter Eight, a fourth recommendation is for LC 
Strategies, particularly beneficiation to be linked to a country’s fiscal regime. Here, an 
Optimal Investment Strategy can steer how a country’s royalty framework is structured 
and the link between incentives for beneficiation and compliance. An example is the 
South African context, where the new royalty regime makes a case for beneficiation 
through the application of the following:  
➢ for refined mineral resources (0.5% - 5%); and 
➢ for unrefined mineral resources (0.5% to a maximum of 7%) (refer to the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act, 2008). 
This is based on gross sales and profitability (EBIT) of the mine in question. Although, 
not currently applied across all major commodities, its application to the gold sector 
can be learned and perfected for other economies aiming to pursue domestic 
beneficiation within local economies. While not discussed extensively in Chapter Six, 
the South Africa example elucidated above, show how to link fiscal frameworks with a 
beneficiation strategy (or in this case an SED strategy) for development. Even beyond 
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beneficiation, non-compliance of LC instruments, which are usually in the form of 
levies and penalties can be subsumed into a country’s mining fiscal regime to create an 
incentive mechanism for local content.  
9.3.5 Taking Stock of Mining’s Impact  
A fifth recommendation is to use the SD indicators devised at the national level (in 
Chapter Four) as a platform to monitor the impact of mining’s sustainability in RRA 
countries. The SDGs have replaced the MDGs as the new goal post for development 
until 2030; for many mineral economies, indicators specific to the unique context of 
developing mineral economies for monitoring have yet to be devised. Because of the 
challenge of realising the ideal SD view, it is being suggested that regional institutions 
such as the African Union, the African Minerals Development Centre and the African 
Natural Resource Center of the AfDB use these indicators as the basis for cataloguing 
and collecting data on mineral economies and measuring the impact of mining. This is 
purely for data and measurement purposes since for mineral economies, SED is posited 
as an opportunity for transformation. Here, better and measurable indicators need to be 
devised for mineral economies; the selected indicators in Chapter Four can be the 
foundation for further assessments.    
9.3.6 Policy Coordination for Development in Mineral Economies 
The discussions in Chapter Eight alluded to the need for policy coordination of mining 
frameworks, particularly for the Strategy to be realised in the four countries. This means 
that in translating the Strategy, there is need to identify the horizontal and vertical 
elements of coordination in policy and build the coherency of the frameworks towards 
a common goal. Chapter Seven (under inclusive institutions) highlighted the critical 
actors and institutions needed to enhance the IFRAD Strategy; thus, the framework 
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adopted from the OECD (2012, 2008) may need consideration when re-calibrating and 
aligning a country’s mining objectives with development. Per the observations in 
Chapter Eight, the point for coherency is to avoid policy and programme duplications 
and gaps amongst different sectors, which may lead to increased costs and reduced 
efficiency in policy-making. Through such assessments, inter-sectoral linkages 
between mining and other productive sectors can be built to ensure that duplications in 
policy are eliminated and mining’s full contribution to SED is realised.  
9.3.7 Regional Framework for Sustainable Mining Investments 
The final recommendation is for a regional framework that guides sustainable mining 
investments for mineral economies. It was noted in Chapter Eight that regionalisation 
and harmonisation of investment code can limit the race to the bottom mentality, which 
is often pervasive in mineral economies in Africa. Here, it was suggested that the draft 
AU’s PAIC which recognises PSONR can be used as the foundation to define a 
framework for mining investments. The ECA and AU in 2016 conducted a baseline 
study on harmonisation of mining fiscal regimes in Africa. However, with a broader 
mandate, such a regional mining investment framework spearheaded by the AMDC can 
guide mineral economies to make sound long-term decisions to enhance mining’s 
positive impact on their economies. The reason for this recommendation is the fact that 
the AMDC is the implementing arm of the AMV and has the mandate to spearhead 
research in the minerals sector regionally. Since the PAIC recognises the PSONR, it 
will be expedient for the Centre to consider a regional approach to mining investment 
harmonisation in Africa.       
Similar to the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa, where 
West African Member States have harmonised their business laws, the proposed 
“Regional Harmonisation of Mining Investment Framework” under PAIC can ensure 
220 
 
that mining countries harmonise their legal and fiscal frameworks. This will enhance 
greater regional integration and coherency in mining policies in Africa. Even for the 
Optimal Mining Investment Strategy, such a framework can guide the development of 
regional strategies in mining that are geared towards investment attraction. To 
recapitulate, as part of operationalizing the AMV for SED, a draft proposal on the need 
for regional harmonisation of mining investment frameworks and the recommendation 
of the ECA (2016b) study can be the premise to build a case for regional integration of 
investments. The regional elements are crucial to building competitive regional value 
chains for mining in Africa as was indicated in Chapter Eight.   
9.4 Areas for Further Research  
Based on the above recommendations and findings, the section discusses areas for 
further research, which were not covered in the Thesis. Tracing from the challenges of 
the market system and how SD came to cure the ills of the market, it was shown that 
the current interpretation of sustainability for mining is challenging. Two levels of 
interventions were suggested at the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. The 
Thesis however, considered the national level intervention by justifying the need for an 
Optimal Investment Strategy anchored in a nation’s development frameworks and 
industrial policies. In light of these, two areas for further research are advanced to 
support the SED view for mineral economies. 
Firstly, future research should consider SED at the micro-economic level (or for 
industry). It was stated in Chapter Five that SD should be a national value system with 
SED instruments operationalised for the development of mineral economies and at the 
industry levels. Here, the AU or the AMDC can work on developing SED principles as 
a national value system for mining countries and the industry. Specifically, at the 
industry level in Africa, what SED protocols exist, are there effective standards and 
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metrics for monitoring sustainability at the microeconomic level, and in applying 
principles for SED and optimal mining at firm level, what should it mean for mining’s 
productivity? Although Chapter Five alluded to what optimal mining means at the 
microeconomic (firm) level, it would be interesting for further studies to refine and 
devise industry level indicators and quantify the effects of applying optimal mining 
principles on a firm’s productivity. Additionally, at the macro-economic level, what 
national level instruments besides investment and industrial policies specific to each 
country should be harnessed to spearhead the gold mining industry’s competitiveness 
or mining generally? Because only four gold producing countries were covered for the 
study, it will be interesting to understand different mineral commodities in a broader 
study at the national and local levels. This is to close the loop in the process of SED for 
Africa’s mineral economies.  
The second area for further research is to justify from an economic perspective the 
impact of mining investment Strategies on a nation’s growth path using macro-level 
data and statistics. It would be expedient to consider an econometric analysis and 
modelling of the situation in each of the case study countries, to reinforce the need for 
SED strategies in transitioning the concept of sustainability. For example, in 
recommending wealth funds under Process 5 of IFRAD, what would be the effects of 
such a fund or a fund mechanism from metallic minerals on the SED of mineral 
economies in Africa in the medium to long-term? Will the economic case for SWFs 
from metallic resources be justified in countries like South Africa and Ghana, and what 
stake of mineral wealth is being set aside for future generations’ development and 
growth? Although, these are political economy decisions by state actors, future research 
can investigate to determine whether the notion of wealth funds and special purpose 
vehicles for metallic resources are effective SED tools for Africa in the long-run.  
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9.5 Concluding Thoughts: Sustainable Development and Mining Investments  
“Everybody wants development; but not everybody understands and accepts the basic 
requirements for development. The biggest requirement is hard work” (Nyerere, 1968, 
p.244, Freedom and Socialism). According to the first President of Tanzania, a basic 
requirement for development is hard work and “out of the box” thinking. For mineral 
economies, the playing field is rather advanced with being advantaged with mineral 
resources that can catapult a nation to development. The King of Saudi Arabia, King 
Faisal (1906- 1975) once said of the oil in the Emirates that "in one generation we went 
from riding camels to riding Cadillacs. The way we are wasting money, I fear the next 
generation will be riding camels again." (King Faisal in an interview with his Minister 
of Oil and Mineral Resources, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, cited in Brandreth, 2000). 
These above quotes exemplify the view of this Thesis that mineral economies (RRA 
countries) must identify novel approaches and have the political will to ensure that 
mineral resources are used optimally for both present and future generations’ benefit. 
However, as the discussions and assessments showed, African governments have been 
in a deficit in terms of translating their mineral wealth for SED. That said, (Figure 9.3) 
shows that major investments would lead to Africa (in the next 50 years) since the 
continent’s share of strategic metallic minerals to the world is high compared to any 
other region (see Ernest and Young, 2013; USGS, 2012).  
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Figure 9.3: Africa's Share (%) of Metallic Resources in Relation to the World 
Sources: Adapted from Ernest and Young (2013) and USGS (2015, 2012)- Minerals 
Year Book  
What should mineral economies in Africa do? The view of SED as shown in the Thesis 
is one way of re-interpreting SD for countries highly dependent on minerals for growth. 
Chapter Five’s exposition on the concept of optimal mining and SED should warrant 
further research into new ways of making mining competitive in the Africa region vis-
à-vis the world. This means a consideration of new technologies in mechanisation and 
automation for mining in order to cause no harm, equipping workers with the requisite 
skills, and advanced qualifications to handle the next level of innovation in mining.  
At the national level, governments need to be strategic in how they assert PSONR to 
define a fairer deal in the share of mineral resources. The recent trend involves setting 
new regulations, which call for transparent regimes- tax declarations, increase in royalty 
on metallic resources and fairer bargain in the elements of the MDAs. However, 
although these approaches may be warranted, it is a tricky balancing act between 
serving the interest of investors and ensuring that governments obtain a fair share in 
Platinum, 0.89 
224 
 
light of the socio-economic deficits in their countries. Caution must be taken due to the 
long-term effects such approaches have on a country’s sovereign risk profile and 
competitiveness in the face of uncertainty and volatility of mineral prices and demand 
and supply factors. Moreover, as was indicated as a requirement for IFRAD, the 
technical expertise and capacity to manage the mineral economy and administer mining 
rents are vital if mining is to have a transformative impact on economies in Africa. 
Educational programmes and reforms in social and physical sciences (particularly in 
science, technology, engineering and mathematics) specific to the needs of the mineral 
economy must be available; coupled with mining administration training for State and 
political actors to build their capacity in the governance of the minerals sector. 
A subtle way to obtain much benefits from minerals is to be able to identify a country’s 
needs as well as mining’s needs and devise effective frameworks and plans, which 
capitalise on a country’s comparative advantage for competitiveness. What was noted 
(as gaps) and suggested in the Thesis was that gold mining countries do not have 
effective LC strategies or policies that can enhance critical mineral sector linkages and 
the necessary requirements for down and up-stream value addition. As custodians of 
mineral wealth, the onus lies on this generation to ensure that mineral wealth is 
equitably used and equally shared between current and future generations. Thus, LC 
strategies must be well devised together with a country’s investments and industrial 
policies; and must be strategically positioned to facilitate local economic development 
within mining communities and for national economic development. Additionally, LC 
strategies must be in synch with fiscal frameworks by ensuring transparency in the share 
of mineral revenues and transparency on the part of MNCs. In buttress to this view 
point, Deloitte (2017), tracking trends, have acknowledged that a step in this direction 
is corporative dialogue and partnerships that create shared value and repairs the broken 
trust relations between governments and miners. 
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At the regional level, although the AMV has fast tracked a mining-led growth agenda 
for mineral economies (through the country mining visions), there is more to be done 
if the African people behind the vision aim to achieve the tenets of the vision. Just on 
the first tenet of “a knowledge-driven African mining sector that catalyses & 
contributes to the broad-based growth & development of, and is fully integrated into, a 
single African market” (AU, 2009; p. v); it requires a regional integration framework 
for investments. This is because regional agglomeration effects can quickly enhance 
downstream and upstream linkages needed in mining. Hence, it was recommended that 
the PAIC be used as the foundation to build a continental mining investment framework 
for mineral economies in Africa. The institutional mechanism exists with the AMDC 
and the African Union who can spearhead the case and the eventual development of the 
framework for the regionalisation of mining investments. This would ensure better 
gains regionally, and as well benefits from a harmonised Optimal Mining Investment 
framework at the national level.  
Finally, SD and mining investments remain dynamic and the goal post for achieving 
SD ends keep changing. Thus, the requisite partnerships between companies, 
communities and governments must be strengthened with innovative approaches to 
solving problems in mining and the economy. It would be essential to include 
communities in the mines’ integrated set-up and ensure that forward-looking policies 
in digitizing the mining process are understood and adopted by policy makers. At the 
core of SD is integration and as was argued in the Thesis, for mineral economies in their 
current of stage of development, an SED goal that is measurable and creates shared 
value for all stakeholders is the way forward for the development of the mining sector 
in RRA countries.    
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Table of Annexes 
Chapter 1  
Annex 1.1: Classification of Resource-rich Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa   
(Non) Resource-rich 
Countries 
Resource-rich (non-oil) 
Producing Countries 
Resource-rich Oil 
Producing Countries 
Benin Botswana Angola (Oil and Diamonds) 
Burundi Burkina Faso Cameroon 
Cabo Verde Central African Republic Chad 
Comoros Cote d'Ivoire* Republic of Congo 
Eritrea** DRC Equatorial Guinea  
Ethiopia** Ghana* Gabon 
Gambia, The Guinea Nigeria 
Guinea-Bissau Liberia Sudan 
Kenya** Mali South Sudan 
Lesotho Mauritania  
Madagascar** Mozambique  
Malawi Namibia   
Mauritius Niger   
Rwanda Sierra Leone   
Sao Tome and Principe South Africa   
Senegal Tanzania   
Seychelles Zambia   
Somalia Zimbabwe   
Swaziland Post-2014   
Togo Eritrea**   
Uganda Ethiopia**   
 Kenya**  
 Madagascar**  
Sources: Data from World Bank (2016); IBIS (2014); Lundgren et al. (2013) 
Malawi, Rwanda and Uganda are in the initial stages of developing their minerals 
sectors. 
Explanation for the Classifications 
The Thesis employed (IMF, 2012b; Lundgren et al., 2013) classifications to define resource-rich and non-
resource rich countries. From the table, resource-rich countries have 25 per cent or greater of their exports 
merchandise from mineral resources. Non- resource-rich countries have lower than 25 per cent of their exports 
and mineral revenues relative to output. For non-resource-rich countries, they usually produce minerals on a 
small-scale level and have no significant mineral discoveries. For ‘oil producers’, this included traditional oil 
producing countries as shown in table, coupled with South Sudan.  
* Cote d’ Ivoire and Ghana although recently started producing oil are still classified as resource-rich countries 
(non-oil) producers for the purposes of the Thesis. Ghana for instance is a major gold producer as well as Cote 
d’ Ivoire. 
** Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Madagascar have recently (from 2014) started exploring large-scale mining/ oil 
and gas and have proven reserves of commercial production of minerals; hence, the classification as resource-
rich countries (see also IBIS, 2014). 
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Annex 1.2: The Symbol on the World Conservation Strategy Report in 1980 
 
Source: IUCN (1980; p. i)  
 
The above diagram is extracted from the World Conservation Strategy report (see 
IUCN, 1980). It consists of three arrows within a circle. The circle represents the 
biosphere, while the arrows refer to the aims of the Strategy which were: maintenance 
of essential ecological processes and life-support systems; preservation of genetic 
diversity; and sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems. The focus on ecological 
preservation in the report represented one of the earliest views on environment and 
development.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Annex 3.1: Some Sustainable Development Initiatives in Mining 
A List of Common International Voluntary Initiatives for SD of Mining 
 Initiatives Definition Sources 
1 
Occupation OHSAS 
18001 
Occupation Health and Safety Assessment Series 18001, abbreviated as OHSAS 
18001 is a standard for health and safety management systems in an 
organisation. It is aimed at assisting organisations to control, monitor and 
manage occupational health and safety risk.  
 
Certification 
Europe (2017) 
 
 
2 
International 
Organization for 
Standardization (ISO)  
26000 
ISO 26000 is an international standard to assist organisations to effectively 
assess and address vital social responsibilities of relevance to the aims and 
objectives for setting up the company. Companies work with core and wider 
stakeholder base who are integral to the functioning of the core process of the 
business, to ensure that all operations and processes are within the ambit of 
the mission and vision of the company. 
International 
Organization for 
Standardization 
(2010) 
3 
Natural Resource 
Charter (NRC) 
The NRC is a practical 12 precepts stage wise translation of policy options and 
guidance for governments, societies and the international community on 
managing natural resources. It draws on the wide experiences of other 
resource economies into it precepts. It begins with strategic planning into a 
mineral-led economy, exploration, taxation, SD dimensions, revenue 
governance and the management of the role of the international community 
in the extractive sector.    
NRC (2014); NRGI 
(n.d.) 
4 ICMM SD Principles 
The ICMM SD framework is based on the 2-year Mining Metals and Sustainable 
Development Project in 2002. At the heart of the SD framework is how mining 
activity can operate so that positive long-term net benefits can be ample for 
human well-being and the ecosystem. 10 principles were developed to 
facilitate mining’s contribution to sustainability by mining companies.  
ICMM (2003) 
5 
Extractives Industry 
Transparency 
Initiative 
The EITI is aimed at ensuring that natural resource revenues especially from 
mining, oil and gas are transparent, to encourage accountability between the 
key actors of government, extractive companies and citizens. 
EITI (2013) 
6 UN Global Compact 
The UN Global Compact is a principle-based framework for ensuring that its ten 
principles are upheld by business and operations in the areas of human rights, 
environment, labour, anti-corruption, social and environmental ethics, 
amongst others in conducting business operations.  
UN (2002) 
7 ISO TSF 14001 
ISO 14001 and its Tailings and Storage Facility frameworks set out criteria for 
environmental management systems. According to the ISO (2015), it maps out 
a framework that a company or organisation can follow to set up an effective 
environmental management system, particularly in tailings storage and 
management. 
ISO (2015) 
8 
International 
Cyanide 
Management Code 
(ICMC) 
The ICMC is a voluntary programme for cyanide management designed to assist 
the gold mining industry, producers and transporters of cyanide, which is used 
in gold extraction. The programme aims to improve cyanide management 
practices and demonstrate the compliance of gold mining companies in 
cyanide usage and management. Compliance with the standard ensures that 
the potential harmful and wasteful effects of cyanide are limited on the 
environment, as well as on people.  
International 
Cyanide 
Management 
Code (n.d.) 
9 
ISO 50001- Energy 
management system 
ISO 50001:2011 on energy management systems provides guidelines and 
requirements for efficient and effective energy usage by organisations through 
the life cycle of the business. Prior to receiving certification, organisations are 
assisted in the development of an energy management system to ensure 
reductions in different sources of energy.  
ISO (2011) 
10 
Carbon Disclosure 
Leadership Index 
The CDP "Carbon Disclosure Project" from which is derived the CDLI is an 
assurance mechanism for carbon disclosure reporting by different industries 
and sectors. The CDP reporting is based on a set of specific questions on carbon 
emission on scope 1, 2 and 3, by companies and the measures taken by these 
organisations to minimize the impact of their activities or limit their carbon 
footprint on the environment. The CDP works with organisations to disclose 
CDP (n.d.) 
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Several Sources: Included in the Table 
 
Annex 3.2: Global Sustainable Development Goals 
Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030) 
Goal 1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere 
Goal 2 
End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture 
Goal 3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages 
Goal 4 
Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all 
Goal 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls 
Goal 6 Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all 
Goal 7 Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all 
Goal 8 
Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and 
productive employment and decent work for all 
Goal 9 
Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation 
and foster innovation 
Goal 10 Reduce inequality within and among countries 
Goal 11 Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable 
Goal 12 Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns 
Goal 13 Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts 
Goal 14 
Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for 
sustainable development 
Goal 15 
Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, 
sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reserve land 
degradation and halt bio-diversity loss 
Goal 16 
                      
Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide 
access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions 
at all levels  
Goal 17 
Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for 
sustainable development 
Sources: United Nations (2015a, 2015b) 
 
 
the greenhouse gas emissions and after rank the transparency of the reporting 
on an index.  
11 
Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) 
The GRI is a reporting tool with global acceptance intended to serve as a 
framework for reporting on an organisation’s SD performance. The aim of this 
reporting tool is to aid in benchmarking against industry standards and 
performance with respect to SD laws and initiatives and codes of conduct and 
norms 
Global Reporting 
Initiative (2013) 
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Annex 3.3: Sustainability Views and the North and South Perspectives 
The table outlines the characteristics, ethics, the geographical perspective of the two 
main views of sustainability and their variations, i.e. very weak and very strong forms 
of sustainability. 
Sustainability 
labels 
Weak 
sustainability  
Strong sustainability 
Very strong 
sustainability  
Very weak 
sustainability  
Management 
strategies 
Modified 
economic growth- 
adjusted green 
accounting; 
Substitutability of 
natural capital- 
under the 
constant capital 
rule 
Zero economic growth 
and zero population 
growth; heavy 
regulation of the 
environment through 
macroeconomic 
policy; No increase in 
the scale of growth 
from natural resources 
Reduced scale of 
the economy and 
population; 
natural capital 
should remain 
intact and not 
used- 
preservationist 
position in the 
management of 
the economy 
Maximised 
economic growth 
(GDP and GNP) 
and development 
with some care for 
the environment.  
Ethics 
Extended care of 
the environment 
while inter and 
intra equity is 
factored into 
resource use and 
distribution. 
Ethical reasoning 
based on caring 
for others is 
incorporated 
Collective group 
interests take 
precedence over those 
of the individual 
(global over local); 
primary value is 
placed on the 
ecosystem’s wellbeing 
and all human activity 
is secondary 
Acceptance of bio-
ethics; intrinsic 
value conferred on 
nature over that of 
human’s 
Atypical property 
rights under the 
market systems; 
traditional ethical 
reasoning. 
Individual rights 
are important- 
instrumental 
value- recognised 
value of humans in 
nature 
Geographical 
Perspectives 
Developed North Developed North Developed North Developing South 
Source: Modified from (Pearce, 1994) 
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Chapter 4  
 
 
Annex 4.1: Gold Production Quantities in RRA Countries 
Second Criteria (Gold production> 10,000kgs) 
17 Resource-rich Countries (in SSA) 
2014 Production estimates of 
Gold above (10,000 
kilogrammes) 
Gold Mining Countries that 
qualified for the next 
selection criteria  
TIER ONE 
Botswana 884 Ghana (90,754kg) 
Burkina Faso 36,199 Tanzania (40,481kg) 
Eritrea 1,000 Burkina Faso (36,199kg) 
Ethiopia 12,500 Ivory Coast (17,318kg) 
Ghana 90,754 Ethiopia (12500kg) 
Ivory Coast 17,318 
  
Madagascar 160 
Mozambique 180 
Namibia 1,938 
Tanzania 40,481 
Zambia 5,000 
TIER TWO 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 32,000 South Africa (151,618kg) 
Guinea (Conakry) 16,955 Mali (39,724kg) 
Mali 39,724 DRC (32,000kg) 
Niger 732 Guinea (Conakry) (16,955kg) 
South Africa 151,618 Zimbabwe (14,500kg) 
Zimbabwe 14,500  
**Kenya is eliminated in the first stage   
Source: USGS (2015) 
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Annex 4.2: Matrix of SD Indicators at the National Level 
The Matrix of SD indicators at the macroeconomic level comprises of (23) core indicators in the first column and (39) specific indicators. The specific 
indicators consist of (14) economic indicators, (7) environmental indicators, and (18) social indicators. The matrix also illustrates the broad global-
regional-national issues, which the indicators cover. The specific indicators have been narrowed to only indicators that are measurable from the issues 
column in the Table. 
Matrix of Sustainable Development Indicators at the National (or Macroeconomic) Level 
CORE INDICATORS (CI) SPECIFIC INDICATORS ISSUES 
NUMBER OF 
INDICATORS 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM (E) 
E 1: Macroeconomic Stability 
E 1.1: GDP; Effectiveness of economic 
policies and the business environment.                                                                                                                                                        
Growth Policies- Fiscal, Taxation, Investments; 
FDIs; GDP; General Accounts. 
1 
E 2: Investments into Capital Development 
E.2.1: Investments into education and health; 
social investments into communities and nation.                                                                               
E 2.2: Research and development, and science, 
technology and innovation.                                                                     
E.2.3:  Net Savings.                                                        
SD Concerns (mainly investments into any 
social project is considered as economic 
spending hence captured in this section)- 
Economic Development, Poverty Alleviation; 
Investments into Development Projects- Road 
and Railway Systems Public Works; Capital 
Infrastructure Development; Employment 
Creation; Social Investments into 
Communities; Social Infrastructure Mining R 
& D, Science Technology Innovation Policies, 
Cleaner Technologies and Production. 
3 
E 3: Resource Nationalism (RN) Issues 
E 3.1: Perceptions of stability in the mineral 
regime and investments.     
Considers mining industry players' view of 
government approaches to RN issues such as: 
uncertainty over environmental regulations, 
regulatory duplications, legal systems and tax 
regimes; Other issues include:                                                                         
1. Mandated Beneficiation;                                                                
2. Greater Stake in Companies;                                                             
3. Increasing Taxation (Royalties, Corporate 
Taxes);                                                                                                                             
4. State Ownership; and                                                                                  
5. Nationalisation of mines. 
1 
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E 4: Mining Sector Linkages 
E 4.1: Local beneficiation strategies; Legal 
requirements for local procurement and 
supply chain.      
E 4.2: Legal requirements for local 
procurement and supply chain.                     
Policy coherence of the mineral policy 
framework with other sector policies; Local 
beneficiation policy; Procurement and local 
supply chain. 
2 
E 5: Transparency and Management of Revenues 
 E 5.1: General revenue management; 
Minerals revenue management; 
Transparency and benefit sharing (mineral 
revenues).                                                          
Public revenue management; Transparency in 
the use of mineral rents; Equitable 
distribution of revenues and wealth (benefit 
sharing) with communities. 
1 
E 6: ASM (Economic) Issues 
E 6.1: Legal recognition of the contribution of 
ASM to GDP; legal provisions safeguarding 
their interest/ signatory to the regional 
Yaoundé vision.                    
Incoming revenues from ASM; legal provisions 
for ASM as an economic activity. 
1 
E 7: Sustainable Production E 7.1: Net Adjusted Savings 
Sustainable production and consumption of 
natural resources. 
1 
E 8: Trade and Investment 
E 8.1: Trade Integration                                                                                      
E 8.2: Trade Intensity                                                                                              
E 8.3: Trade Policy Openness                                                                                
E 8.4: Existence of investment funds from 
mining rents. 
Intra-regional trade with other African 
countries and trade with developed 
countries; Bilateral agreements and 
investments. 
4 
NATURAL SYSTEM (N) 
N 1: Effective Environmental Regulations 
N 1.1: All environmental regulations and 
laws, which deal with environmental 
pollution:                                                                
1. Cumulative national air emissions;                                           
2. Water;                                                                                                                                     
3. Land degradation (pollution);                                                              
4. Nuisance;                                                                                                                       
5. Climate change;                                                                                                     
6. Biodiversity protection. 
Nuisance, air and water quality; land 
degradation, biodiversity, etc. 
1 
N 2: Environmental Quality  
N 2.1: GHGs, climate change; Quality of 
water and river bodies; Biodiversity damage; 
Land degradation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Energy usage and emissions- Ghgs, co2; 
Water, air and land pollution; Wastes- liquid 
effluents and leachates; AMD; Biodiversity 
and habitat loss. 
1 
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N 3: Sustainable Natural Resource Management 
N 3.1: Natural Resource management 
systems           
Water - Use, Security of Supply and Recycling; 
Protection of the Natural System- Forest 
Reserves and Land; Land Use; Environmental 
Management and Monitoring Systems; Post-
Mine Rehabilitation and Strategic Planning; 
Waste Management 
1 
N 4: Mine Closure N 4.1: Planning for mine closure 
Environmental plans and strategies for 
closure. 
1 
N 5: ASM (Environmental) Issues 
N 5.1:  Mercury emissions into air, soil and 
water; Land degraded as a result of ASM;                                                                                                                               
Contaminated water bodies as a result of 
siltation and mercury, etc. 
ASM Pollution- mercury; Land degradation; 
Regulations and management. 
1 
N 6: Knowledge of Mineral Reserves and 
Resources  
N 6.1: Known mineral resources and reserves 
Knowledge of available mineral reserves; 
Horizon- effective life span until exhaustion. 
1 
N 7: Compliance on Global and Regional 
Environmental Sustainability Frameworks 
N 7:1. Adherence to Global Environmental 
Frameworks, voluntary standards and 
initiatives. 
International standards and compliance. 1 
SOCIAL SYSTEM (S) 
S 1: Governance   S 1.1: Governance and institutional quality                                            
Institutional quality; Voice and accountability; 
Good governance; Civil and political rights. 
6 
S 2: Quality of Life 
S 2.1: Standard of living                                                                                            
S 2.2: Peace and security                                                                            
Standard of living; Welfare; Human 
development- income, health, quality of 
education; Job security and labour 
entitlements; HRD- education, training and 
skills development.  
2 
S 3: Gender Equality and Empowerment  S 3.1: Gender equality and empowerment 
Women’s empowerment; Equality in terms of 
access to resources- income, wealth and 
healthcare delivery services; Social and 
political participation in all aspects of family, 
society and national governments. 
1 
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S 4: Human Rights Concerns 
S 4.1: Civil liberties                                                    
S 4.2: Political rights 
Equal opportunity and non-Discrimination; 
Social inclusion; Equality; Participation; Legal 
frameworks backing employee and worker 
rights.  
2 
S 5: Legal Provisions for Corporate Social 
Responsibility  
S 5.1: Existence of CSR legal provisions                                            
S 5.2: Elements within CSR considered       
As a legal obligation by Companies; CSR 
institutionalised in legal frameworks. 
2 
S 6: Local Content Legislations  
S 6.1: Existence of local content legal 
provisions                                                                      
S 6.2: Local content provisions considered       
Job provision; labour quota of locals in 
employment; Inclusive development; 
Procurement and enterprise development; 
measures to deal with historical legacies; 
Health and safety.  
2 
S 7: Social Cohesion and Socio-economic 
Development 
S 7.1: Social cohesion                                                             
S 7.2: Socio-economic Development     
Community development - state of urban and 
rural development and local government 
relations; Preservation of culture and 
indigenous peoples’ rights; Social Licence to 
Mine. 
2 
S 8: Compliance on Global Voluntary Social 
Initiatives and Frameworks 
S 8.1: Ratified multilateral treaties (on all UN 
Human Rights frameworks)  
Ratifications on UN multilateral treaties on 
human rights concerns. 
1 
Sources: Researcher’s Synthesis of Global, Regional and National SD Reports; References can be found in Table 4.6 of Chapter Four  
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Annex 4.3: Elements for SD Measurements under Economic System 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM (E) 
Themes Definitions of Indicators/ Assessment Elements Sources 
E 1: Macroeconomic 
Stability 
 
E1: World Bank's 
Country Policy and 
Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA)- 
Macroeconomic 
Stability 
The CPIA's cluster (A) assessment of economic 
management were used for the SD assessment. 
The average for a stable macroeconomic 
environment such as: sound fiscal policy, 
monetary policy, debt policy and structural 
policies were assessed and then averaged for 
E1. 
World Bank (2017) 
E1: World Economic 
Forum (WEF)- 
Macroeconomic 
Stability Pillar 
On occasion, the WEF's pillar on 
macroeconomic stability (scores) used in the 
construction of the Global Competitiveness 
Index was used for the macroeconomic 
stability in calculating the SD index for DRC. Per 
the WEF (2016), the pillar evaluates the 
stability of the macroeconomic environment 
for governments, so it does not directly take 
into account the way in which public accounts 
are managed by the government. 
WEF (2016) 
E 2: Investments 
into Capital 
Development 
E2: Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation 
Gross fixed capital formation (formerly gross 
domestic fixed investment) is defined to 
include land improvements (fences, ditches, 
drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and 
equipment purchases; and the construction of 
roads, railways, and the like, including schools, 
offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, 
and commercial and industrial buildings by the 
World Bank. This was key in measuring 
investment into capital development of the 
countries which were assessed. 
World Bank (2015) 
E2: WEF's 
Innovation Pillar 
The WEF's innovation pillar considers 
investments of countries in research and 
development (R&D), interlinkages in research 
between the private sector, governments, 
knowledge-based institutions, and venture 
capitalists. Per the WEF (2016), the presence of 
high-quality scientific research institutions that 
can generate the basic knowledge needed to 
build and enhance newer technologies 
between universities and industry is a corner 
assessment of this pillar. As a result, the pillar's 
scores was part of the indicators for E2 
'investments into capital development'.  
WEF (2016) 
 
 
 
E 3: Resource 
Nationalism (RN) 
Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E3: Policy 
Perception Index 
(PPI) 
The PPI was used because it presents a report 
card of the stability of mineral regimes in order 
to secure investments for minerals 
development. It tests the attractiveness of 
mineral regimes and in essence measures the 
state of resource nationalism in mining 
countries. Hence, the proxy was used as a 
powerful measure of how nationalism efforts 
have affected regimes requirements for 
mineral development. 
Jackson and Green 
(2015) 
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E 4: Mining Sector 
Linkages 
 
E4.1: Local 
beneficiation 
Strategy   
Are there legal provisions encouraging 
beneficiating locally? (Y/N)                                                                                                                           
Ranked (Yes, 100 and No- 0); and                                                                                                                                           
1. Are legal requirements for local beneficiation 
adequately outlined in the mineral regime? 
2. Are there plans and strategies for local 
beneficiation enforced in the mining 
regulation? 
3. In terms of strategies and plans for local 
beneficiation, are they reviewed frequently? 
4. Are there monitoring mechanisms for local 
beneficiation in place, such as benchmarks, 
targets and incentives? 
Strategies based on the questions are ranked: 
(100- Yes, 75- To greater extent, 50- Average 
consideration, 25- To a lesser extent, 0- No) 
 National 
Documents  
E4.2: Local supply 
chain strategy 
Are there legal requirements for local 
procurements for mining supply chain? (Y/N)                                                                                                                                    
Ranked (Yes, 100 and No- 0); and                                                                                                                                
1. Are legal requirements for local 
procurement and supply chain adequately 
outlined in the mineral regime? 
2. Are there plans and strategies for local 
procurement and supply chain enforced in the 
mining regulation? 
3. In terms of strategies and plans for local 
procurement and supply chain, are they 
reviewed frequently? 
4. Are there monitoring mechanisms for local 
procurement and supply chain in place, such as 
benchmarks, targets and incentives for local 
procurement and supply chain? 
5. Do local authorities in mining communities 
include plans and strategies to enhance local 
procurement and supply chain requirement in 
their development planning? 
Strategies based on the questions are ranked: 
(100- Yes, 75- To greater extent, 50- Average 
consideration, 25- To a lesser extent, 0- No) 
 National 
Documents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
E 5: Transparency 
and Management of 
Revenues 
 
 
E5: Resource 
Governance Index 
(RGI) 
The RGI measures the quality of governance in 
58 resource and oil-rich countries in the world. 
According to NRGI (2015), the Index which was 
developed by the Institute aims to assess the 
following: institutional and legal setting; 
reporting practices; safeguards and quality 
controls; and enabling environment for 
effective mineral governance and management 
of mineral wealth. Only the enabling 
environment dimension was used to measure 
the management of pubic mineral revenues 
and transparency under E5. 
NRGI (2015) 
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E 6: Artisanal and 
Small-scale Mining 
(ASM) (Economic) 
Issues 
E6: Regimes 
provisions ASM 
Development 
1. Are there provisions which legalise all types 
of artisanal, small and medium scale mining 
activities in the mineral regime? 
2. Are there legal provisions enhancing the 
economic impact of ASM through skills 
development, training and optimising ASM as a 
business in the mineral regime? Based on 
provisions of the mining regime and jurisdiction 
requirements and best practice                                            
3. Have there been medium to long term funds 
set up for enhancing the economic 
opportunities of ASM activities and their 
communities in the mineral regime? 
4. Are there M&E protocols to check non-
compliance ASM Operators in the mineral 
regime? 
Strategies based on the questions are ranked: 
(100- Yes, 75- To greater extent, 50- Average 
consideration, 25- To a lesser extent, 0- No) 
  National 
Documents 
E 7: Sustainable 
Production 
E7: Net Adjusted 
Savings 
Net adjusted savings was used to measure the 
nature of sustainable production vis-à-vis net 
savings of mineral depletion from mineral 
economies. The indicator measures net savings 
plus education expenditure and minus energy 
depletion, mineral depletion, net forest 
depletion, and carbon dioxide and particulate 
emissions damage. 
World Bank (2015) 
E 8: Trade and 
Investment 
E8.1: ECA's Africa 
Regional Integration 
(ARI) Index 
The ARI Index by the ECA was used to measure 
the integration agenda of the four countries 
used in the assessment. The ARI measures 
Africa’s integration on a number of dimensions, 
i.e. regional infrastructure; trade integration, 
financial and macro-economic integration; free 
movement of people; productive integration. 
AU-AfDB-ECA 
(2016) 
E8.2: Merchandise 
Trade (%) GDP 
Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is defined 
as the sum of merchandise exports and imports 
divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. 
dollars (World Bank, 2015). This indicator was 
used to measure the nature and volume of 
trade intensity within mineral-rich economies. 
World Bank (2015) 
E8.3: CPIA's Trade 
Policy Openness 
Per the World Bank (2013), the CPIA's Trade 
Policy Criterion covers two parts. The first part 
seeks to measure the extent to which a country 
supports regional organisations and its 
commitment to economic cooperation and 
regional integration initiatives. The second part 
focuses on trade and covers two areas: (a) 
trade regime restrictiveness focusing on the 
height of tariffs barriers, the extent to which 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are used, and the 
transparency and predictability of the trade 
regime; and (b) customs and trade facilitation, 
including the extent to which the customs 
service is free of corruption, relies on risk 
management, processes duty collections and 
refunds promptly, and operates transparently. 
The indicator assisted in assessing the 
soundness of trade policy to enhance a 
regional integration agenda for the mineral 
economies with other states in Africa  
World Bank (2017) 
E8.4: Existence of a 
Fund from Mineral 
revenues 
 Is there existence of a fund from mineral 
revenues for long term development?                                                                                                                                         
Ranked (Yes, 100 and No- 0) 
National 
Documents 
Sources: Included in the Table; National Documents- Mining Laws: local content and Labour Laws 
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Annex 4.4: Elements for SD Measurements under Natural System 
ENVIRONMENTAL/ NATURAL SYSTEM (N) 
Themes Definitions of Indicators/ Assessment Elements Sources 
 
N1: Effective 
Environmental 
Regulations 
 
N1: Are there in 
existence national 
environmental 
regulations frameworks 
to support 
environmental 
protection?                                                                  
Environmental regulations for:                                                                                         
- Cumulative National Air Emissions 
- Water 
- Land Degradation (Pollution) 
- Nuisance 
- Climate Change 
- Biodiversity Protection                                                                                                           
Ranked (Yes- 100, No- 0) 
 National 
Documents 
 
 
N2: Environmental 
Quality  
 
 
N2: Environmental 
Performance Index (EPI) 
The EPI measures the impact of the 
environment on the health of humans and 
the health and wellbeing of the eco-system. 
Some of the indicators measure: air quality, 
air pollution, water and sanitation, safe 
drinking water, the ecosystems vitality, etc. 
To assess the quality of the environment and 
its impact vis-à-vis national regulations, the 
EPI was used as the proxy for environmental 
quality. 
YCELP (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N3: Sustainable 
Natural Resource 
Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N3: Natural Resource 
Management Strategies 
1. Are there any sustainable land and water 
management strategies in place or other 
natural resource management systems? Y/ N 
(Scaled 1- 10) Based on provisions of the 
mining regime and jurisdiction requirements 
and best practice                                            
2. Are there legal provisions which support 
the integration of NRM in all development 
policies? Y/N 
3. Are there M&E protocols to check non-
compliance on NRM strategies? 
4. Have there been national benchmarks/ 
and targets which have been set for the six 
variables: emissions, water, land 
degradation, biodiversity, climate change 
and Nuisance for mining? 
5. Are environmental mgmt. fund for 
rehabilitation of mining site and 
communities in the mineral regime? 
6. Are there NRM strategies and initiatives by 
governments to check impact- waste, 
emissions, water, and land degradation from 
mining industry on the environment?                                                                                                                                                         
Strategies based on the questions are 
ranked: 
(100- Yes, 75- To greater extent, 50- Average 
consideration, 25- To a lesser extent, 0- No) 
 National 
Documents  
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N4: Mine Closure 
 
N4: Planning for Mine 
Closure 
1. Are legal requirements for post-mine 
closure adequately outlined in the mineral 
regime? 
2. Are there plans and strategies for post 
mine closure enforced in the mining 
regulation? 
3. In terms of strategies and plans for post-
mine closure, are they reviewed frequently? 
4. Are there monitoring mechanisms for 
post-mine closure in place? 
5. Do the national and local authorities 
include the scenario of closure in their 
development planning? 
6. Are provisions being made from the 
benefits of mining to support development 
initiatives for mine closure at the local level? 
Strategies based on the questions are 
ranked: 
(100- Yes, 75- To greater extent, 50- Average 
consideration, 25- To a lesser extent, 0- No) 
  National 
Documents 
N5: ASM 
(Environmental) 
Issues  
N5: Regimes provisions 
for regulating ASM 
environmental issues 
are assessed by a series 
questions. 
1. Are there legal provisions which support 
the integration of ASM activities in all 
development policies? Y/N 
2. Are there legal provisions regulating the 
environmental impact of ASM activities? Y/ N 
(Scaled 1- 10) Based on provisions of the 
mining regime and jurisdiction requirements 
and best practice                                            
3. Have there been national benchmarks/ 
and targets which have been set for the six 
variables: emissions, water, land 
degradation, biodiversity, climate change 
and Nuisance for regulating ASM activities? 
4. Are environmental mgmt. plans/ fund 
required for operation by ASM operators on 
mining site and communities in the mineral 
regime? 
5. Are there NRM strategies and initiatives by 
government to check the impact of- waste, 
emissions, water, land degradation from 
ASM activities on the environment? 
6. Are there M&E protocols to check non-
compliance on NRM strategies for ASM? 
Strategies based on the questions are 
ranked: 
(100- Yes, 75- To greater extent, 50- Average 
consideration, 25- To a lesser extent, 0- No) 
  National 
Documents 
N6: Knowledge 
of Mineral 
Reserves and 
Resources  
N6: Robust knowledge 
about know resources 
and reserves in the 
mineral regime                                                                  
1. Is there knowledge of all known mineral 
resources and reserves?  
2. Have all minerals and the extent of the 
resources and reserves been mapped out?  
3. Is there knowledge of probable gold ore 
reserves in the regime? 
4. Is there knowledge of proven gold ore 
reserves in the regime? 
5. Are there long-term plans ensuring the 
sustainability of the reserves for future 
generations? 
6. Do you have a mineral management 
regulation to deal with revenues from gold? 
Knowledge of reserves and resources based 
on the questions are ranked: 
(100- Yes, 75- To greater extent, 50- Average 
consideration, 25- To a lesser extent, 0- No) 
 National 
Documents  
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N7: Compliance on 
Global and 
Regional SD 
Frameworks 
 
N7: Status and 
Ratification of Global 
and Regional 
Frameworks                                                           
Signed and Ratified (1), 
Not Signed (0), Signed 
but not Ratified (0.5) 
Global Frameworks: Have you signed and 
ratified the following environmental 
frameworks?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
- The Convention on Biological Diversity 
- The United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification 
- The Basel Convention on the Control of 
Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal  
- Bamako Convention on the Ban of the 
Import into Africa and the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes Within Africa 
- The United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
- The Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 
(CITES) 
- The Kyoto Protocol to United Nations 
Framework on Climate Change 
- The Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer 
- The Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
deplete the Ozone Layer 
- The Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative 
Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal 
Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora 
- The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior 
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade 
- The Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (POPs) 
- The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  
- Cancun Adaptation Framework 
- Minamata Convention 
- SDGs 
- Paris Agreement 
Documents 
from the 
United 
Nations’ and 
the African 
Union’s 
Repositories 
on Signed and 
Ratified 
Environmental 
Agreements 
 
(AU, 2015b; 
OHCHR, 2015) 
Sources: Included in the Table; National Documents- Mining Laws: Environmental Regulations; 
SD and Mining frameworks.  
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Annex 4.5: Elements for SD Measurements under Social System 
The metrics, comprising of indexes of relevant to RRA countries and elements to be considerd for 
ranking and assessment in mining legislation are presented in the following tables.  
SOCIAL SYSTEM (S) 
Themes Definitions of Indicators/ Assessment Elements Sources 
S1: Governance 
S1: Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
The WGI measures the nature of 
governance across six dimensions- these 
are (Voice & Accountability, Political 
Stability and Lack of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
Corruption).  These indicators were the 
prime indicators for measuring quality of 
governance and were aggregated under 
S1. 
UNDP (2016); World 
Bank- WGI (2015) 
S2: Quality of Life 
 
S2.1: Human 
Development Index (HDI)  
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a 
key welfare measure that is composed of 
an aggregation of a country's life 
expectancy, education, and per capita 
income indicators into a single 
composite index. (Scored on 0- 1 scale). 
This was used to assess quality of life. 
UNDP (2016) 
S2.2: Global Peace Index 
(GPI) 
The GPIs indicators on peace and safety 
were used as a proxy for the collective 
wholeness of a country. The GPI consists 
currently of 22 indicators seeking to 
measure global peace based on: levels of 
safety and security in society; the extent 
of domestic and international conflict; 
and the degree of militarisation. The 
index measures the extent to which civil 
and political rights are sound in a 
country. Some of the broader issues that 
it aims to measure are: low crime rates, 
terrorist acts and violence, violent 
demonstrations, stable political 
atmosphere, harmonious relations with 
neighbouring countries, the proportion 
of a population being internally 
displaced, amongst others. This is scored 
on 1- 7 scale.  
Institute for 
Economics and 
Peace (2015) 
 
S3: Gender 
Equality and 
Empowerment 
 
S3: Gender Inequality 
Index (GII) 
To measure the state of gender and 
women's empowerment, the GII was 
used. The GII tries to measure the level 
of inequality between females and 
males, in terms of achievements in 
empowerment and economic status. It 
thus reflects the nature of dis-
empowerment amongst women in a 
country. It sometimes shows the relative 
position of women to men in areas of 
women's health issues according to the 
UNDP (2015). 
UNDP (2015)  
 
S4: Human Rights 
Concerns 
 
S4: Freedom House 
Indicators (FHI)- Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties 
In terms of human rights concerns, the 
FHI which measures the state of 
democracy, civil and political rights of 
countries was used as the proxy for S4. 
The FHI is a survey conducted to 
measure freedom— in terms of the 
opportunity to act without control of the 
government and other inherent and 
Freedom House 
(2015) 
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external forces of dominance over an 
individual or collective's rights. The FHI 
measures two dimensions of freedom- 
political rights and civil liberties. 
According to the Freedom House (2015), 
political rights enhances people's ability 
to participate freely without restraint or 
pressure in political processes.  
 
 
 
S 5: Legal 
Provisions for 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
S5.1: Are there in 
existence CSR Provisions 
in the legal frameworks?                                                             
Ranked (Yes- 100, No- 0) 
S5.2: Do the CSR provisions consider:                                                                                                                                                
- Community and socio-economic 
development 
- Reclamation 
- Reforestation 
- Promotion of Cleaner Technologies 
- Education 
- Health 
- Sports and Youth Development 
- Cultural Enhancement 
- HRD- CPD 
- Provisions for Collective Bargaining 
- Company and Employee Relationships 
- Job Security 
- Ranked (Yes- 100, No- 0) 
National Documents 
S 6: Local Content 
Legislation  
 
S6.1: Are there in 
existence Local Content 
Provisions in the legal 
frameworks?                                                                 
Ranked (Yes- 100, No- 0) 
S6.2: Do the Local Content provisions 
consider:                                                                                                                             
- Building Local Infrastructure     
- Community Development     
- Employment- Job Creation     
- Community Development Fund     
- Community Involvement and 
Relationships     
- Local Procurement & Enterprise 
Development     
- Technology Transfers     
- Research and Development     
- Training and Skills Development     
- Local Content Plan     
- Monitoring and Evaluation                                                                            
Ranked (Yes- 100, No- 0)     
National Documents 
 
 
 
 
S7: Socio-
economic 
Development and 
social Cohesion 
 
 
 
S7.1: CPIA- Social 
cohesion 
The CPIAs cluster on social cohesion, 
which assesses the soundness of policies 
for social inclusion / equity, Equity of 
Public Resource Use, Building Human 
Resources and Social Protection and 
Labour were grouped for the SD 
assessment.   
World Bank (2017) 
S7.2: Africa Infrastructure 
Development Index (AIDI) 
The AfDB’s Africa Infrastructure 
Development Index (AIDI) was used as a 
proxy for measuring infrastructure 
development. The AIDI aims to monitor 
the status and progress of infrastructure 
development across the continent on 
four major components: (i) Transport; (ii) 
Electricity, (iii) ICT, and (iv) Water & 
Sanitation. It is scored on 0- 100 scale. 
AfDB (2016) 
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S 8: Compliance 
on Global 
Voluntary Social 
Initiatives and 
Frameworks 
  
S8: Status and Ratification 
of Global and Regional 
Human Rights 
Frameworks was the 
proxy.                                                         
The assessment was 
scored base on:                                                           
(Signed and Ratified (1), 
Not Signed (0), Signed 
but not Ratified (0.5)). 
Global Frameworks: Have you signed and 
ratified the following global human 
rights frameworks?                                                                                                                                
- International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination :1969 
- International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights :1976 
- Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
:1976 
- Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of 
the death penalty: 1991 
- International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: 1976 
- Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights; 2013 
- Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
:1981 
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women: 2000 
- Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment: 1987 
- Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment: 2006 
- Convention on the Rights of the Child 
:1990 
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed 
conflict: 2002 
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child 
pornography: 2002 
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on a 
communications procedure: 2014 
- International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families 
:2003 
- International Convention for the 
Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance: 2010 
- Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities: 2008 
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
:2008 
Regional 
Frameworks: Have 
you signed and 
ratified the following 
regional human 
rights frameworks?                                                                                                                            
- African Convention 
on the conservation 
of nature and 
natural resources    
- African Charter on 
Human and Peoples 
Rights     
- Revised African 
Convention on the 
Conservation of 
Nature and Natural 
Resources     
 
 
 
 
Documents from the 
United Nations 
Human Rights Office 
of the High 
Commissioner 
(OHCHR) (2015- 
2016)  
 
(see (AU, 2015b; 
OHCHR, 2015) 
 
Sources: Included in the Table; National Documents: Mining Laws- Local Content policies, 
Labour Laws and Social and Labour Plans for mining 
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Annex 4.6: Regional SD Goals 
Regional SD goals tabled through a lengthy scan of the challenges and issues facing the continent 
identified by the ECA and as Africa’s contribution to the post-2015 development framework were 
co-opted into the SD indicators’ framework. These became the goals for which the indicators were 
aimed at achieving in the long-term. The Global SDGs were not used because the regional SD 
Goals reflect the regional but global view of what continent wants to achieve in SD. The goals 
presented below are adapted from (ECA, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e). 
Proposed Sustainable Development Goals for the African Region 
Goal 1 
Eradicate poverty and extreme hunger, and achieve food and nutrition 
security 
Goal 2 Vigorously promote good governance, peace and security 
Goal 3 Provide adequate, qualitative, affordable and accessible health care to all 
Goal 4 Enhance accessibility and affordability of quality education to all 
Goal 5 Improve availability and accessibility of clean water and sanitation to all 
Goal 6 Intensify gender equality, women empowerment and youth development 
Goal 7 Heighten social inclusion and security for all 
Goal 8 
Transform conventional to inclusive green growth and promote sustainable 
consumption and production 
Goal 9 Scale-up investments in infrastructure development and efficient services 
Goal 10 Advance sustainable exploitation, use and management of natural resources 
Goal 11 Improve quality and sustainability of the environment 
Goal 12 Promote global partnerships and institutional effectiveness 
Source: (ECA, 2013e) 
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Annex 4.7: Scores for the four Countries under the Social System 
The following indicators were assessed: S1- governance, S2- quality of life, S3- gender 
equality and empowerment, S4- human rights concerns, S5- legal provisions for CSR, 
S6- local content legislation provisions, S7- social cohesion and socio-economic 
development, and S8- compliance on global and regional voluntary initiatives. The scores 
are presented below. 
S1: Governance 
The measure for this indicator was the Worldwide Governance Indicators. See scores. 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Country Series Name 2015 
Final Scores for S1 
(Avg. of the series) 
Ghana 
Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank 53.4   
Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank 44.7   
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: 
Percentile Rank 50.0   
Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank 53.4   
Rule of Law: Percentile Rank 60.6   
Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank 65.5 55% 
Dem. Rep. 
Congo 
(DRC) 
Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank 9.1   
Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank 3.8   
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: 
Percentile Rank 3.8   
Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank 6.3   
Rule of Law: Percentile Rank 3.4   
Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank 12.8 7% 
Tanzania 
Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank 25.5   
Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank 31.3   
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: 
Percentile Rank 30.5   
Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank 41.3   
Rule of Law: Percentile Rank 39.4   
Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank 40.4 35% 
South 
Africa 
Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank 58.2   
Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank 64.9   
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: 
Percentile Rank 38.6   
Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank 63.9   
Rule of Law: Percentile Rank 59.1   
Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank 68.5 59% 
Source: World Bank- WGI (2015) 
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S2: Quality of Life 
The measure for this indicator were the HDI and the Global Peace Index. See scores. 
S 2: Quality of Life 
Countries 
Human Development Index- 
HDI (0 - 1) 2015 
Scaling Use in the SDI (scaled to 100) 
Ghana 0.579 57.9 57.9 
SA 0.666 66.6 66.6 
Tanzania 0.521 52.1 52.1 
DRC 0.433 43.3 43.3 
Countries 
Global Peace Index- GPI (1- 5) 
2015= x 
Scaling y= 
(x/5) 
Use in the SDI (scaled to 100) 
(100- y) 
Ghana 1.84 0.368 63.2 
SA 2.376 0.4752 52.48 
Tanzania 1.903 0.3806 61.94 
DRC 2.196 0.4392 56.08 
Final Scores for S2- Quality of Life 
Countries HDI GPI 
Final Scores for S2 (Avg. of HDI 
and GPI) 
Ghana 57.9 63.2 61% 
SA 66.6 52.48 60% 
Tanzania 52.1 61.94 57% 
DRC 43.3 56.08 50% 
Sources: UNDP (2016); Institute for Economics and Peace (2015) 
 
 
S3: Gender Equality and Empowerment 
The measure for this indicator was the Gender Inequality Index. See scores below. 
S 3: Gender Equality and Empowerment 
Countries 
Gender Inequality Index (0- 
1) 2015= x 
Scaling 
(1-x) 
Use in the SDI (scaled to 100) 
  Final Scores for S3 
Ghana 0.547 0.453 45% 
DRC 0.663 0.337 34% 
South Africa 0.394 0.606 61% 
Tanzania 0.544 0.456 46% 
Source: UNDP (2015)  
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S4: Human Rights Concerns 
The measure for this indicator were civil and political liberties of the Freedom House 
Indicators. See scores.  
S 4: Human Rights Concerns 
Countries 
Freedom House 
Indicators (2015) 
Freedom 
Rating 
(1/7) 
   
Use in the 
SDI (scaled 
to 100) 
  
Civil 
Liberties 
Political 
Rights 
X  (x/7) 1-x 
Final scores 
for S4 
Ghana 2 1 1.5  0.21 0.79 79% 
Dem. R. 
Congo 6 6 6 
 0.86 
0.14 14% 
South 
Africa 2 2 2 
  
0.29 0.71 71% 
Tanzania 3 3 3  0.43 0.57 57% 
Source: Freedom House (2015) 
 
S5 (CSR Provisions) and S6 (Local Content Requirements)   
S5.1 CSR Strategies and S6.1 Local Content Strategies   
S 5.1 and S 6.1 assessed the existence of express LC and CSR regulations or strategies. 
It was ranked based on (100% - yes, 75% - to greater extent, 50% - average consideration, 
25% - to a lesser extent, 0% - no consideration).  
S 5.1- CSR Provisions and S 6.1- Local Content Requirements 
Countries 
S 6.1: Are there legal 
provisions for local content in 
mining codes? 
S 5.1: Are there legal provisions 
for CSR in mining codes? 
Ghana 100% 50% 
Dem. R. Congo 25% 25% 
South Africa 100% 50% 
Tanzania 100% 25% 
Sources: National mining documents- DRC (DRC, 2002a, 2003, 2006); Ghana (GoG, 
2003, 2006, 2012e); South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1995, 2002; Republic of 
South Africa-Department of Labour, 2013; Republic of South Africa-DMR, 2004, 2004); 
Tanzania (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2004a, 2010) 
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S5.2 CSR Provisions and S6.2 Local Content Provisions   
S 5.2 and S 6.2 teased key CSR and LC elements for social sustainability. These are 
presented in the tables below. The legislative instruments whether implied or expressed 
are ranked based on the elements below. (1 for yes, 0.5 for implied and 0 for not included 
in the regime’s requirements).  
S 5.2: Legal provisions for CSR 
Countries 
Economic 
Issues 
Beyond 
environmental 
sustainability 
Social upliftment Employee issues 
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1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 75 
Ghana  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 75 
Tanzania 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 67 
Sources: National mining documents- DRC (DRC, 2002a, 2003, 2006); Ghana (GoG, 
2003, 2006, 2012e); South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1995, 2002; Republic of 
South Africa-Department of Labour, 2013; Republic of South Africa-DMR, 2004, 2004); 
Tanzania (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2004a, 2010) 
 
 
S 6.2: Local Content Policies and Mining Law 
Local Content Provisions 
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Dem. R. 
Congo  
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.4 
Ghana  0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 73 
Tanzania 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 55 
Sources: National mining documents- DRC (DRC, 2002a, 2003, 2006); Ghana (GoG, 
2003, 2006, 2012e); South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1995, 2002; Republic of 
South Africa-Department of Labour, 2013; Republic of South Africa-DMR, 2004, 2004); 
Tanzania (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2004a, 2010) 
 
The total scores for S 5 and S 6 are presented in the table below. 
 S5: Legal Provisions for CSR  S6: Local Content Legislation 
Countries 
Are there legal 
provisions for 
CSR in mining 
codes? 
What 
elements are 
considered? 
Final 
Scores 
for S5 
Are there legal 
provisions for 
local content in 
mining codes? 
What 
elements 
are 
considered? 
Final 
Scores 
for S6 
Ghana 50 75 63% 100 72.3 87% 
DRC 25 75 50% 25 36 31% 
South 
Africa 
50 100 75% 100 100 100% 
Tanzania 25 67 46% 100 55 78% 
 Source: Author’s Calculations (2016) 
 
S7: Social Cohesion and Socio-economic Development 
The measure for this indicator were CPIAs Social Cohesion policy assessment and the 
African Infrastructure Development Index. See scores below. 
S7: Social Cohesion and Socio-economic Development 
Countries CPIA- Social cohesion (2015) 
Africa 
Infrastructure 
Development 
Index (2015) 
Final 
Scores 
for S7 
 Scored out of 6 
Use in the SDI 
(Normalised scores) 
scored out of 100 
Ghana 3.95 65.83 25.43 46% 
DRC 2.75 45.83 8.089 27% 
South 
Africa 3.35 55.83 75.9 66% 
Tanzania 3.85 64.17 11.92 38% 
Source: World Bank (2015); AfDB (2016) 
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S8: Compliance on Global and Regional Vol. Initiatives 
The status and ratification on the listed relevant global and regional social instruments for 
Mineral economies were ranked based on the following: (signed and ratified (1), not 
signed (0), signed but not ratified (0.5). The final scores are presented in the tables below 
S8.1- regional instruments and S8.2- global frameworks. 
S 8.1: Status of Ratification on Regional Instruments  
(As of 2015) 
Countries 
A
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 C
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 C
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 o
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  P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
To
ta
l 
Dem. Rep. Congo  1 1 0.5 
0.8
33 
83% 
Ghana  1 1 1 1 100% 
South Africa  1 1 1 1 100% 
Tanzania 0.5 1 1 
0.8
33 
83% 
Source: AU Regional Frameworks from the Repository (see AU, 2015) 
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S 8.2: Status of Ratification on Global Human Rights Instruments  
(As of 2015) 
Countries 
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c
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P
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 d
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h
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C
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c
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n
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e
n
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e
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c
ti
o
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 D
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 D
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 C
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P
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 D
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e
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Percentage 
of Total 
Ghana 1 1 1 0 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 1 1 81% 
DRC 1 1 1 0 1 0.5 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 69% 
South Africa 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 75% 
Tanzania 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.5 1 1 58% 
Source: OHCHR Framework Repository on Status of Ratification of UN Frameworks (see AU, 2015; OHCHR, 2015)
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The total scores for S 8 are presented in the table below. 
S8: Compliance on Global and Regional Vol. Initiatives 
Countries 
Global Human 
Rights Frameworks 
Regional 
Frameworks- Social 
and Human Rights  
Final Scores for S8 
Ghana 80.6 100 90% 
Dem. R. Congo 69.4 83.3 76% 
South Africa 75.0 100 88% 
Tanzania 58.3 83.3 71% 
Source: Author’s Calculations (2016) 
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Annex 4.8: Scores for the four Countries under the Natural System 
Environmental system covered seven core indicators of relevance to mineral economies. 
These are: N 1: Environmental Regulations; N 2: Environmental Quality; N 3: Sustainable 
Natural Resource Management (NRM); N 4: Mine Closure; N 5: ASM Environmental 
Issues; N 6: Knowledge of Mineral Reserves and Resources; and N 7: Compliance on 
Global and Regional SD Frameworks. The scores are presented below:  
 
N1: Effective Environmental Regulations 
For N1, the existence of the following (issues) regulated in the environmental regime was 
scored on toggle question of (0, No and 1, Yes) based on provisions of the mining regime 
and jurisdictions requirements. 
N1: Effective Environmental Regulations 
Countries 
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 
n
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n
al
 a
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is
si
o
n
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W
at
er
 
La
n
d
 d
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C
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d
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p
ro
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Final 
scores 
for N1 
Ghana 1 1 1 1 1 1 100% 
Dem. R. Congo 1 1 1 1 1 1 100% 
South Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 100% 
Tanzania 1 1 1 1 1 1 100% 
Sources: National mining documents- DRC (DRC, 2002a, 2003, 2011); Ghana (GoG, 
1994, 1999, 2006); South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1998, 2002; Republic of South 
Africa-DME, 2011) Tanzania (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b, 2010) 
 
N2: Environmental Quality 
The measure for this indicator was the Environmental Performance Index. See scores. 
N2: Environmental Quality (EPI, 2014) 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)*, Scoring (0-100) Final Scores for N2 
Ghana 32% 
Dem. R. Congo 25% 
South Africa 54% 
Tanzania 36% 
Source: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy- YCELP, 2014) 
*Scoring for N2 on the EPI is out of 100 and is maintained for the SDI calculations. 
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N3: Natural Resource Management 
The strategies and provisions of the environmental regimes for NRM were ranked on a 
scale of (100%- yes, 75%- to greater extent, 50%- average consideration, 25%- to a lesser 
extent, 0%- no). The average scores for the probing questions are included in the table 
below. 
N3: Natural Resource Management  
Countries 
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 p
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l p
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Final 
Scores 
for N3 
Ghana 75 50 25 25 100 50 54% 
Dem. R. Congo 50 50 25 25 25 25 33% 
South Africa 75 100 75 75 100 50 79% 
Tanzania 75 75 50 25 100 50 63% 
Sources: National mining documents- DRC (DRC, 2002a, 2003, 2011); Ghana (GoG, 
1994, 1999, 2006); South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1998, 2002; Republic of South 
Africa-DME, 2011) Tanzania (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b, 2010) 
 
 
 
N4: Mine Closure 
The strategies and provisions of the environmental regimes for post-mine closure were 
ranked on a scale of (100%- yes, 75%- to greater extent, 50%- average consideration, 25%- 
to a lesser extent, 0%- no). The average scores for the probing questions are included in 
the table below. 
N4: Mine Closure 
 Countries 
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at
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h
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l l
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? Final 
Scores 
for N4 
Ghana 75 100 25 25 0 25 42% 
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Dem. R. 
Congo 50 50 25 25 0 0 25% 
South Africa 75 100 100 75 50 50 75% 
Tanzania 75 100 50 25 0 25 46% 
Sources: National mining documents- DRC (DRC, 2002a, 2003, 2011); Ghana (GoG, 
1994, 1999, 2006); South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1998, 2002; Republic of South 
Africa-DME, 2011) Tanzania (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b, 2010) 
 
 
 
N5: ASM (Environmental) Issues 
The strategies and provisions of the environmental regimes for ASM regulation were 
ranked on a scale of (100%- yes, 75%- to greater extent, 50%- average consideration, 25%- 
to a lesser extent, 0%- no). The average scores for the probing questions are included in 
the table below. 
N5: ASM (Environmental) Issues 
Countries 
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l p
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at
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l p
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Final 
Scores 
for N5 
Ghana 50 25 0 100 25 0 33% 
Dem. R. 
Congo 50 25 0 50 0 0 21% 
South Africa 75 25 0 100 25 25 42% 
Tanzania 75 25 0 100 25 0 38% 
Sources: National mining documents- DRC (DRC, 2002a, 2003, 2011); Ghana (GoG, 
1994, 1999, 2006); South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1998, 2002; Republic of South 
Africa-DME, 2011) Tanzania (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b, 2010) 
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N6: Knowledge of Resources and Reserves 
Knowledge of the existence of resources and reserves were ranked on a scale of (100%- 
yes, 75%- to greater extent, 50%- average consideration, 25%- to a lesser extent, 0%- no). 
The average scores for the probing questions are included in the table below. 
N6: Knowledge of Resources and Reserves 
 Countries 
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 m
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l m
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 b
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 m
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d
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d
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 r
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 p
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 f
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at
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. D
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 d
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Final 
Scores 
for N6 
Ghana 75 75 50 25 0 0 38% 
Dem. R. Congo 75 25 25 0 0 0 21% 
South Africa 100 100 100 100 0 0 67% 
Tanzania 75 75 75 25 0 0 42% 
Sources: DRC (Chamber of Mines- DRC, 2015); South Africa (Chamber of Mines- SA, 
2015; StatsSA, 2013); Ghana (The Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2014); Tanzania (The United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2015b, 2008); USGS (2015, 2012) 
*For this indicator, inference was made from available survey documents, from the USGS and national 
information available online. The most accurate of the data was from South Africa’s mineral accounts 
spanning 1990- 2010.
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N7: Compliance on Global and Regional Environmental Frameworks 
The status and ratification on the listed relevant global and regional environmental instruments for Mineral economies were ranked based on the 
following: (signed and ratified (1), not signed (0), signed but not ratified (0.5). The final scores are presented in the table. 
Status on Global SD Instruments and Frameworks of Relevance to Mineral economies 
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Final 
Scores 
for N7 
Ghana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 91% 
Dem. R. Congo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 91% 
South Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 91% 
Tanzania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 91% 
Source: Source: OHCHR Framework Repository on Status of Ratification of UN Frameworks (see AU, 2015; OHCHR, 2015)  
 
*The environmental considerations in the SDGs were ranked. Since, all the four countries were signatories to the passing of the SDGs together with the COP 15 for the Paris 
declaration, they each received (0.5) in the SD assessment. In this light, the Minamata Conventions, which was also recently passed have been signed by all four countries 
and are yet to ratify, the terms of the agreement in their legislations, hence on this instrument, they each received (0.5)
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Annex 4.9: Scores for the four Countries under the Economic System 
Under the economic system, eight core indicators were assessed. The indicators included: 
E1- macroeconomic stability; E2- investments into capital development; E3- resource 
nationalism issues; E4- mining sector linkages; E5- transparency and management of 
public revenues; E6- artisanal and small-scale mining (economic) issues; E7- sustainable 
production; and E8: trade and investment. The scores are provided below. 
E 1: Macroeconomic Stability 
The measure for this indicator was the WEFs macroeconomic stability pillar and the 
CPIA’s macroeconomic environment scores. See scores. 
E 1: Macroeconomic Stability 
World Economic Forum (2015)  
Macroeconomic Stability Pillar (out of 7) = x (x/7) Rescaled (to 100) 
Ghana 2.792 0.398 40% 
Tanzania 4.532 0.674 65% 
Dem. R. 
Congo 3.25 (out of 6) * 0.542 (out of 6) * 54%* 
South Africa 4.502 0.643 64% 
Source: WEF (2015) 
*The Democratic Republic of Congo was not part of the WEFs 2015 assessment of Global Competitiveness, thus 
on macroeconomic stability, the SD assessment relayed upon the World Bank’s CPIA on the following: business 
regulatory environment rating, debt policy rating economic management cluster, efficiency of revenue 
mobilisation rating average, fiscal policy rating, macroeconomic management rating, quality of budgetary, 
financial management rating, and structural policies cluster average for macroeconomic stability. On this 
parameter, the DRC scored an average of 3.25 from the 2015 dataset. 
E 2: Investment into Capital Development 
The measure for this indicator were Gross Fixed Capital Formation, and the WEFs 
Innovation pillar. See scores below. 
E2: Investments into Capital Development 
Countries 
Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation 
(%) of GDP 
Score (min max 
transformation) 
 
WEFs 
Innovation 
Pillar 
(1/7)= x 
Score 
(x/7) 
Average (GCFC 
and WEF 
Innovation 
Pillar) 
Final 
Scores for 
E2 (Scaled 
to 100) 
Ghana 23.61 0.33 
  
3.31 0.47 0.4 40% 
Dem. R. 
Congo 16.15 0.17 2.77 0.40 0.285 29% 
South Africa 20.05 0.26 3.69 0.53 0.395 39% 
Tanzania 31.26 0.50 3.03 0.43 0.465 47% 
Source: World Bank (2015); WEF (2015) 
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E 3: Resource Nationalism Issues 
The measure for this indicator was the policy perception index (2015). See scores below. 
E 3: Resource Nationalism Issues                                                                 
Countries Policy Perception Index Final Scores for E3 
Ghana 69.089 69% 
Dem. R. Congo 42.743 43% 
South Africa 51.913 52% 
Tanzania 62.124 62% 
Source: Jackson and Green (2015) 
 
E 4: Mineral Sector Linkages (Beneficiation and Procurement) 
E4.1: Local Beneficiation Strategies 
E 4.1 assessed the existence of express local beneficiation strategies. It was ranked based 
on (100%- yes, 75%- to greater extent, 50%- average consideration, 25%- to a lesser 
extent, 0%- no).  
E4.1: Local Beneficiation Strategies 
Countries 
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Score 
(%) 
Ghana 0 0 25 25 12.5 
Dem. R. Congo 0 0 25 25 12.5 
South Africa 75 50 75 75 68.75 
Tanzania 0 0 25 25 12.5 
Sources: National mining documents- DRC (DRC, 2002a, 2003); Ghana (GoG, 2006, 
2010, 2012b); South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 2002, 2011; Republic of South 
Africa-DMR, 2010); Tanzania (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010, 2011) 
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E4.2: Local Procurement and Supply Chain Strategies 
E 4.2 assessed the existence of express local procurement and supply chain strategies for 
mining. It was ranked based on (100- yes, 75- to greater extent, 50- average consideration, 
25- to a lesser extent, 0- no).  
E4.2: Local Procurement and Supply Chain Strategies 
Countries 
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Score 
(%) 
Ghana 50 25 50 75 50 
Dem. R. Congo 25 25 50 75 43.75 
South Africa 100 100 100 100 100 
Tanzania 50 25 50 75 50 
Sources: National mining documents- DRC (DRC, 2002a, 2003); Ghana (GoG, 2006, 
2010, 2012b); South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 2002, 2011; Republic of South 
Africa-DMR, 2010); Tanzania (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010, 2011) 
The total scores for E 4 are presented in the table below. 
E 4: Mineral Sector Linkages 
Countries E 4.2 E 4.1 Final Scores for E4 
Ghana 50% 12.5% 31% 
Dem. R. Congo 43.75% 12.5% 28% 
South Africa 100% 68.75% 84% 
Tanzania 50% 12.5% 31% 
Source: Author’s Calculations (2016) 
 
E 5: Transparency and Management of Public Revenues 
The measure for this indicator was the institutions and enabling environment for 
transparency in mineral revenues of the Resource Governance Index. See scores. 
E 5: Transparency and Management of Public Revenues 
Resource Governance Index* (Institutions and Enabling Environment) Final Scores for E 5 
South Africa 55.5 56% 
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Ghana 62.7 63% 
Tanzania 49.76 50% 
Dem. R. Congo 38.6 39% 
Source: Revenue Watch (2013) 
* The indicator used the enabling environment for transparency and quality of the institutions to ensure 
effective management of mineral revenues. The Resource Governance Index was used as the proxy to 
measure E4. 
 
E 6: ASM (Economic) Issues 
The strategies and provisions of the regime for enhancing the economic development of 
ASM were ranked on a scale of (100%- yes, 75%- to greater extent, 50%- average 
consideration, 25%- to a lesser extent, 0%- no). The average scores for the probing 
questions are included below: 
E 6: ASM (Economic) Issues 
Countries 
4
. A
re
 t
h
er
e 
M
&
E 
p
ro
to
co
ls
 t
o
 c
h
e
ck
 n
o
n
-
co
m
p
lia
n
ce
 A
SM
 O
p
er
at
o
rs
 in
 t
h
e 
m
in
er
al
 
re
gi
m
e?
 
3
. H
av
e 
th
e
re
 b
e
e
n
 m
ed
iu
m
 t
o
 lo
n
g 
te
rm
 f
u
n
d
s 
se
t 
u
p
 f
o
r 
e
n
h
an
ci
n
g 
th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
o
f 
A
SM
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
an
d
 t
h
ei
r 
co
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s 
in
 t
h
e 
m
in
er
al
 r
eg
im
e?
 
2
. A
re
 t
h
er
e 
le
ga
l p
ro
vi
si
o
n
s 
en
h
an
ci
n
g 
th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
A
SM
 t
h
ro
u
gh
 s
ki
lls
 
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t,
 t
ra
in
in
g 
an
d
 o
p
ti
m
is
in
g 
A
SM
 a
s 
a 
b
u
si
n
es
s 
in
 t
h
e 
m
in
er
al
 r
eg
im
e?
 
1
. A
re
 t
h
er
e 
p
ro
vi
si
o
n
s 
w
h
ic
h
 le
ga
lis
e 
al
l t
yp
es
 o
f 
ar
ti
sa
n
al
, s
m
al
l a
n
d
 m
ed
iu
m
 s
ca
le
 m
in
in
g 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 in
 t
h
e 
m
in
er
al
 r
eg
im
e?
 
Final 
scores 
for E6 
Ghana 25 25 50 50 38% 
Dem. R. Congo 25 25 50 50 38% 
South Africa 50 50 75 50 56% 
Tanzania 25 25 75 75 50% 
Sources: National mining documents- Ghana (DRC, 2002a, 2003, GoG, 2006, 2010, 
2012b, Republic of South Africa, 2002, 2011; Republic of South Africa-DMR, 2010; The 
United Republic of Tanzania, 2010, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
285 
 
E 7: Sustainable Production 
The measure for this indicator was the net adjusted savings of the World Bank. See scores 
E 7: Sustainable Production 
Countries 
Net Adjusted 
Savings (%) Change, 
World Bank stats 
Min-max 
Transformation 
Final 
scores for 
E7 (scaled 
to 100) 
Ghana 1.606857991 0.460102639 46% 
Dem. R. Congo -26.64056333 0 0% 
South Africa 2.127863939 0.468588943 47% 
Tanzania 15.14949106 0.680689189 68% 
Source: World Bank (2015) 
 
E 8: Trade and Investment 
The measure for this indicator were the ECA’s Regional Trade Integration Index (E.8.1), 
the CPIA’s Trade Policy Openness (E.8.2), trade intensity (E 8.3), and the existence of 
an investment fund (E.8.4), specifically from mineral resources in the country. E 8.4, was 
scored on a toggle question of (0, No and 1, Yes) based on provisions of the mining 
regime and jurisdictions’ requirements. 
E 8: Trade and Investment 
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Ghana 0.604 60.33 0.355 4 0.67 0 0.407 41% 
Dem. R. 
Congo 0.275 34.05 0.1547 3.5 0.58 0 0.247 25% 
South 
Africa* 1 59.56 0.3491 4 0.67 0 0.504 50% 
Tanzania 0.78 33.88 0.1534 4 0.67 0 0.40 40% 
Several Sources: ECA (2016); World Bank (2015); National documents- DRC (DRC, 
2002a); Ghana (GoG, 2006); South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 2002); Tanzania 
(The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010) 
*Because there are no CPIA values for South Africa, the sub-regional average of (4) was determined 
from the scores of countries within Southern Africa for South Africa.  
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Annex 4.10: Mining Charter Report Card for Gold Mining Companies 
The Table highlights the performance of the four major gold mining companies in South 
Africa with market capitalisation of above (R200 billion in assets) and their compliance 
on the benchmarks and targets set in the Charter as signatories to the “Stakeholder 
Declaration Strategy” on the Charter.  
Report Card on SAs Mining Charter- Gold Mining Companies* 
Theme Targets AGA Gold Fields Harmony Sibanye 
Reporting Annual Reporting Annually fulfilled Annually fulfilled Annually fulfilled Annually fulfilled 
Ownership 
26% of equity to 
HDSA 
Target reached Target reached Target reached Target reached 
Housing and 
living 
conditions 
Single Occupancy Target reached Target reached 97.78 Target reached 
Family Units Target reached Target reached 
Not reached/ in 
Discussions (DMR) 
Not reached/ in 
Discussions (DMR) 
Procurement 
Capital goods 
(40%) 
53 81.86 82.56 54.44 
Services (70%) 73 73.07 73.89 71.36 
Consumer goods 
(50%) 
67 85.03 67.56 65.67 
Annual spend of 
(0.5%) supply 
chain from 
multinationals 
 0.23 
0% from multi-
national suppliers 
Source from local 
companies 
Employment 
(40%) 
Top Management 55.6 50 60 38.46 
Senior 
Management 
42.9 50 46.49 34.79 
Middle 
Management 
49.3 63.16 38.58 26.14 
Junior 
Management 
57.4 52.31 56 43.43 
Core Skills (40%) 52.6 72 62.57 64.71 
HRD 5% of total payroll 
Not reached/ in 
Discussions 
96 86.44 47.83 
SD and growth 
of the mining 
industry 
Implementing EMP 
(100%) 
Not reached/ in 
Discussions 
100 87.5 100 
Implementing 
Health & Safety 
(100%) 
95 100 100 95.8 
% of Sampling to 
SA Facilities (100%) 
100 100 100 100 
Mine 
Community 
Development 
Working with Local 
Municipalities/ IDP 
Almost reached/ in 
Discussions (DMR) 
96 86.44 47.83 
Sources: Data from DMR in “this is gold,” (2015a, 2015b) fact sheet  
* The major players include (AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., Gold Fields Ltd., Harmony Gold Ltd., and 
Sibanye Gold Ltd.). 
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Chapter 6  
 
Annex 6.1: Core Sustainable Development Principles by UNCTAD 
These principles by UNCTAD (2012) shown in the Table are to provide guidelines for 
parties for green investments and assisting countries in designing robust investment 
policies.  
Core Principles  Definitions  
1. Investment for sustainable 
development 
• Concerns for environmental and social issues in 
investment policy decision making.  
2. Policy coherence  
• Ensure that investment policies are integral in a 
country’s overall development vision and plan, and in 
harmony with international level instruments and 
frameworks. 
3. Public governance and institutions 
• Strong regulatory framework and rule of law should 
persist in administering investment policies with 
transparency and accountability present in all procedures 
and dealings between investor and host nations. 
4. Dynamic policymaking  
• Investment policies should be evolving to suit any 
development dynamics that may persist in the future.  
5. Balanced rights and obligations 
• The right and obligations of the host State and investor 
should be clearly defined and balanced for all.  
6. States’ right to regulate  
• A State should have the right to set entry and 
operational requirements to guide foreign investment and 
in the interest of its citizens.  
7. Openness to investment  
• Investment policies should be structured in such a way 
that it is open and stable with minimal political and 
economic risks borne by the investor.  
8. Investment protection 
• Investment policies must provide the enabling 
environment for foreign investments to thrive and with 
adequate protections established. 
9. Investment promotion and facilitation 
• Investment policies should be aligned to the SDGs 
whereas promoting direct investments into a country.  
10. Corporate governance and 
responsibility 
• Investment policies must enhance CSR objectives and 
comply with global best practices on social responsibility 
and corporate governance. 
11. International cooperation 
• There should be international corporation that addresses 
the challenges of investment policies and development. 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (2012; p.11) 
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Chapter 8  
 
Annex 8.1: Top Gold Producing Countries used for the Global CIF Averages 
FISCAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
CIF (SEE CHAPTER SIX) 
TOP TEN GOLD PRODUCING COUNTRIES 
China Russia Australia 
United 
States 
(Various 
States) 
Canada 
(Quebec, 
British 
Columbia 
and 
Ontario) 
Peru 
South 
Africa 
Mexico Uzbekistan Ghana 
Global CIF 
AVERAGE 
for gold 
economies 
(2016) 
Tax stability agreements Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes 
Corporate tax rate (national) 25% 20% 30% (4- 9%), 35% 10%- 16% 30% 
(0%- 
32.5%) 
Acc. to a 
spec. 
formula 
for gold 
mining 
30% 7.5% 35% 22.05% 
Branch office tax 25% 20% 30% 
5%, 30%-
35% 
5%, 25% 30% 28% 30% 10% 25% 25.55% 
Income tax credits for 
foreigners 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Minimum corporate tax x 15.50% x (4- 9%), 15% 10% x x x x x x 
Additional profits tax 
No (but a 
Resource 
tax exists 
separate 
from 
royalties) 
Yes 
No (was 
repealed) 
No No 
Yes/ 
Special 
Mining Tax 
(SMT): 
No No 
No (but there 
exists a special 
regime for 
after profit 
tax) 
10% No 
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Tax holidays (years) Yes No No 
(Yes/No) 
depends on 
State 
Yes (3 
years) 
Yes (pre- 
production) 
Yes/No Yes 
Yes (deducting 
expenses 
incurred for 5 
years when 
there are 
expansions) 
Yes 
(during 
pre-
productio
n) 
Yes 
Tax treaties Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ring fencing Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Forward carry of losses 
(years) 
Yes (5 years) 
Yes (10 
years) 
 indefinitely 
after it has 
been 
assessed 
Yes (20 
years) 
Yes (20 
years) 
Yes (4 
years) 
 
indefinitel
y after it 
has been 
assessed 
Yes (10 
years) 
Yes (5 years) 
Yes (5 
years) 
Yes (12.9 
years)  
Backward carry of losses  No No No No 
Yes (3 
years) 
No No No No No No 
Depreciation (years)  
Minimum 
depreciatio
n periods 
subject to 
the tax laws 
(1- 25) 
over the 
life of 
the mine 
Up to 100% 
on certain 
mining 
assets and 
outgoings 
up to 50% 
on mining 
assets (over 
the life of 
the asset) 
(also 
depends on 
the State) 
up to 50% 
on mining 
assets (over 
the life of 
the asset) 
up to 50% 
on mining 
assets 
(over the 
life of the 
asset) 
Up to 50% 
on mining 
assets (1- 
25) over 
the life of 
the mine 
up to 50% 
on mining 
assets 
over the 
life of the 
mine 
Up to 15% on 
mining assets 
over the life of 
the mine 
20% over 
the life of 
the mine 
41.87% 
(LOM)/ 
Method SL 
Capital gains tax No 
Yes 
(30%) 
Yes (30%) 
Yes/No 
(depends on 
State) 
Yes/No 
(depends 
on State) 
5% 22.4% 
Yes (25%- 
30%) 
No 15% 
Yes 
(21.65%) 
Tax on assets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Value added/sales tax 0%- 17% 18% 10% 
depends on 
State 
5%- 10% 16% 14% 0% 20% 
14% 
generally 
(Mining 
exempt)  
Yes 
(11.44%) 
Fuel tax Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes/No Yes 
Repatriation/dividend/with
holding tax 
10% 15% 10% 
(Yes/No) 
(depends on 
State) 
25% on 
dividends 
5% 
10%- 15% 
on 
dividends 
10% 10% 8%- 10% 
Yes 
(11.8%) 
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Multiple Sources: Multiple Sources: PwC (2012); Ernest and Young (2015); Moody’s Rating (2015a, 2015b, 2017); Mining Acts of DRC, Ghana, South 
Africa and Tanzania - (DRC, 2002a; GoG, 2006; Republic of South Africa, 2002; The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010)  
 
 
 
Import duties 0% 0% 
0% (on 
mining 
machinery 
not 
produced in 
Australia) 
0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 
Exempt 
for mining 
plant, 
machinery 
and 
equipmen
t (all other 
materials 
for mining 
attract 
5%) 
0% 
Export duties Yes 
Yes 
(depend
s on the 
tax act) 
No 
(Yes/No) 
(depends on 
State) 
No 
Mining 
exempt 
Mining 
exempt 
0% 0% 
Mining 
exempt 
0% 
Payroll tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Land tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial (State) taxes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Municipal taxes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes 
Royalty rate 0.5%- 4% 6% (3%- 5%) 0%, (2%-5%) 
2- 16% 
(Range for 
the three 
provinces) 
1%- 12% 
(0.5- 5%) 
for 
refined/ 
(0.5- 7%) 
for 
unrefined 
0.50% 2.8%- 5% 5% 4.39% 
Transfer pricing rules Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Annex 8.2: Ghana’s Evaluation for the IFRAD Strategy 
 
Annex 8.2a: SWOT Analysis of Ghana’s Mineral Sector 
 
Strengths Opportunities 
• Matured and well-developed gold deposits within 
the African region. 
• A stable economic and political regime with a 
clearly defined mining framework. 
• Sound environment, which promotes foreign 
investments. 
• A somewhat favourable risk to reward ratio in the 
mining sector. 
• Investment incentives (in the form of special tax 
arrangements) for senior miners when 
investments exceed US $500 million. 
• Reformed mining sector which is building capacity 
of its skills base. 
• Improved efforts in community development and 
social licence to operate. 
Weaknesses Threats 
• Prone to external shocks should global prices fall. 
• Cost of mining is high due to a semi-developed 
mining infrastructure. 
• High incidence of negative externalities from 
mining on the environment. 
• Weak linkages of the sector to other sectors of the 
economy. 
• CSR frameworks for mining needs standardisation. 
• Threat of losing out on mining investments to 
other countries within the region. 
• There is a deficit in mining infrastructure, skills 
and labour. 
• Low gold prices and weak demand from China 
may threaten the buoyancy of the sector. 
• Weak mining R & D may hinder transformation of 
the sector and increase the cost of mining gold 
should prices decline. 
Sources: GoG (2010); GoG- NSDF (2015a); The Ghana Chamber of Mines (2011, 2012, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016)  
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Annex 8.2b: The Inter-linkages between Ghana’s Development Frameworks and Investment Policies with the Mining Sector 
Elements  
Points of 
Strategic 
Assessment 
Issues 
Comments on 
the Evaluation 
Final 
Evaluation 
Process 1: 
Integrating 
development 
objectives 
with mining  
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: What 
are the country’s 
express 
development 
objectives as well as 
mining’s (potential) 
objectives’? Have 
they been aligned 
and has mining 
been integrated into 
the national 
development and 
industrial policies 
and strategies of the 
country? 
Development 
Frameworks: 
Long-term Development Framework: 
Ghana National Spatial Development Framework (NSDF) (2015- 2035) 
The NSDF addresses Ghana’s development challenges in the next 20 years and provide a clear vision and guideline 
for Ghana’s long-term development. The NSDF (2015- 2035) is contoured on the SDGs and recognises and 
strategically positions the sector and other natural resources for transformation (see GoG- NSDF, 2015).  
 
It does recognise Ghana’s mining sector and has argued for the needed mining infrastructure, enforcing regulations 
for ASM and environmental management.  
 
Medium-term Development Framework: Post- 2000 
The two medium term frameworks- the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP) I & II and the 
Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) I & II also aimed to build a legacy of the sector with 
interventions to support the sector. 
 
The assessment of the frameworks showed the centrality of mining to Ghana’s development. This drive under the 
GPRSP II and GSGDA I led to the establishment of Ghana’s third Mining Act and first mining policy (in 2006 and 2011 
respectively) in order to reshape the industry (see (GoG- GPRS II, 2006; GoG-GSGDA I, 2010). The mining policy was 
drafted to unify all the mineral development frameworks, industrial policies and environmental management 
policies toward the realization of SED ends. 
  
  
  
 Overall, Ghana has a 
clearly defined 
spatial development 
framework that 
recognises the 
impact of minerals of 
transformation and 
SED. Thus, for the 
evaluation, it was 
observed that its 
development, 
industrial, 
investment and 
mining frameworks 
are integrated. 
Yes 
  
  
  
Mining 
Frameworks: 
Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703) 
The Act consolidated existing mining laws as a platform for transformation and sustainable development. The Act 
creates a special regime for mining and guides the mineral investment environment in Ghana.  
 
To define principles which fulfil the development imperatives for the country while developing the sector, a draft 
mining policy was devised in 2011. The principles clearly affirmed the need to achieve the socio-economic 
development of the economy and build the needed linkages within the sector.  
 
In 2012, new mining sector regulations (LI 2173- 2177; 2182) were unveiled to further some of the objectives 
defined in the mining policy and Ghana’s medium-term development framework. 
 
Industrial 
Frameworks: 
Ghana Industrial Policy (GIP) & the Industrial Support Sector Programme (ISSP) 
Arguably, the GIP has been modern Ghana’s first industrial policy which aims to create a modern productive 
economy, with high levels of value-addition and expand productive employment in the manufacturing sector.  
 
The GIP was unveiled in 2011 aimed at the competitiveness of its manufacturing sector and value addition for its 
productive sectors (GoG, 2011a; [b] 2011). Although, the mining sector was not specifically singled out for 
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improvement under the Industrial Sector Support Programme (ISSP), avenues for including the mining sector for 
value addition should have been considered. The challenge with the GIP was that although value addition was 
priority, the expert skills needed was strategized only for the oil and gas sector when it comes to mining. 
Investment 
Frameworks: 
 There is the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, which does not apply to mining generally since a special regime 
(the Minerals and Mining Act) applies. However, there are broader synergies in the supply chain services that fall 
under this investment framework. 
 
There are other public investment frameworks such as the Ghana infrastructure investment fund and the Ghana 
Public Investment Management Policy that are geared towards building public infrastructure. 
Process 2: 
Resource 
potential  
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: Is 
there a national 
inventory that maps 
the economic 
potential of the 
mineral resource? 
Have governments 
set targets on 
acquiring 
information on the 
demonstrated 
mineral resources 
that are within its’ 
jurisdiction, and are 
there on-going 
projects 
(government-led, 
private exploration 
(joint venture-ships 
with governments) 
and or regional-
based, aimed at 
building the 
geological 
information of 
mineral ore bodies 
in the country? 
Institutions, 
programmes 
and projects 
by 
government 
and other 
partners 
Ghana’s Geological Survey Department (GSD) undertakes all geological mapping of mineral resources in the 
country. It was established under Act 127 in 1962 to facilitate the geological mapping of Ghana.  
 
The economy has an inventory of its mineral resources and has on-going projects with a number of development 
partners such as the World Bank and the European Union. Ghana has partnered with the World Bank, the Nordic 
Development Fund, GEUS (Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland) and others to acquire and secure 
adequate geological information on its mineral resources. It recently launched an online open cadastre system on 
minerals and mineral rights holders in the country.  
 
The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (Act 865) stipulates the promotion of investments for exploration and 
exploitation. There are however not clearly defined targets on accumulating geological knowledge. The country 
recently passed the Geological Survey Authority Bill to advise the government on geoscientific issues, research and 
development on mineral resources and the environment. And the MDF has committed to providing funding for the 
GSD.  
 The evaluation was a 
‘yes’ for Ghana. This 
is because the GSD 
undertakes 
geological mapping 
as its mandate.  
Yes 
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Process 3: 
Type of 
mining 
investment 
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: What 
types of mineral 
investments exist 
and is the 
investment regime 
competitive? How 
are current mining 
investments 
(development) 
agreements 
structured? What 
new (potential) and 
current risks have 
affected the regime 
and how has it 
affected mining 
investments? 
Types of 
mineral 
investments 
and is the 
regime 
competitive? 
Ghana has several BITs with other African countries and partners outside of Africa. ECA (2016) listed all the 
countries in Africa and outside the continent that Ghana has entered into an agreement with.  
 
The economy remains competitive and attractive to foreign investment with the GIPC Act 2013. As a mining 
destination, the opportunities of its mining sector lay in the incentives for competitiveness through stability 
agreements, MDAs and other benefits for mining capital (such as tax exemptions), no VAT on certain mining 
equipment, amongst others.  
 
To further support a liberalised agenda for development, it enacted the Technology Transfer Regulations, 1992, (LI 
1547) and Transfer Pricing Regulations, 2012 (L.I. 2182) to safeguard R & D creation and to curb illicit transfer of 
funds by foreign companies.  
 
Based on the CIF 
assessment and it 
investment 
environment, the 
evaluation for Ghana 
remains competitive 
to attract 
investments. 
 
Competitive  
Process 4: 
Mining 
sector 
linkages 
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: Have 
effective safeguards 
been established in 
the legislative 
framework to 
support mining 
sector agencies? In 
terms of building 
critical mining 
sector linkages are 
the economy’s local 
content and CSR 
policies well 
integrated with its 
fiscal policy? Has 
government been 
successful in 
managing various 
risk factors which 
influence mining 
investments? 
The focus is 
on LC and 
CSR and 
institutions 
that support 
mineral 
sector 
linkages and 
governance 
Ghana’s mining regulations L. I. (2173- 2177; 2182) capture local content, recruitment and employment quotas, 
local procurement and penal actions for non-compliance. The regulations also cover health and safety, explosives, 
licensing and compensation and resettlement.  
 
There are institutions to monitor compliance. These include the Minerals Commission working in partnership with 
the Ghana Chamber of Mines. Thus, the evaluation for Process 4 show a ‘yes’ in all three aspects for optimal mining 
transmission.  
 
For the L.I.s which support the sector, the penal actions are fines for non-compliance. The monetary charges are 
put into a fund to train and build local capacity and development of the mining sector. 
 
Based on the evaluation of the regime, the elements and their evaluation for sector linkages are presented as 
follows: 
Institutional Framework 
Agencies (Support Mining Investments) (Yes) 
Agencies (Monitoring and Compliance) (Yes)  
Agencies Responsible for Managing Mineral Revenues (Yes) 
  
Social 
Local Content (Yes) 
CSR Policy and guidelines (Yes) 
 
For Ghana, since the 
L.I.s to build the 
critical linkages 
needed in the sector 
were recently 
enacted, it was 
evaluated with a 
‘yes’. 
Yes 
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Environment 
Environmental law and due diligence (Yes) 
Health and Safety (yes) 
Process 5: 
Managing 
investment 
portfolio 
Point of Strategic 
Assessment: 
Considering the 
current level of 
development of the 
economy, are there 
established 
transparent 
institutional 
processes and 
mechanisms to set 
up a fund? 
 Institutional 
Mechanisms 
for managing 
a fund 
For institutional mechanism, Ghana’s Minerals Commission and the Central Bank of Ghana are well established to 
run a fund system if needs be.  
 
Also, in terms of framework, the Mineral Development Fund- MDF, Act 912 establishes a fund for mining 
communities. The purpose of the fund is redressing the harmful effects of mining; promoting local economic 
development; and building mining R & D and capacity of the sector (See MDF Act 912, 2016: Section 4 (a- e), p.4).  
For Ghana, the 
general evaluation 
was ‘yes’ because of 
the existence of 
institutions and 
regulations in 
managing a fund 
system. 
 
Additionally, there 
have bene direct 
investments into the 
economy.  
Yes  
Existence of a wealth fund. 
In terms of existence 
of a wealth fund, 
discussion in Chapter 
Four revealed that 
none exists for 
mineral resources. 
No 
Sources: (GoG, 2010, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012e, 2013, 2015, 2016; GoG- GPRS I, 2003; GoG- GPRS II, 2006; GoG- NSDF, 2015a; GoG- 
PIM, 2015; GoG-GSGDA I, 2010; GoG-GSGDA II, 2014) 
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Annex 8.2c: Ghana’s Policy Instruments for Operationalising the IFRAD Strategy 
Instruments Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 Process 4 Process 5 
Legal/ Regulatory 
Instruments 
- Good governance & equity 
- Transparency, especially for revenues 
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and reporting: 
Rules/codes on the reporting of 
Resources  
- Favourable standards and 
elements in investment 
treaties/ agreements  
- Realistic downstream 
processing requirements 
- Social responsibilities- LC 
and CSR Guidelines 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
Economic/ Financial 
Instruments 
- Encourage domestic supply through 
NMP  
- Enter into long-term supply contracts 
(with local companies) 
- Mobilising investment to contribute 
to SD 
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Integrated mine development 
(database/ open cadastre system) 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Competition policies 
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and reporting: 
Accounting rules 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Royalties, taxes, levies and 
rents 
- CSR/ local content and 
local participation 
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Accounting rules 
- Risk management 
Social Instruments 
- Mobilising investment to contribute 
to SD 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Government capacity to develop 
policy and enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent administration & 
partnership 
- Support R&D to promote 
substitution  
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
Institutional Instruments 
- Ensuring relevance and effectiveness 
of development agreements 
- M & E 
- Research and development  
- Mining database systems and 
agencies to promote partnerships 
in exploration 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Training and research 
centres on mining 
- Institutions for mining 
sector governance 
- Fund management and 
administration 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
Source: Table 7.2; Chapter Seven 
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Annex 8.3: South Africa’s Evaluation for the IFRAD Strategy 
 
Annex 8.3a: SWOT Analysis of South Africa’s Mineral Sector 
 
Strengths Opportunities 
• Matured economy with world class mining assets 
in gold, PGMs, chromite, etc. 
• A somewhat robust legal and regulatory 
environment which supports the mining sector. 
• Developed mining infrastructure and significant 
contributions to mining R & D. 
• Opportunities for downstream value addition. 
• New discovery and potential growth in the world 
economy could propel growth in the sector. 
• Opportunities for developing mining R & D 
• Reformed mining sector which is building capacity 
of its skills base. 
• Improved efforts in community development with 
the BBBSEE Mining Charter may improve social 
licence to operate. 
Weaknesses Threats 
• Declining ore grades and greater mine depth for 
economically feasible ores make the cost of 
mining high.  
• Intermittent upheavals by labour makes the sector 
prone to instability and internal shocks. 
• Although the economy is somewhat robust, 
frequent amendments to the mining regime 
heighten mining investment risks.  
• Trust amongst the actors in the sector is weak due 
to stakeholders receiving less of what they deem 
they deserve 
• Threats of losing out on mining investments to 
emerging economies within the region. 
• There is a deficit in highly skilled mining labour.  
• Weak demand and volatile gold prices threaten 
the stability of the sector.  
• Limited development capital for mining due to 
rising risks in the industry and declining 
profitability of the sector. 
Sources: Chamber of Mines- South Africa (2016, 2015); Republic of South Africa (2008); Republic of South Africa-DME (2011, 1998); Republic of 
South Africa-DMR (2010); Republic of South Africa-DTI (2007); Republic of South Africa-Economic Development Department (2010); Republic of 
South Africa-NPC (2012)  
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Annex 8.3b: The Inter-linkages between South Africa’s Development Frameworks and Investment Policies with the Mining Sector 
Elements  
Points of 
Strategic 
Assessment 
Issues 
Comments on the 
Evaluation 
Final 
Evaluation 
Process 1: 
Integrating 
development 
objectives 
with mining  
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: What are 
the country’s express 
development 
objectives as well as 
mining’s (potential) 
objectives’? Have they 
been aligned and has 
mining been 
integrated into the 
national development 
and industrial policies 
and strategies of the 
country? 
Development 
Frameworks: 
Long-term Development Framework: 
National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 
 
The National Development Plan aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. It aims at achieving six 
priorities: 
• Uniting all South Africans around a common programme to achieve prosperity and equity.  
• Promoting active citizenry to strengthen development, democracy and accountability.  
• Bringing about faster economic growth, higher investment and greater labour absorption.  
• Focusing on key capabilities of people and the state.  
• Building a capable and developmental state.  
• Encouraging strong leadership throughout society to work together to solve problems (Republic of South Africa- 
NPC, 2011) 
  
  
  
The NDP priority areas 
focus on fast economic 
growth and higher 
investments. Its 
medium term Strategic 
Framework and the 
IPAP recognise the role 
of mining for South 
Africa’s development. 
Also, the MPRDA aims 
to use the contributions 
from the sector for 
equitable and SD of the 
economy. Hence, the 
overall evaluation for 
South Africa was a ‘yes’   
  
 Yes 
  
  
Mining 
Frameworks: 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA)  
The MPRDA aims to make provisions for equitable access to and sustainable development of the nation's mineral 
and petroleum resources; and to provide for matters connected therewith. (p.2 of the Act). 
 
The objects set the fundamental guiding principles for the Act.  
It recognises its right of PSONR and aims to promote SD and equitable access to the nation's mineral and petroleum 
resources to all the people of South Africa (See Section 2 (a- i) of the MPRDA (2002) 
 
Industrial 
Frameworks: 
National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) 
The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) is premised on implementing the priority sectors of the- of the NDP is hedged 
on the NIPF. The core areas of the policy (2017- 2020) are: inclusive growth, empowerment, diversification, 
localisation; investment in value-adding manufacture, export & labour-intensive economic sectors. 
Investment 
Frameworks: 
 MPRDA and Protection of Investment Act (PIA), 2015  
A different regime (MPRDA) applies to mining investment generally. However, with the nullifying of BITs and IIA, 
the PIA no. 22 of 2015 also applies.  
 
The purpose of the PIA is to: 
• Protect investment in accordance with and subject to the Constitution, in a manner which balances the public 
interest and the rights and obligations of investors;  
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• Affirm the Republic’s sovereign right to regulate investments in the public interest;  
• Conﬁrm the Bill of Rights in the Constitution and the laws that apply to all investors and their investments in the 
Republic (section 4 of the PIA)  
Process 2: 
Resource 
potential  
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: Is there a 
national inventory 
that maps the 
economic potential of 
the mineral resource? 
Have governments set 
targets on acquiring 
information on the 
demonstrated mineral 
resources that is 
within its’ jurisdiction, 
and are there on-
going projects 
(government-led, 
private exploration 
(joint venture-ship 
with governments) 
and or regional-based, 
aimed at building the 
geological information 
of mineral ore bodies 
in the country? 
Institutions, 
programmes 
and projects 
by 
government 
and other 
partners 
The Council for Geoscience (CGS) provides many services on minerology but with a basic function of geologically 
mapping South Africa’s minerals. It was established under “The Geoscience Act, Act No. 100 of 1993”. There are a 
number of projects on-going by the CGS in partnership with other agencies and sectors.  
 
For mining, the CGS provide services such as: 
 
Minerals Development 
Mapping and sampling of ore deposits 
Mineralogical and physical characterisation 
Mineral-commodity reports and maps for specific purposes 
Assistance to small-scale miners 
Industrial minerals 
Maintenance of the COREDATA and COAL databases 
Maintenance of the SAMINDABA mineral-deposits database 
From the publications 
and geological data 
available from their 
website. It was 
observed that in terms 
of knowledge of the 
resources and reserves 
of minerals, the CGS 
have data for South 
Africa. Hence, the final 
evaluation was a ‘yes’. 
Yes  
Process 3: 
Type of 
mining 
investment 
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: What 
types of mineral 
investments exist and 
is the investment 
regime competitive? 
How are current 
mining investment 
(development) 
agreements 
structured? What new 
(potential) and current 
risks have affected the 
regime and how has it 
Types of 
mineral 
investments 
and is the 
regime 
competitive? 
PIA guides South Africa’s environment and upholds five of the six core tenets of investment protection. According 
to investment policy hub and the ECA (2016), South Africa-  has over 46 BITs signed with foreign governments 
within and outside of Africa. The new PIA currently regulates all signed contract with investors. (See UNCTAD, 2017) 
at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/195) 
 
In terms of the competitiveness of the regime, the CIF (see Table 8.2, of Chapter Eight) did show that the economy 
is competitive vis-à-vis the global environment. 
 
In terms of the 
competitiveness of the 
regime and structure of 
investments, it was 
concluded from the CIF 
that South Africa 
remains a competitive 
economy and an 
attractive destination 
for FDIs. It remains a 
stable regime despite 
the downgrade by 
Moody. Thus, receiving 
the evaluation of 
‘competitive’. 
Competitive  
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affected mining 
investments? 
Process 4: 
Mining 
sector 
linkages 
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: Have 
effective safeguards 
been established in 
the legislative 
framework to support 
mining sector 
agencies? In terms of 
building critical mining 
sector linkages, is the 
economy’s local 
content and CSR 
policies well 
integrated with its 
fiscal policy?  
The focus is 
on LC and 
CSR and 
institutions 
that support 
mineral 
sector 
linkages and 
governance 
Here the emphasis was the on the Broad-Based Black Socio-Economic Mining Charter. As a pacesetter, the Mining 
Charter (2004) and it’s 2010 & 2017 amendments under Act. (100) sections (1) and (2) laid the foundation for a 
local content strategy for equitable access and the SED of the sector. The Charter sets targets and benchmarks on 
(10) core issues of (ownership, beneficiation, employment equity, human resource development, mining 
community development, local procurement and enterprise development, housing and living conditions, SD and 
growth of the industry and reporting aimed at compliance) within the three components of sustainable 
development for the mining industry.  
 
The Charter has stipulations which cover the local content instruments and aims to empower those that were 
disadvantaged under the former apartheid regime. Thus far, there have been three renditions (2004; 2010; 2017). 
This is administered by the DMR in partnership with prominent stakeholders such as the Chamber of Mines.  
 
The third rendition of the charter has come under heavy criticism (see arguments by Leon, Leyden, and Müller, 
2017; Matthew, 2017). Some of the uncertainty lay in the ownership targets and its inter-linkages with the 
Beneficiation Strategy (launched in 2011) for miners. For the new Charter III, the requirements would need further 
deliberation with industry players and all stakeholders, to ensure that all parties agree on the way forward with 
amending the new requirements, particularly where uncertainty exists.  
 
Based on the evaluation of the regime, the elements and their evaluation for sector linkages are presented as 
follows: 
 
Institutional Framework 
Agencies (Support Mining Investments) (Yes) 
Agencies (Monitoring and Compliance) (Yes) 
Agencies Responsible for Managing Mineral Revenues (Yes)
  
Social 
Local Content (Yes) 
CSR Policy and guidelines (Yes) 
 
Environment 
Environmental law and due diligence (Yes) 
Health and Safety (yes) 
For South Africa in this 
case, the Mining 
Charter is a strong LC 
instrument with 
stakeholder buy-in. 
Hence, it was evaluated 
with a ‘yes’ 
Yes 
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Process 5: 
Managing 
investment 
portfolio 
Point of Strategic 
Assessment: 
Considering the 
current level of 
development of the 
economy, are there 
established 
transparent 
institutional processes 
and mechanisms to 
set up a fund? 
 Institutional 
Mechanisms 
for managing 
a fund 
The regime has the enabling environment and institutions to manage a wealth fund should it so decide. The 
Department of Mineral Resources, Department of Trade and Industry, Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs), Trade 
and Investment South Africa, and the South African Reserve Bank are in a position to manage such a fund.  
The general evaluation 
here was a ‘yes’ 
because of the 
existence of institutions 
to manage a fund. 
Additionally, there have 
been direct 
investments into the 
economy. 
Yes  
Existence of a wealth fund. 
In terms of existence of 
a wealth fund, 
discussion in Chapter 
Four revealed that 
none exists for mineral 
resources. 
No 
Sources: Republic of South Africa (2015, 2015, 2002, 1998); Republic of South Africa-DMR (2010, 2010, 2010, 2004); Republic of South Africa-DTI 
(2016, 2007); Republic of South Africa-Economic Development Department (2011, 2010, 2010); Republic of South Africa-NPC (2012) 
*The elements within the Social Labour Plans and guidelines for mining were not included in the general analysis since the focus was on main mining and development 
frameworks and legislation.   
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Annex 8.3c: South Africa’s Policy Instruments for Operationalising the IFRAD Strategy 
Instruments Process 4 Process 5 
Legal/ Regulatory 
Instruments 
- Realistic downstream processing requirements 
- Environmental management 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially for revenues and the mining 
Law 
- Act to regulate the management of the fund 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially for revenues 
Economic/ Financial 
Instruments 
- Prolonging mine life  
- Realistic downstream processing requirements 
(beneficiation) 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Royalties, taxes, levies and rents 
- Mobilising investment to contribute to SD 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially for revenues 
- Risk management 
Social Instruments 
- Government capacity to develop policy and enforce 
rules, i.e. Competent administration 
- Prolonging mine life  
- Encourage exploration 
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Mobilising investment to contribute to SD 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially for revenues 
Institutional Instruments 
- Ensuring relevance and effectiveness of mining 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially for revenues 
- Training and research centres on Mining 
- Ensuring relevance and effectiveness of mining 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially for revenues 
- Fund management and administration 
Source: Table 7.2; Chapter Seven 
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Annex 8.4: Tanzania’s Evaluation for the IFRAD Strategy 
 
Annex 8.4a: SWOT Analysis of Tanzania’s Mineral Sector 
 
Strengths Opportunities 
• Tanzania has world class mineral assets not only in 
gold but in uranium, oil and gas of which about 
90% of the resources have been geographically 
mapped. 
• Its fiscal regime is competitive in comparison with 
other global gold mining players. 
• A peaceful socio-political environment and 
increasing mindfulness for the rule of law. 
• Many incentives to promote private capital 
(investments) in exploration in the mining sector. 
• New discoveries in uranium and oil and gas 
makes it potentially a mining power house. 
• Its liberalised development agenda has led to 
legal support through mining legislation and its 
industrialisation policies. 
• A focus on the competitiveness and resilience of 
its economy means that investors in mining have 
preferential treatment. 
Weaknesses Threats 
• Mining sector is weakly linked with other sectors 
of the economy. 
• The high dependence on foreign private capital by 
a few source countries (i.e. South Africa, Britain 
and Canada) leave the sector susceptible to 
external shocks. 
• Weak capacity of the mining administrators to 
effectively monitor the sector from exploration to 
pre-fabrication.  
• Inadequate mining infrastructure, particularly 
energy may result in the loss of mining 
investments. 
• Threat of losing mining investments to other 
countries within the Eastern African region.  
• Mining skills and labour gap in Tanzania. 
• Changes to the fiscal regime (i.e. ban of 
unprocessed concentrates) may lead to flight of 
foreign capital. 
• Weak demand from China and India can make 
mines unprofitable. 
Sources: The United Republic of Tanzania (2008, 2015), Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency- TMAA (2015, 2016) 
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Annex 8.4b: The Inter-linkages between Tanzania’s Development Frameworks and Investment Policies with the Mining Sector 
Elements  
Points of 
Strategic 
Assessment 
Issues 
Comments on 
the Evaluation 
Final 
Evaluation 
Process 1: 
Integrating 
development 
objectives 
with mining  
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: What are 
the country’s express 
development 
objectives as well as 
mining’s (potential) 
objectives’? Have they 
been aligned and has 
mining been 
integrated into the 
national development 
and industrial policies 
and strategies of the 
country? 
Development 
Frameworks: 
Long-term Development Framework: 
Tanzania’s Development Vision (TDV) 2025  
The TDV is premised on a good quality life, good governance and rule of law and a competitive economy. It sets 
out the development agenda for the country with its medium-term frameworks (the National Strategy for 
Poverty Reduction) known as MKUKUTA I & II. These have been framed to meet the development obligations 
indicated in the TDV 2025.  
 
The link between its mining policy and development vision 2025 has also been acknowledged with the Ministry 
of Energy and Mines (MEM) contending that both the policy and law seek to ensure an “effective minerals 
sector, contributing significantly to the acceleration of socio-economic development through SD and utilisation 
of mineral resources in Tanzania by 2025” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2015b, p.26). 
 
Medium-term Development Frameworks: 
The National Strategy for Poverty Reduction) known as MKUKUTA I & II was framed to meet the TDV 2025.  
 
The Five-Year Development Plan (FYDP) I and II. The FYDP II (2016/17- 2020/21) aims at developing a 
competitive economy and to catapult Tanzania into a middle-income country. It was launched as a vehicle to 
transition the TDVs long term plan to recognise the role that mining plays in the development of the economy. 
The fundamental considerations in the second FYD (2016/17- 2020/21) incorporates mining and hence has 
designed interventions to improving value addition, skills development and training and the fiscal regime to 
gain more benefit from mining. 
 
 
 The link between its 
mining frameworks 
and development 
frameworks have 
been established. 
Hence, it was 
evaluated with ‘yes’.  
  
 Yes 
  
  
Mining 
Frameworks: 
The Mining Act of Tanzania, Act. No.14 of 2010 
The principles of the Act are captured in its mining policy. The MEM suggests that the law and policy seek to 
ensure an “effective minerals sector, contributing significantly to the acceleration of socio-economic 
development through SD and utilisation of mineral resources in Tanzania by 2025” (MEM, 2015: Investment 
Guide of Tanzania, p.26). The policy sets the goals for developing the sector, the ASM sector, exploitation of 
minerals, value addition and building local content of the economy.  
Industrial 
Frameworks: 
Sustainable Industrial Development Policy for Tanzania (SIDP 2020) 
The SIDP was the replacement to the basic industrial policy of the 1970s. Crafted in 1996, it was to liberalise 
the economy by building the capacities of the productive and manufacturing sectors, such as agriculture and 
mining for growth.  
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Tanzania's Integrated Industrial Development Strategy (IIDS) 2025 
The IISD aims at creating strategies that will enhance the realisation of the SIDP.  
 
The IIDS 2025 creates a platform to enable Tanzania to industrialise using its natural resources whiles 
concurrently working to achieve the goals in the TDV 2025.  
Investment 
Frameworks: 
The Tanzania Investment Act of 1996.   
 
The effects of the National Investment Promotion Policy in 1996 augmented the minerals sector for three 
reasons: 1) it argued for mechanisms to manage the minerals sector; 2) promote ASM- by establishing the legal 
and institutional mechanisms for regulation; and 3) intervention for competitiveness through encouraging 
investments in exploration, mining and market of miners (The United Republic of Tanzania, 1996). This resulted 
in the liberalised and private sector development approach to its mining and industrial policies. 
 
For the mining sector, the Mining Act, No.14 applies a special regime to mining investors, with contract 
specification in the MDAs stipulated in the Act. 
Process 2: 
Resource 
potential  
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: Is there a 
national inventory 
that maps the 
economic potential of 
the mineral resource? 
Have governments set 
targets on acquiring 
information on the 
demonstrated mineral 
resources that is 
within its’ jurisdiction, 
and are there on-
going projects 
(government-led, 
private exploration 
(joint venture-ship 
with governments) 
and or regional-based, 
aimed at building the 
geological information 
of mineral ore bodies 
in the country? 
Institutions, 
programmes 
and projects by 
government 
and other 
partners 
The Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST) is the government agency mandated to acquire and store geological 
data. The GST asserts that it collects basic data on geological mapping and geo-data management. It provides 
other general services such as mapping and sampling of ore deposits and providing mineralogical and physical 
characterisation of orebodies to the public and private sectors.  
 
From their website, it was stated that many projects are currently on-going with other agencies and 
development partners in the region. However, since targets for building the geological data have not been set 
in the mining regulations, it did not receive a full ‘yes’. 
The evaluation was a 
‘yes/no’ 
Yes/No  
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Process 3: 
Type of 
mining 
investment 
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: What 
types of mineral 
investments exist and 
is the investment 
regime competitive? 
How are current 
mining investment 
(development) 
agreements 
structured? What new 
(potential) and current 
risks have affected the 
regime and how has it 
affected mining 
investments? 
Types of 
mineral 
investments 
and is the 
regime 
competitive? 
 
Tanzania has investment treaties with a number of countries in and outside Africa and with ‘bilateral’ with 
other development partners. The CIF discussed the competitiveness of the regime vis-a-vis global players and 
concluded that the country is competitive. 
 
Although, for IFRAD this is maintained, it must be noted that Tanzania just passed three laws: the Natural 
Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty); the Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and 
Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms); and the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) of 2017 to 
ensure a more favourable regime for the State (See The United Republic of Tanzania 2017b, [a] 2017). These 
laws give the State new powers of control over mining contracts through the PSONR and the power to 
renegotiate already existing contracts agreed in the MDAs. It also aims to change the fiscal regime by 
increasing royalties from 4% to 6% for gold and 5% to 6% for uranium.  
 
Logically, such a drastic regime change could serve as a disincentive to investments into Tanzania and raise 
the risk profile of the country to levels that negate the competitiveness that the country has achieved. 
However, despite the regime change, Tanzania is still rated as a competitive regime. 
Based on the CIF 
assessment and it 
investment 
environment, the 
evaluation for 
Tanzania remains 
competitive to 
attract investments. 
Competitive  
Process 4: 
Mining 
sector 
linkages 
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: Have 
effective safeguards 
been established in 
the legislative 
framework to support 
mining sector 
agencies? In terms of 
building critical mining 
sector linkages, is the 
economy’s local 
content and CSR 
policies well 
integrated with its 
fiscal policy? Have 
government been 
successful in managing 
various risks factors 
which influence 
mining investments? 
The focus is on 
LC and CSR and 
institutions 
that support 
mineral sector 
linkages and 
governance 
The institutional mechanism exists for LC and CSR monitoring.  On HSE and environmental management, 
there are regulations. In the law, Sections 47- 53 of Act 2010 stipulate some form of LC for local economic 
development. But, there is need for government to set local ‘local’ standards and build capacity and 
guidelines for monitoring compliance.  
 
Based on the evaluation of the regime, the elements and their evaluation for sector linkages are presented as 
follows: 
 
Institutional Framework 
Agencies (Support Mining Investments) (Yes) 
Agencies (Monitoring and Compliance) (Yes) 
Agencies Responsible for Managing Mineral Revenues ((Yes) 
 
Social 
Local Content (Yes/No) 
CSR Policy and guidelines (Yes/No) 
 
Environment 
Environmental law and due diligence (Yes) 
Health and Safety (yes) 
For Tanzania, the 
existence of 
institutional 
mechanisms to 
support mining 
sector linkages and 
to an extent having 
some LC instruments 
led to the country 
being positively 
evaluated with a 
‘yes/no’ in some 
instances. 
 
‘Yes/no’ because in 
some cases 
institutional 
mechanism exist but 
no specific regulation 
(especially for local 
content and 
guidelines for 
Yes/No 
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monitoring 
compliance).   
Process 5: 
Managing 
investment 
portfolio 
Point of Strategic 
Assessment: 
Considering the 
current level of 
development of the 
economy, are there 
established 
transparent 
institutional processes 
and mechanisms to 
set up a fund? 
 Institutional 
Mechanisms 
for managing a 
fund 
The regime has the enabling environment and institutions to manage an SED fund. The legal framework to 
support this endeavour exists with the MEM spearheading such an initiative.  
 The general 
evaluation here was 
a ‘yes’ because of the 
existence of the 
stated institutions. 
Additionally, there 
have been direct 
investments into the 
economy from 
mining. 
Yes  
Existence of a wealth fund. 
In terms of existence 
of a wealth fund, 
discussion in Chapter 
Four revealed that 
none exists for 
mineral resources. 
No 
Sources: The United Republic of Tanzania (2008, 2011, 1996); Biashara (1996); The United Republic of Tanzania (2009); United Republic of Tanzania 
(URT) (2010, 2006); The United Republic of Tanzania (1996, 2010, 2015b, 2003); The United Republic of Tanzania- FYDP I (2011); The United 
Republic of Tanzania- FYDP II (2016); UNCTAD (2002)  
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Annex 8.4c: Tanzania’s Policy Instruments for Operationalising the IFRAD Strategy 
Source: Table 7.2; Chapter Seven 
Instruments Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 Process 4 Process 5 
Legal/ Regulatory 
Instruments 
- Good governance & equity 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and 
reporting: Rules/codes 
on the reporting of 
Resources  
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Favourable standards and 
elements in investment 
treaties/ agreements  
- Setting standards for downstream 
processing  
- Environmental management 
- Rules and guidelines for social 
responsibilities in mining 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Fiscal rules 
- Act to regulate the 
management of SED 
fund 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
Economic/ Financial 
Instruments 
- Encourage domestic 
supply through NMP  
- Enter into long-term 
supply contracts (with 
local companies) 
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Integrated mine 
development (database/ 
open cadastre system) 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Trade and tariff policy 
- Competition policies 
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Compliance and reporting: 
Accounting rules 
- Integrated mine development 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Royalties, taxes, levies and rents 
- CSR/ local content and local 
participation 
- Enterprise development 
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Accounting rules 
- Good governance 
- Risk management 
Social Instruments 
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Government capacity to 
develop policy and 
enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent 
administration & 
partnership 
- Support R&D to promote 
substitution  
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Government capacity to 
develop policy and enforce 
rules, i.e. Competent 
administration 
- Government capacity to develop 
policy and enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent administration 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Environmental management and 
health and safety 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
Institutional 
Instruments 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of 
development agreements 
- M & E 
- Research and 
development  
- Mining database 
systems and agencies to 
promote partnerships in 
exploration 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of mining 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Compliance and reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially for 
revenues 
- Training and research centres on 
Mining 
- Institutions for mining sector 
governance 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of mining 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Fund management and 
administration 
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Annex 8.5: The DRC’s Evaluation for the IFRAD Strategy 
 
 
Annex 8.5a: SWOT Analysis of the DRC’s Mineral Sector 
 
Strengths Opportunities 
• DRC has world class mineral assets that are yet to 
be developed.  
• Its geographic location makes it well poised as a 
hub for the integration of Central Africa and the 
development of regional infrastructure.  
• It has a fairly competitive regime in comparison 
with other global developing mining players in the 
region. 
• New discoveries and exploration of the 3Ts (Tin, 
Tungsten and Tantalum) together with other 
associated minerals make the DRC a potential 
mining power house. 
• The fiscal regime is relaxed compared to other 
traditional mining players with many incentives 
available to miners. 
• Significant ASM sector that can be used for rural 
economic transformation 
Weaknesses Threats 
• Inadequate infrastructure, specifically mining 
infrastructure makes the cost of mining high.  
• The socio-political environment is fragile hence a 
significant risk to mining investments.  
• The dependence on foreign capital makes the 
economy also susceptible to external shocks. 
• Weak governance and capacity of the mining 
administrators to monitor the sector.  
• Threat of losing mining investments to other 
players in the region. 
• High illegal ASM activity could threaten the 
stability of DRCs mining regions if not regulated.   
• Limited human capital increases the risk of mining 
investments. 
• For the DRC, China buys 50% of its minerals, thus 
a weak demand can cripple MNCs and the 
economy’s dependence. 
Sources: DRC (2002); DRC- GPRSP 2 (2011); Chamber of Mines- DRC (2016, 2015); AfDB (2017) 
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Annex 8.5b: The Inter-linkages between the DRC’s Development Frameworks and Investment Policies with the Mining Sector 
Elements  
Points of 
Strategic 
Assessment 
Issues 
Comments on the 
Evaluation 
Final 
Evaluation 
Process 1: 
Integrating 
development 
objectives 
with mining  
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: What 
are the country’s 
express 
development 
objectives as well 
as mining’s 
(potential) 
objectives’? Have 
they been aligned 
and has mining 
been integrated 
into the national 
development and 
industrial policies 
and strategies of 
the country? 
Development 
Frameworks: 
Long-term Development Framework: 
The RDC Long-term Development Plan 
 
Medium-term Development Framework 
The Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper I and II  
 The GPRSP II aims to  
• strengthen governance and consolidation of peace;  
• enhance economic diversification, acceleration of growth and employment promotion;  
• improve access to basic social services and building human capital; and  
• provide environmental protection and climate change control (Government of DRC- GPRSP II, 2011). 
 
The PRSP II acknowledges the significance of mining’s contribution to growth and development of the country (see 
pages 40- 61 of the Government of DRC- GPRSP II, 2011).  
 
The challenge of a long-term plan (or mining policy) to frame principles to guide the sector was absent.  
 
National Development Strategy for SMEs (2016) and its Action Plan (2017- 2021) 
 
The government recently launched the SME medium term strategy to promote SMEs and the development of 
sustainable and inclusive growth of the economy. The objectives of the Strategy are premised on: 
i) strengthening the institutional frameworks for SMEs; 
ii) providing support services to SMEs; 
iii) financing; 
iv) training of SMEs; and  
v) providing the necessary market infrastructure for enhancing SME development.  
  
  
  
Based on the identified 
issues, and the fact that 
DRC is currently 
finalising its 
development plan for 
the next five years, it 
was evaluated with 
‘yes/no’. In terms of 
alignment with its 
development vision, 
the GPRSP 2 has 
recognised the need for 
a minerals sector 
strategy (or policy), 
which aims to link its 
development visions 
with the objectives of 
its mining economy.  
  
 Yes/No 
  
  
Mining 
Frameworks: 
Mining Code (Law No. 007/2002)  
The mining code sets the principles and requirements which guides mining investments in the DRC. Due to notable 
challenges such as laxity in the fiscal regime and lack of clear guidelines on the sector linkages, it has been difficult 
to monitor compliance of the regime’s requirements.  
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Investment 
Frameworks: 
The Investment Code of 2002 regulates general investments in the DRC and establishes the National Investment 
Promotion Agency (Agence Nationale pour la Promotion des Investissements- ANAPI) to coordinate mining 
investments in the DRC.  
Process 2: 
Resource 
potential  
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: Is 
there a national 
inventory that 
maps the economic 
potential of the 
mineral resource? 
Have governments 
set targets on 
acquiring 
information on the 
demonstrated 
mineral resources 
that is within its’ 
jurisdiction, and are 
there on-going 
projects 
(government-led, 
private exploration 
(joint venture-ship 
with governments) 
and or regional-
based, aimed at 
building the 
geological 
information of 
mineral ore bodies 
in the country? 
Institutions, 
programmes 
and projects 
by 
government 
and other 
partners 
  
Although the E- & Y (2012) and USGS (2012) provide data on the mineral resources and basic knowledge on reserves 
and resources, as an emerging mineral economy, the DRC is gradually equipping its economy with capacity and 
geological information of its mineral resources.  
 
The PROMINES and the Geology Department work with government agencies to promote the development of 
mining in the economy. It recently validated a new geological map for the DRC to cover the extent of new mineral 
resources. Despite the challenge of data, the DRC has partnered with the World Bank and the EU to build capacity 
of the staff at Promines.   
Limited data to make 
any robust evaluation. 
However, because of 
the existence of mining 
sector agencies, under 
process 2, the DRC was 
evaluated with a 
‘Yes/No’ 
Yes/No 
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Process 3: 
Type of 
mining 
investment 
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: What 
types of mineral 
investments exist 
and is the 
investment regime 
competitive? How 
are current mining 
investment 
(development) 
agreements 
structured? What 
new (potential) and 
current risks have 
affected the regime 
and how has it 
affected mining 
investments? 
Types of 
mineral 
investments 
and is the 
regime 
competitive? 
The DRC’s mining regime remains competitive based on the assessment in CIF.  The CIF discussed the 
competitiveness of the regime vis-à-vis a global player.   
Based on the CIF 
assessment and it 
investment 
environment, the 
evaluation for DRC 
remains competitive to 
attract investments. 
Competitive  
Process 4: 
Mining 
sector 
linkages 
Points of Strategic 
Assessment: Have 
effective 
safeguards been 
established in the 
legislative 
framework to 
support mining 
sector agencies? In 
terms of building 
critical mining 
sector linkages, is 
the economy’s local 
content and CSR 
policies well 
integrated with its 
fiscal policy? Have 
government been 
successful in 
managing various 
risks factors which 
influence mining 
investments? 
The focus is 
on LC and 
CSR and 
institutions 
that support 
mineral 
sector 
linkages and 
governance 
Based on the evaluation of the regime (mining code and mining sector regulations), the elements and their 
evaluation for sector linkages are presented as follows: 
Institutional Framework
  
Agencies (Support Mining Investments) (Yes) 
Agencies (Monitoring and Compliance) (Yes/No) 
Agencies Responsible for Managing Mineral Revenues (Yes) 
 
Social
  
Local Content (No) 
CSR Policy and guidelines (Yes/No) 
 
Environment
  
Environmental law and due diligence (Yes) 
Health and Safety (yes) 
For DRC, the existence 
of some of the 
institutional 
mechanisms to support 
the mining sector led to 
a positive evaluation in 
some cases and ‘no’ in 
others. But, overall, it 
was evaluated with a 
‘yes’.  
Yes 
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Process 5: 
Managing 
investment 
portfolio 
Point of Strategic 
Assessment: 
Considering the 
current level of 
development of the 
economy, are there 
established 
transparent 
institutional 
processes and 
mechanisms to set 
up a fund? 
 Institutional 
Mechanisms 
for managing 
a fund 
The regime has the enabling environment and institutions. PROMINES, Mining Ministry and the Central Bank can 
manage a fund for SED.  But limited by corruption and weak governance. 
The general evaluation 
here was a ‘yes’ 
because of the 
existence of mining 
sector agencies and 
institutions. However, 
administrative 
bottlenecks and lack of 
capacity limit the 
effective functioning of 
such institutions. 
Additionally, there have 
been direct 
investments into the 
economy. 
Yes  
Existence of a wealth fund. 
In terms of existence of 
a wealth fund, 
discussion in Chapter 
Four revealed that 
none exists for mineral 
resources. 
No 
Sources: DRC (2002b, 2002a); DRC- GPRSP 2 (2011); Chamber of Mines- DRC (2015, 2016); DRC- PRSP (2006); DRC-Interim-PRSP (2004) 
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Annex 8.5c: DRC’s Policy Instruments for Operationalising the IFRAD Strategy 
Instruments Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 Process 4 Process 5 
Legal/ Regulatory 
Instruments 
- International (soft) law 
- Trade and tariff policy 
- Competition policies 
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Good governance & 
equity 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and 
reporting: Rules/codes 
on the reporting of 
Resources  
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Favourable standards 
and elements in 
investment treaties/ 
agreements  
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Environmental 
management 
- Social responsibilities 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Fiscal rules 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
Economic/ Financial 
Instruments 
- International (soft) law 
- Mobilising investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- Encourage exploration 
and mine development 
- Mobilising investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Integrated mine 
development (database/ 
open cadastre system) 
- Prolonging mine lives 
- Trade and tariff policy 
- Competition policies 
- Mobilising investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Encourage exploration 
- Compliance and 
reporting: Accounting 
rules 
- Integrated mine 
development 
- Prolonging mine life  
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Royalties, taxes, levies 
and rents 
- CSR/ local content and 
local participation 
- Enterprise 
development 
- Mobilising 
investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Accounting rules 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
- Risk management 
Social Instruments 
- Mobilising investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Prolonging mine life  
- Environmental 
management 
- Social responsibilities 
- Government capacity to 
develop policy and 
enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent 
administration 
- Prolonging mine life  
- Mobilising investment 
to contribute to SD 
- Government capacity 
to develop policy and 
enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent 
administration 
- Government’s capacity 
to develop policy and 
enforce rules, i.e. 
Competent 
administration 
- Integrated mine 
development 
- Prolonging mine life  
- Appropriate ASM rules 
- HSE rules 
- Social responsibilities 
- Mobilising 
investment to 
contribute to SD 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
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Source: Table 7.2; Chapter Seven 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
Instruments 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of mining 
- M & E 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of mining 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, especially 
for revenues 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of mining 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Ensuring relevance and 
effectiveness of mining 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for revenues 
- Training and research 
centres on Mining 
- Institutions for mining 
sector governance 
- Ensuring relevance 
and effectiveness of 
mining 
- Compliance and 
reporting 
- Good governance 
- Transparency, 
especially for 
revenues 
- Fund management 
and administration 
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